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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 The Context 
The 1996 Information Database Directive (“the Database Directive”) grants 
producers exclusive rights to prevent the extraction and/or re-utilization of the 
whole or of a substantial part of the contents of a database for 15 years with 
possible term renewals.1 To qualify for the sui generis right (also referred to 
as “the database right”), a database must display “a substantial investment in 
either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents.”2 In a series 
of four cases involving horseracing and football fixture lists, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) has ruled that database contents, which evidence a 
substantial investment in the creation of data rather than in its obtainment, are 
excluded from protection.3 
 The decision to protect database contents is based on the incentive theory 
of intellectual property. According to this theory, the public goods character-
istics of intellectual property mean its price approaches zero and there exists 
little economic incentive for production. Legal mechanisms can be used to 
create an incentive so that producers can recoup their investment and make a 
profit.  
 
1. Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on 
the legal protection of databases OJ (L) 77/20, 27/03/1996. 
2. Ibid., Art. 7.1. 
3. See British Horseracing Board Ltd and Others v. William Hill Organization Ltd, ECJ 
case C-203/02, 9 Nov. 2004 (from England); Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Oy Veikkaus 
Ab, ECJ case C-45/02, 09 Nov. 2004 (from Finland); Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Organ-
ismos prognostikon agonon podosfairou AE, ECJ case C-444/02, 09 Nov. 2004 (from 
Greece); and Fixtures Marketing Ltd. v. Svenska Spel AB, ECJ case C-338/02, 09 Nov. 
2004 (from Sweden). 
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 Despite what seems like sound economic reasoning, the European Com-
mission has expressed a willingness to rethink the entire initiative. In its first 
evaluation report written nearly eight years after implementation,4 the Com-
mission states, “The economic impact of the ‘sui generis’ right on database 
production is unproven.”5 It asks, “Is ‘sui generis’ protection therefore neces-
sary for a thriving database industry? The empirical evidence, at this stage, 
casts doubts on this necessity.”6 
 Additional empirical research is necessary to explore whether the lack of 
improvement is a demand or supply side problem.7 But the evidence we do 
have reveals that the number of databases remained the same from 1998 at 
3,092 databases to 2004 at 3,095.8 These figures hide numbers which suggest 
that database production went up to 4,085 in 2001 but dropped after most 
Member States had implemented the Directive.9  
 The unexpected outcome of the Commission’s legislative initiative is 
spawning efforts to revise database protection policy. The Commission itself 
has forwarded the following policy options: (1) repeal the entire Directive, 
(2) withdraw the sui generis right, (3) amend the sui generis right or (4) 
maintain the status quo.  
 It is important to proceed with caution in reformulating current policy, 
however. Like many modern information goods, databases do not fit per-
 
4. Under Article 16.3 of the Directive, the Commission is mandated to evaluate the im-
pact of the Directive three years after the implementation deadline of 1 January 1998, 
and every three years thereafter. Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom met the 
implementation deadline. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland and Spain im-
plemented the Directive during 1998. Italy and the Netherlands implemented it in 
1999, Greece and Portugal in 2000 and Ireland and Luxembourg in 2001. 
5. European Commission, “First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection 
of databases” (Brussels: 12 December 2005), p. 5 (hereinafter The 2005 Evaluation). 
6. Id. 
7. Empirical analysis from a demand side perspective could reveal, for example, that 
there are only so many databases that a particular Member State can absorb, especially 
those in a language with a limited number of speakers. It could also corroborate the 
theory that countries producing in languages with broader global appeal, such as Eng-
lish, may be more successful regardless of the status of legal protection.  
    There could also be supply side explanations. One of the most jarring to the Com-
mission could be that when it comes to database production, economic incentives may 
not provide a meaningful stimulant. Another explanation could be that it is consistency 
of policy that matters regardless of whether or not there is legal protection. Without 
thorough empirical research, such questions are difficult to answer.  
8. European Commission, The 2005 Evaluation, ¶ 1.4. 
9. Id. 
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fectly into the traditional intellectual property paradigms with their more 
finely-tuned balance between production incentives and information access. 
Thus, a danger of overprotection arises which could lead to less, not more, 
production.10 
 The negative effects of overzealous regulation can be compounded in 
several ways. First, the formulation of a new policy is costly. Experience with 
the Database Directive demonstrates that any new initiative will be bound up 
in litigation in order to clarify the nature of the right. Moreover, if perceived 
to be successful, a database protection regime is likely to be replicated in 
other regions and so may have repercussions beyond Europe. The sui generis 
right could also serve as a precedent for the further extension of protection to 
even less deserving subject matter. Such an outcome needs to be seriously 
evaluated. 
1.2 Policy Questions 
The invitation to rethink policy options is a rare opportunity that cannot be 
missed. A number of legal academics have written detailed analyses of the 
database protection regime both from the standpoint of what the law is and 
how it should be interpreted.11 Some have applied economic theory.12 Poli-
 
10. J.H. Reichman, “Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms,” 94 
Columbia Law Review 2432 (Dec. 1994), pp. 2455-65. 
11. See for example Estelle Derclaye, “What is a Database? A Critical Analysis of the 
Definition of a Database in the European Database Directive and Suggestions for an 
International Definition,” Journal of World Intellectual Property 5, no. 1 (Nov. 2002), 
pp. 981-1011; Estelle Derclaye, “Database Sui Generis Right: What is Substantial In-
vestment? A Tentative Definition,” International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law 36, no. 1 (2005), pp. 2-30; Matthias Leistner, “The Legal Protection 
of Telephone Directories Relating to the New Database Maker’s Right,” International 
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 31, no. 7-8 (Nov. 2000), pp. 
950-967; Perttu Virtanen, Database Rights in Safe European Home: The Path to More 
Rigorous Protection of Information (Ph.D., Lappeenranta University of Technology, 
2005), Guido Westkamp, “Protecting Databases Under US and European Law – 
Methodological Approaches to the Protection of Investments Between Unfair Compe-
tition and Intellectual Property Concepts,” International Review of Intellectual Prop-
erty and Competition Law, no. 7 (2003), pp. 772-803. 
12. See Thomas Riis, “Economic Impact of the Protection of Unoriginal Databases in 
Developing Countries and Countries in Transition,” LEFIC Working Paper (Copenha-
gen: Copenhagen Business School Center for Law, Economics and Financial Institu-
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cymakers have benefited from this expertise as well as from the experience of 
Member States in protecting unoriginal database contents ranging from 
sweat-of-the-brow copyright to the Nordic Catalogue Rule to the tort of un-
fair competition. 
 Rather than reiterate these traditional protection models or duplicate the 
fine efforts of other academics, this thesis is an effort to add something new 
to the discussion. Building from the ground up, the author seeks to question 
the basic rationale and theory behind protection of unoriginal database con-
tents in order to determine the best method of regulation.  
 A major contention is that the policy question addressed by the sui generis 
right – that of how to stimulate the production of databases – is not, in fact, 
the correct question to ask. Instead, based on the evidence presented in this 
thesis, it is argued that the most pertinent policy questions are: 
1. What is the best way to provide production incentives for those who need 
it? 
2. What is the best way to provide legal access to materials contained within 
a database? 
These policy questions are variations of the classic debate over how to regu-
late any type of intellectual property. The challenge is to find where the bal-
ance lies.  
1.3 Methodology 
In exploring where the balance should be established, the following factors 
are considered: (1) the specific nature of the database industry, (2) economic 
analysis of the law and (3) the empirical evidence offered by the European 
and US protection regimes.  
 A contention of this thesis is that the nature of the subject matter should be 
taken into account when determining the best way to regulate. Therefore, the 
function of databases is examined with the intention of discovering their 
value to society. Focus is placed on articulating the needs of all stakeholders 
from the perspective of balancing incentives and access.  
 
tions, 2002-3); Mark J. Davison, The Legal Protection of Databases (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
1.4 Delimitations 
 15 
 Armed with an understanding of the uniqueness of the subject matter and 
of its implications for regulation, economic-based theories of intellectual 
property are surveyed in order to further pinpoint the most appropriate policy 
option. The choices represent a spectrum ranging from property rights theory, 
where strong rights are advocated, to commons-based licensing options, 
where free access is promoted. A critical knowledge of these theories enables 
a more intelligent selection of the most appropriate regulation method.  
 Further investigation of possible policy options continues through an 
evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the applicable law. The raw 
materials for this phase of the thesis are the protection regimes in Europe and 
in the United States. The analysis will highlight the regime currently operat-
ing in each region and their effect on production and use. The focus will be 
placed on Europe which arguably includes a realm of no protection similar to 
that in the United States and a realm of strong protection under the database 
right. Lessons learned from 16 years without unoriginal database content 
protection in the United States will be explored to the extent it is relevant to 
Europe.  
 A final evaluation will synthesize the implications of the nature of the 
subject matter, economic analysis of the law and the empirical evidence in 
order to answer the policy questions and to establish the correct balance. This 
determination will be employed to evaluate the following two policy options: 
(1) the two intertwining regimes currently operating in Europe and (2) 
amendments to the relevant European law. The evaluation will be conducted 
by comparing the costs and benefits of each alternative and its impact on the 
balance between incentives and access. It is hoped that the outcome will be 
the most appropriate policy option.  
1.4 Delimitations 
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the impact of the database right on the 
protection of unoriginal database contents and to formulate amendments to 
improve its effectiveness. There is no discussion of copyright of the structure 
and arrangement, also harmonized under the Directive, because it is generally 
considered less problematic.  
 In contrast, the database right continues to be controversial. It is a legisla-
tive innovation with no legal precedent. Confusion as to its interpretation has 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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resulted in four cases decided by the ECJ.13 Its lack of clarity continues to 
challenge policymakers, judges and academics. The empirical evidence on 
the impact of the right is also less than convincing. That is why basic ques-
tions are still being contemplated as to whether the right is effective and 
whether it should be revised.  
 The database right is contained in a European Community Directive. As a 
result, the analysis concentrates on law at the European level. National trans-
positions of the law and the national case law are not discussed.  
 Since there exists no comparable right in the United States, that regime is 
explored to the extent that it provides insight on the situation in Europe. Two 
legal phenomenon are worthy of investigation. The first is the impact of tech-
nological protection measures and their enforcement. The second is contrac-
tual provisions, valid in some jurisdictions, which can override copyright and 
prevent copying. The implications of these developments are highlighted in 
order to avoid similar occurrences in Europe.  
 Other legal mechanisms in the United States are not analyzed simply be-
cause they lack relevance within the European context. Examples include 
trespass to chattels, US anti-trust law and the “hot news” tort of misappro-
priation. Trespass to chattels is a concept emanating from property law which 
can be used in some jurisdictions to prevent the re-use of database contents.14 
This mechanism is not likely to be employed in Europe simply because it is 
not a widespread practice to import property rules from case law in order to 
regulate intellectual property.  
 US anti-trust law is more permissive than European competition law. As a 
result, anti-trust law is not generally looked towards as a solution to the lock-
ing-up of database contents. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Ser-
vices Co., which involved a telephone company’s refusal to license the white 
pages of its directory to a regional directory compiler, is a case in point.15 It is 
likely that a refusal to license by a telephone company which possesses mar-
ket power by virtue of a legal monopoly could be embraced by competition 
law under EC rules. It is unclear, however, who would prevail.  
 The tort of misappropriation, which is similar to unfair competition law, 
can be viewed as a possible alternative for database contents protection. 
However, the “hot news” misappropriation cases within the United States 
encompass a specific context of the re-use of information whose value comes 
 
13. See supra, footnote 3.  
14. See eBay v. Bidder’s Edge, 100 F.Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Register.com v. 
Verio, 126 F.Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
15. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
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from its timeliness.16 But the policy in Europe is to pursue database contents 
protection in general. Thus, the “hot news” tort is too narrow. 
 Theoretically, a general right against unfair competition could be adopted 
in Europe to protect database contents. Despite the appealing nature of such a 
solution, it is not discussed in detail for three reasons. The first is that for-
warding a completely new solution would disturb any legal certainty and 
stability that exists. Second, since the legislative intent of the Directive has 
always been to forward an exclusive right, it is impractical to expect that an 
unfair competition regime will be pursued. As will be described, however, the 
first draft of the Directive was an exclusive right inspired by unfair competi-
tion principles. Therefore, it is possible to narrow the exclusive rights regime 
so that unfair competition principles continue to influence its interpretation.  
1.5 Justifying Economic Analysis 
Since the primary objective of the Database Directive is economic and the 
database right mirrors a version of the incentive theory, a detailed economic 
analysis of protection is critical to any evaluation. Yet the use of economic 
analysis of the law is controversial. This is because the goals of a legal sys-
tem extend beyond the need for efficiency. Most troubling, economic analysis 
ignores distributive justice, the promotion of democracy and service of the 
greater public interest. Unlike in a business setting, the application of eco-
nomic principles to legal decision making does not provide the kind of direct 
feedback needed for readjustment.17 A failed economic policy for a specific 
issue does not bankrupt a nation. It can bankrupt a company. 
 But economic analysis can be helpful for understanding policy issues that 
are primarily economic in nature. Because the focus is on the general welfare 
of society, it can provide perspective to policymakers who may be caught up 
in legal details or who may be vulnerable to well-funded lobbyists. In addi-
tion, economic analysis can prove helpful in cutting through complicated 
issues to reveal their contradictions. Enlightening conclusions can emerge 
simply by comparing the costs and benefits of various policy options. 
 Even though it may be argued that economic analysis does not generally 
apply to the law, the fact is that economic principles have found their way 
 
16. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); National Bas-
ketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2nd Cir. 1997). 
17. Paul Newman, ed., “Posner, Richard Allen,” Palgrave Dictionary of Law and Eco-
nomics, vol. 3, (London: MacMillan Reference Limited, 1998), pp. 55-62. 
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into both policymaking and judicial decision making. The Database Directive 
is a prime example. Not only can economic reasoning be found in the Direc-
tive itself, but it is also evident in national court decisions interpreting the 
Directive.18  
 In what could be a misapplication of economic analysis, the trend is to 
treat information as property. This tendency emanates from the United States 
where law and economics is an established field, but it is seeping into the 
European continent. For example, EC documents in Danish now translate 
directly the English term “intellectual property” rather than using the term 
“intangible rights,” which is the correct term under Danish national law. As 
the concept of information as property spreads, an economic perspective is 
particularly needed to evaluate this trend and to understand its implications.  
 Words of caution are in order, however. Economic analysis can be mis-
leading because economists may hide their most basic assumptions in com-
plicated economic terms or mathematical equations. In understanding any 
theory, then, it is important to tease out basic assumptions. Moreover, eco-
nomic principles can be applied in a vacuum without reference to empirical 
analysis of the subject matter being regulated. Any policy conclusions ought 
to incorporate the nature of the subject matter and empirical evidence back 
into the equation. 
1.6 Chapter Descriptions 
Chapter 2 begins with a critical analysis of the subject matter. The assump-
tion is that the type of intellectual property to be regulated should be taken 
into account. It is posited that databases function as resource tools which aid 
in the understanding, analysis and transformation of information. A database 
is thus different from a book. Whereas a book is an example of information, 
knowledge and culture, a database is a storage, processing and retrieval tool 
that aids in accessing that book and all other works. A database is thus more 
like the Internet than a creative work. Both are tools that facilitate informa-
tion use. 
 Following the description of the function of a database, strategies of pro-
duction and of use are explored. A sampling of models exposes the extent of 
access needed to create databases. The analysis reveals that the re-use of 
 
18. See for example Derclaye, “Database Sui Generis Right: What is a Substantial Invest-
ment?,” p. 19. 
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information is particularly important within the context of the industry. 
Therefore, it is suggested that any policy regulation should incorporate the 
interests of three types of stakeholders instead of two: producers, re-users and 
consumers.  
 Producers are defined as the first to obtain data and compile it into a data-
base. Re-users are secondary users who intend to transform the original con-
tents for another productive purpose. That could be to create value-added 
databases or to engage in a productive activity outside the industry. In con-
trast, consumers simply use information for their own personal satisfaction 
for activities that do not lead to further production. The explanation of the 
function of a database and the re-categorization of stakeholder interests mean 
that there should be a focus on expanded access.  
 Chapter 3 introduces theories on the economic analysis of the law in order 
to understand the various regulatory options available. Each theory contains a 
vision of the balance between production incentives and information access 
and of which type of regulatory mechanism is most appropriate. The rationale 
for discussing such a range is that it enables a broader perspective in design-
ing a suitable policy.  
 Several lessons can be drawn from this theoretical journey. The first is that 
the popular notion of “the more protection, the more production,” as illus-
trated by the example of Goldstein’s celestial jukebox, may not be viable in 
reality. Instead, Landes and Posner reveal that the highest production levels 
and the greatest social welfare can only be achieved through the provision of 
access. Their research thus supports the need to balance incentives with ac-
cess in formulating a regulatory policy. Due to the importance of re-use in the 
database industry, it is suggested that the optimal level of protection may be 
lower for databases than for copyrighted works. 
 Frischmann and Lemley point out, however, that supply-side economic 
models can be woefully misleading when intellectual property functions as a 
generic infrastructural input. To qualify, three criteria must be satisfied. The 
work must be: (1) nonrivalrous, in that many people can exploit it simultane-
ously, (2) an input upon which others can build and (3) generic or used as a 
building block for the production of a wide variety of goods and services. In 
such cases, access assumes such a high priority that regulation should be 
provided in an openly accessible manner, which the authors define as access 
regardless of identity or use. Given the function of a database and its pattern 
of production and use, it is postulated that databases may be generic infra-
structural inputs.  
 Chapter 4 dives straight into the evolution of the Database Directive and 
the subsequent ECJ case law. The goal of this chapter is to elucidate the poli-
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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cymaking process in order to provide the necessary background for a better 
understanding and evaluation of the current law. The legislative initiative 
began as an effort to balance the needs of producers, re-users and consumers. 
However, late in the game, it was transformed into a strong property right and 
provisions granting access were reduced. Nearly seven years after the Direc-
tive was first implemented, however, the ECJ may have restored some of the 
balance by heightening the qualification threshold. 
 The effect is two intertwining protection regimes. Database contents that 
are not protected arguably feature a system similar to that in the United 
States. Those that do qualify are offered a strong right that may, in fact, be 
overprotective. Because re-use is made more difficult, the result may be the 
opposite of what is intended. Instead of encouraging production, it may re-
duce it. Therefore, there is a need to revise the applicable law in order to 
promote more access.  
 Chapter 5 begins with an exploration of the general purpose of the Direc-
tive and the definition of a database. This legal analysis provides further evi-
dence for the argument that a database functions as a generic infrastructure 
input. Next, an interpretation and evaluation of the Directive is provided from 
the perspective of adequately balancing incentives and access. Since it is 
difficult to divorce a discussion of the valid law from possible suggestions for 
its improvement, amendments to the law are also proposed.  
 The chapter ends with a number of suggestions to narrow the database 
right and restore the incentive-access balance. Possible amendments to the 
Directive include: (1) interpreting the qualification threshold and determining 
infringement according to economic criteria, (2) narrowing the scope of the 
right and (3) transforming the rights and obligations of the user to include 
traditional copyright exceptions.19  
 Chapter 6 reviews the US model of no protection for database contents. It 
features a private ordering regime in which the database maker decides upon 
and pays for the type of protection and for enforcement of it. Two main les-
sons can be gleaned. While the lack of certainty in protection may result in 
fewer databases, it could also result in fewer that are dependent on statutory 
protection of database contents. In other words, some compilers may switch 
their model so that free use of content is incorporated. This would stimulate 
re-use and consumer access. It is precisely the effect of re-use on production 
 
19. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmoni-
zation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ 
(L) 167/10, 22 May 2001, Art. 5. 
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that may help explain why database production is currently thriving in the 
United States.  
 There is a catch, however. To the extent that re-users are dependent on 
databases that employ technical measures, that information is likely to be 
priced higher. Less re-use will be made as a result. If technical measures 
become more widespread, the amount of re-use will decline. The implication 
is that information may be locked up even more than under the European 
database right.  
 It is difficult to determine which trend will prevail, if either. Translated 
into the European context, there could be more production within the sector 
of databases that do not qualify for the sui generis right, at least in the short 
run. In the long run, however, policymakers, judges and academics must 
carefully monitor and mediate the tendency towards an information lock-up 
in order to avoid a situation in which there is both less production and less 
access.  
 Chapter 7 wraps up the thesis by synthesizing the conclusions drawn from 
previous chapters in order to answer the policy questions and come up with 
an appropriate model. Based on the evidence provided, it argues that data-
bases should be treated as generic infrastructural inputs. The implication is 
that the balance should be placed on providing minimum incentives and 
maximum access.  
 The effects of the two policy options, the current EC regime and its 
amended version, are then evaluated. A comparative analysis reveals that the 
best way of addressing the policy questions and of striking the appropriate 
balance is to adopt the amended version of the valid law forwarded in Chap-
ter 5. Implementation will result in a regime that adequately protects produc-
ers, grants a healthy amount of access to re-users and satisfies consumer 
needs. By incorporating re-users back into the picture, a vibrant database 
industry and an innovative society can be realized. 
1.7 A Word about Organization and Style 
Because the author of this thesis is grounded in the American legal tradition, 
the organization and writing style are standard American. Thus, the economic 
theory is introduced prior to the descriptive section on the EC and US legal 
regimes. The rationale for such an ordering is that the theory can form a 
prism through which to view, understand and evaluate the currently operating 
regimes. Moreover, the thesis is written in a narrative style. This is meant for 
easier understanding and communication to everyone, not just to the aca-
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 22 
demic community. If some of the words seem strangely spelled or the gram-
mar slightly off, it is because the operating language is American English. In 
the spirit of professional publications in the United States, the Chicago Ma-





20. The Chicago Manuel of Style, 15th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
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2.1 Introduction: The Database Revolution 
Innovation is not the invention of the extraordinary. It is the achievement of 
progressive incremental change. One business executive may strike gold by 
astute observation and the most efficient adjustment of an established busi-
ness method. Another may identify the right product from abroad and suc-
cessfully introduce it to a new region. In fact, many of society’s major 
achievements are not derived out of thin air, but are based on the work of 
others.  
 In the information society, databases are important tools that contain the 
basic building blocks from which new knowledge can be developed. They 
enable the comprehensive collection of logically related material that can be 
easily accessed, searched, analyzed and transformed. Every hour, thousands 
of people are consulting thousands of databases. Academics use research, 
industry and news databases to conduct studies, develop new theories and 
distribute their work. Managers tap into databases to determine specifications 
for new products, survey their inventory or keep tabs on markets.  
 Some databases are absolutely necessary for the smooth running of soci-
ety. These include financial compilations featuring stock market quotes, 
criminal registries used by international law enforcement and collections of 
raw data needed to forecast the weather. Some aid private business and are 
for commercial use, such as product catalogs or sports fixture lists.1 Still 
others are critical to the development and exchange of scientific information 
necessary for innovation. 
 
1. See Thomas Riis, “Economic Impact of the Protection of Unoriginal Databases in 
Developing Countries and Countries in Transition,” LEFIC Working Paper (Copenha-
gen: Copenhagen Business School Center for Law, Economics and Financial Institu-
tions, 2002-3), pp. 9-14. 
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 So why are databases so essential? Rather than borrow volumes of books 
from multiple libraries, a user can sit at home or the office and instantly ac-
cess extremely comprehensive and constantly updated information. Others 
can do the same thing with the same database at the same time. Instead of 
pouring through tables of contents and indexes, users can search and select 
information that is most relevant to them and construct their own databases.  
 The ability to understand, analyze and transform comprehensive informa-
tion at a lower cost and in less time has multiplied the potential for even more 
sophisticated innovation and knowledge development. One example is the 
publicly-funded Human Genome Project Database created by hundreds of 
scientists worldwide to map every gene in human DNA. A project leader 
described the product’s multiple uses: “It’s a history book – a narrative of the 
journey of our species through time. It’s a shop manual, with an incredibly 
detailed blueprint for building every human cell. And it’s a transformative 
textbook of medicine, with insights that will give health care providers im-
mense new powers to treat, prevent and cure disease."2  
 Yet the history of this essential database also reveals the possible clashes 
that can arise between divergent modes of production. The private company, 
Celera, developed a competing database for which it asserted proprietary 
rights.3 But the company had to compete against the freely available data of 
the publicly-funded project and also had to resist significant public pressure 
asserting that basic scientific information should be free. The battle officially 
ended when the number of Celera’s subscribers dwindled and the company 
donated its contribution to the public benefit.4  
 As the example of the Human Genome Project Database illustrates, there 
are many different modes of database production and of use. In pay-per-use 
databases, the goal is to make a profit. Here, consumers expect to pay for 
access. Databases created by governments can be compiled as a public ser-
vice and distributed for free or sold, though some may feel they have already 
paid for use through their taxes. Scientific or academic databases may be 
developed in a cooperative process of sheer discovery in which the producers 
 
2. Quote from Francis S. Collins, M.D., Ph.D., leader of the Human Genome Project 
since 1993, in “An Overview of the Human Genome Project,” available at http://www. 
genome.gov/12011238 (last visited 9 August 2007). 
3. For example, Celera charged two pharmaceutical companies US $50 million each for 
five years of access. See Nicholas Wade, “The Genome's Combative Entrepreneur,” 
The New York Times, 18 May 1999. 
4. Andrew Pollack, “Celera to Quit Selling Genome Information,” The New York Times, 
27 April 2005. 
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are also the users. To aid in this exchange, such databases often are available 
at little or no cost.  
 The premise of this chapter is that an understanding of the function of 
databases and an appreciation of their modes of production and of use must 
be taken into account when formulating policy. The chapter begins with a 
short summary of basic statistics and a description of the components which 
comprise databases. Next, their function is examined. Based on their inherent 
nature, it is suggested that the purpose of databases is similar to that of the 
Internet. Both are general resource tools which facilitate the understanding, 
analysis and transformation of information.  
 After this discussion, the following models of production strategies and of 
use are explored: commercial, noncommercial, public, commons and con-
sumer. The analysis reveals that the re-use of information assumes a greater 
role within the industry than the standard producer-user model presumed in 
regulatory policy and in the academic literature. Therefore, it is proposed that 
the interests of three categories of stakeholders must be taken into account 
instead of two: producers, re-users and consumers. Based on the function of a 
database and the types of stakeholders involved, the following policy impli-
cation emerges: in order to exploit the full social value of databases, access 
may be more important than some have realized.  
2.2 Database Industry Basics5  
More than 10 years after the introduction of the Database Directive, compre-
hensive figures on the value of the database industry are difficult to find. 
Sector-wide statistics may be hard to isolate simply because databases are 
generated by a range of industries whose businesses comprise a host of other 
activities. Yet, the absence of independent data is counter-intuitive because it 
is the burden of the database maker to prove substantial investment in order 
to gain sui generis protection. Thus, it would seem reasonable to assume that 
such statistics are collected and could be made available to an independent, 
objective source for assembly and analysis.6 
 
5. Unless otherwise noted, the information in this section is from Martha E. Williams, 
“The State of Databases Today: 2004,” Gale Directory of Databases 2004, vol. 1. (De-
troit: Gale Research, 2005).  
6. One reason articulated by database makers as to why such information is difficult to 
find is that investment information is confidential. See European Association of Direc-
tory and Database Publishers, “Consultation on ‘DG Internal Market and Services 
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 Statistics on the revenues of various industries involved in database pro-
duction may be overestimates. For example, the European Federation of 
Magazine Publishers states, “A study by FAEP shows that up to 30 percent of 
costs in this vital sector is invested in building and marketing databases of 
various kinds.”7 It then mentions that these figures are extrapolated from a 
survey conducted in the United Kingdom. A questionnaire from the Database 
Publishers Association reveals that “58% of publishers are producing more 
databases in 2005 than in 2000.”8 Yet it is based on the response of 19 mem-
bers.9  
 Additional statistics are available. According to an industry report by the 
European Association of Directory and Database Publishers, revenue reached 
an estimated nine billion euros in 2005.10 Merely as a source of comparison, 
US government data on directory and mailing list publishers records an esti-
mated 14 billion euros in revenues in 2005.11  
 The US-compiled Gale Directory of Databases has been collecting global 
statistics on databases that stretch back to 1974. Its accuracy has been ques-
tioned by European stakeholders, however. For example, the Software and 
Information Industry Association found eight popular US databases not in-
 
Working Paper – First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of data-
bases’ EADP Contribution,” 12 March 2006, p. 6. According to the Federation of Eu-
ropean Direct and Interactive Marketing, those of its members on the New York Stock 
Exchange are not legally permitted to break down revenues and report on them. FED-
MA, “FEDMA input on the DG MARKET Working Paper – First Evaluation of Di-
rective 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases,” 9 March 2006, p. 2. All stake-
holder opinions are available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/prot-
databases/prot-databases_en.htm (last visited 9 August 2007). 
7. European Federation of Magazine Publishers, “Why the sui generis right must be 
protected and the ‘Database Directive’ should stay,” Brussels, 12 March 2006, p. 3. 
Refer to footnote 6 for availability online. 
8. Data Publishers Association, “Submission from the DPA to the European Commission 
DG Markt [sic] in response to the Working Paper ‘First Evaluation of Directive 96/9 
on the legal protection of databases,’” Brussels, 10 March 1996, p. 3. 
9. Data Publishers Association, “Annual Members Survey 2006,” p. 1. 
10. EADP, “First evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC EADP Contribution,” p. 1. Refer to 
footnote 6 for availability online. 
11. US Census Bureau, 2005 Service Annual Survey: Information Sector Services (Wash-
ington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 1. Available at: http://www.census. 
gov/svsd/www/services/sas/sas_data/sas51.htm (last visited on 18 July 2007). The US 
dollar figure of 19.371 billion was converted to euros on 18 July 2007 when one dollar 
equaled 0.724228 euros. 
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cluded in the Directory.12 Still, its objectivity is less suspect simply because it 
is compiled by an independent source. Even if some of the criticisms are 
valid, the Directory’s data is worth outlining because it provides the best 
picture of global industry development currently available.  
 According to the Gale Directory of Databases, the biggest factor contribut-
ing to the growth of the database industry is the transition from paper to elec-
tronic. From 1975 to 2003, the number of databases worldwide grew from 
301 to 18,214. Western Europe and North America have consistently been 
the two largest producing regions. While Western European production wa-
vered from 24% in 1991 to 34% in 2001 to 26% in 2003, North American 
output dropped from 71% of all databases in 1991 to 68% in 2003.13 Coun-
tries operating more than 100 databases are the United States (8125), England 
(1156), Germany (656), Finland (385), Canada (382), France (286), Australia 
(283), Denmark (242), Norway (227), Sweden (162), Netherlands (160), 
Korea (156), Switzerland (122) and Belgium (121). 
 Worldwide, there are about 4,000 database makers. The dominant type of 
producer has changed over time. Governments created the majority in 1977 at 
56%, but this figure dropped to 11% in 2003. During the same period, com-
mercial manufacturers became dominant, starting at 22% in 1977 and in-
creasing to 78% in 2003. Academic and not-for-profit institutions published 
10% in 2003, while 1% was created through collaboration among different 
producer types. 
 In 2003, the average producer made 4.5 databases. Excluding the 5% with 
a million records or more, most contain an average number of 150,000 re-
cords. The majority are distributed online (59%) or by CD-ROM (30%). The 
rest are placed on diskettes, magnetic tapes, batches or handhelds. 
 Users choose databases according to subject category. In 2003, business 
databases and science/technology/engineering databases each comprised 22% 
of the total produced. Other subject areas included health and life sciences 
 
12. The Software and Information Industry Association, “Comments Submitted by The 
Software and Information Industry Association on the DG Internal Market and Ser-
vices Working Paper First Evaluation of Directive 96/6/EC on the Legal Protection of 
Databases,” (no date), p. 4. Refer to footnote 6 for availability online. 
13. Statistics from the Gale Directory reveal that in Europe during the end of the dot-com 
bubble from 2000 to 2002, database production increased from 30 to 33%. While the 
European Association of Directory and Database Publishers asserts contrary evidence, 
this evidence involves global statistics that do not include Europe. See EADP, “First 
evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC EADP Contribution,” § 1.2.1. Refer to footnote 6 for 
availability online. 
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(15%), general (10%), multidisciplinary academic (9%), law (8%), humani-
ties (6%), social sciences (6%) and news (3%). 
2.3 What Is a Database?  
A typical database comprises three components: (1) the contents, (2) a logical 
schema which describes the contents and the relationships within it and (3) a 
database management system through which one can find, manage and trans-
form data.14 
 The contents can range from unoriginal numbers or facts to copyrighted 
expression to a combination of both. Whereas analog databases are restricted 
by their paper form to writings or pictures, electronic databases can accom-
modate many media including film and sound.  
 A pile of facts or sounds is incomprehensible, however. The purpose of a 
logical schema, then, is to present and interpret the material so that it has 
order and makes sense. Features can include menus with different categories 
and subcategories, links to further information and other organizational tools. 
Once the contents make sense, a database management system in the form of 
a computer program allows for searching, further manipulation and addition.  
 An example of how the components function can be seen by logging on to 
www.aok.dk.15 The website’s contents include listings (names, addresses and 
phone numbers), dates, schedules, reviews, surveys and links. For those who 
cannot speak Danish, the subject matter can be guessed at, but it will be in-
comprehensible. It is as if the logical schema is missing. 
 It is only when one reads the menu options provided in Danish, or 
switches to the English menu options, that this vast collection of materials 
begins to make sense. According to the website, it is the largest Internet city 
guide to Copenhagen. Various search options are provided in order to gather 
enough information to make an educated decision about places to go or things 
to do. A quick perusal of the menu reveals categories such as restaurants, 
cafes and nightlife, music, film, art and shopping. Activities can be found 
 
14. “Database,” from Wikipedia at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Database (last visited May 
2007); Michael Pattison, “The European Commission’s Proposal on the Protection of 
Computer Databases,” European Intellectual Property Review 14, no. 4 (1992), p. 115; 
Perttu Virtanen, “Database Rights In Safe European Home: The Path To More Rigor-
ous Protection of Information,” (Ph.D., Lappenranta University of Technology, 2005), 
pp. 26-37. 
15. http://www.aok.dk/ (last visited 9 August 2007). 
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according to a specific calendar day, type of activity, city location, reputation 
or review. For example, a restaurant can be found through searching by al-
phabetical order, type of food desired, location in the city, user ratings or 
through a combination of categories. Links to a map of the restaurant’s loca-
tion and to the restaurant’s own website, if it exists, are also provided. 
 The production of a database requires conversion of meaningless data into 
something useful – information16 – that can then be understood, analyzed and 
further transformed. It is the value-adding process that is so critical. At the 
level of the data, the process can include selection, verification, updating and 
addition of complementary data.17 At the level of the logical schema, it in-
cludes presentation of the database’s organization. In the Database Directive, 
these are some of the investments that form the basis of database content 
protection. 
2.4 What Is the Function of a Database? 
The function of a database is to facilitate use of the vast amount of informa-
tion available in the modern world. In 2003, for example, it was estimated 
that 167 terabytes of fixed web pages, the equivalent of approximately 323 
billion books, comprised the surface web of the Internet. The deep web of 
database-driven websites that create web pages on demand was estimated to 
be 91,850 terabytes.18 Without the ability to understand, analyze or transform 
this data, it ceases to have meaning.  
 It is the nature of a database – its contents, logical schema and data man-
agement system – that determines its function. Returning to the Copenhagen 
city guide www.aok.dk, it is evident that the pile of facts that it contains is 
incomprehensible in the absence of a logical schema that provides organiza-
tion to the data. Once the contents makes sense, the information can be fur-
ther analyzed through its search mechanism. To find the best Thai restaurant 
in the city, for example, one can read the restaurant reviews, look at the price 
comparisons and consult any applicable customer survey. Based on qualifica-
 
16. Mark J. Davison, The Legal Protection of Databases (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2003), pp. 2, 237-9 and 247-254. 
17. EADP, “First evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC EADP Contribution,” § 1.2.2. Refer to 
footnote 6 for availability online. 
18. University of California at Berkeley School of Information Management and Systems, 
“Executive Summary, How Much Information? 2003,” (27 Oct. 2003), pp. 11-12. 
Bright Planet estimates that the deep web is 400-450 times larger. Id. 
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tions developed by the database user, it is possible to determine and produce 
new information: what is the best Thai restaurant in Copenhagen?  
 The above example illustrates that the function of a database is to facilitate 
the understanding, analysis and transformation of data. It is a tool that facili-
tates information use. Is a database like a book or an invention? No. Simple 
intuitive sense makes this clear. Databases function as tools to make available 
all the culture, knowledge and information in the world. This is in contrast to 
the function of copyrightable subject matter such as a book or a song. A book 
is a specific example or expression of world culture, knowledge or informa-
tion, it is not a tool to facilitate the use of all the world’s culture, knowledge 
and information.  
 A database is also different from a patentable invention. An invention is a 
specific example of a new innovation capable of commercial application. It, 
too, is an application of world knowledge and information. But, unlike a 
database, it is not a tool which facilitates use of all the world’s commercially 
applicable inventions. 
 It is not a leap of faith to state that the whole function of a database is to 
aid in the understanding, analysis and transformation of information. Without 
tools such as databases, information on the World Wide Web would be in-
comprehensible. Thus, a database is more like the Internet than a book or an 
invention. In order to understand, analyze and transform information, access 
is necessary to both of these tools. 
2.5 Incentive and Access Needs of Commercial Producers 
Naturally, companies will only create databases if they can make a profit. 
Differences in the business model affect the type of protection and access that 
is needed. The goal of any regulatory mechanism should be to accommodate 
these different modes of production and of use.  
 Business models range from pay-per-use to freely available content sup-
ported by advertising. The primary investment can be toward ensuring that 
public domain data is comprehensive and timely, that its structure and ar-
rangement is user-friendly and that the search engine is sophisticated. Or it 
can be in adding value to the actual data through verification, enrichment and 
updating. Value can also be provided through repeated re-use of insubstantial 
bits from other databases.  
 The following are examples of different production models used to as-
semble commercial databases. In the absence of any detailed study, it must be 
noted that these descriptions are not comprehensive, but rather represent a 
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sampling. Legal databases, such as Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis, provide one 
example of successful pay-per-use databases.19 They employ price discrimi-
nation to reach a variety of clients. In the United States, law schools are of-
fered discount prices so that students can have unlimited free access. Practic-
ing attorneys, on the other hand, pay according to the type of search (for ex-
ample, key cite, case law or preliminary history), the database used (such as 
all state and federal cases, Supreme Court cases, or California state cases) and 
whether the material is printed out or downloaded.  
 The legal decisions that comprise part of the database are free and in the 
public domain. Yet most US litigation attorneys are happy to pay, and nearly 
exclusively use, the case law sections of these databases. What enables West-
law and Lexis-Nexis to charge more than the cost of dissemination for this 
part of its product?  
 It is the value added that is so important. Unique components include the 
comprehensiveness and timeliness of the materials, the sophisticated structure 
and arrangement and the advancement of the search engine. Although quite 
expensive, these features are likely to save the common law lawyer, who 
charges by a six-minute increment, a tremendous amount of time and money. 
 Take Westlaw as an example. Almost every legal decision in the United 
States, past and present, is on the website. Case law appears shortly after it 
has been decided. Moreover, each decision is organized in a very user-
friendly fashion. Flag symbols signify whether a decision is good law, is 
subject to question or has been overturned. The preliminary history is avail-
able with a click. Key cites are interwoven into the decisions to explain legal 
precedent in detail. The search mechanism is also sophisticated. For example, 
key cite searches can provide a string of decisions on a fine legal point.  
 Since the legal decisions and statutes are available for free, what prevents 
other companies from making similar databases? First, both Westlaw and 
Lexis-Nexis have a reputation for generating a high quality database against 
which it would be difficult for a newcomer to successfully compete. In addi-
tion, the timeliness and comprehensiveness of the materials may be hard to 
match. Unless another company is able to collect and compile all legal deci-
sions as fast as the incumbents, then Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis may have 
some lead time advantage. This is due to the significant cost of tracking and 
gathering case law from all 50 states and 13 federal circuits in a timely fash-
 
19. For Westlaw, see http://www.westlawinternational.com/. For Lexis-Nexis, see http:// 
global.lexisnexis.com/us.  
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ion. That advantage is compounded by the fact that fixed costs may be sub-
stantial and even prohibitive. 
 Clearly it takes significant investment to produce these legal databases. But 
what type of incentive is needed to stimulate their creation? First and foremost, 
technical measures provide an overall form of protection regarding access and 
use. Protection is available for the components that add value to the materials 
and attract a customer base. While the comprehensiveness and timeliness are 
likely safeguarded by lead time, the structure and arrangement are secured by 
copyright, as is the computer program that runs the search engine.  
 Because the value-added components are secure, it is not clear that protec-
tion of the database contents is necessary. In fact, it is a hindrance. When it 
comes to re-use, these companies benefit from the fact that the case law is cre-
ated by government and thus is in the public domain. Any attempts to change 
this would no doubt increase costs. Rather than clamor for protection of data-
base contents, then, these producers may prefer to rely on other methods. 
 For another type of database creator, the primary investment may be to 
add value to the information itself. The news media, for example, contributes 
a significant amount of investigation, analysis and expertise to the informa-
tion they gather and create. While much of the content is copyrightable ex-
pression, the raw data from statistics, tables, surveys, polls and listings is not. 
Information may comprise: (1) pre-edited and unedited current news, (2) 
statistics and tables on sports, finance, and politics, (3) surveys and polls and 
(4) entertainment listings. Databases are also formed from archives, press-
clippings and advertisements.20  
 A variety of business models are employed.21 Due to the competitiveness 
of online news, for example, the contents may be provided for free. Adver-
 
20. See Agence France-Press, “Consultation re DG Internal Market and Services’ First 
Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC (Database Directive),” 20 March 2006; European Al-
liance of New Agencies, “EANA Database Right: European Commission Submission, 
(no date); and The Newspaper Society, Letter to European Commission Unit Head 
Tilman Lueder, 12 March 2006. Refer to footnote 6 for availability online. 
21. Another model is to license information to other companies who will then re-use the 
data to generate their own profits. An example could be up-to-the-minute business, 
sports or political information. It may be bought because it is timely, accurate, of high 
quality and because the media organization has a good reputation. It also may be 
bought simply because it is cheap. Ordinary readers can also be charged a subscription 
rate. But given the plethora of free news online, the information must be specialized 
enough to attract a loyal paying clientele. In a highly competitive environment with 
new challenges posed by the nontraditional media, some media organizations may ar-
gue that selling this unoriginal content is an important income source. 
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tisements are then placed on the company website and income is generated 
based on the number of customers that visit. Readers are attracted to a par-
ticular database because of the organization’s reputation, the type of news 
they cover and their point of view. On some websites, readers are encouraged 
to share what they have read through tools that can be used to send the mate-
rials to others. Presumably, the media can count this sharing as part of their 
statistics for advertisers.  
 In contrast to the legal databases, then, the bulk of the value-added in-
vestment contained on media databases goes straight to the information itself. 
Of course, a sophisticated news database will also feature frequently updated 
and timely information that is easily searchable with a user-friendly structure 
and arrangement.  
 So how precisely is their information vulnerable? Because the contents are 
free, it is unlikely that insubstantial use is considered a threat. In fact, it is 
expected that consumers will share their information. Rather than preventing 
such practices, then, businesses merely need to instill in their customers the 
habit of using the mechanism provided to share so that it is reflected in adver-
tising statistics.  
 The likelihood is, however, that these companies need protection against 
competitors who may take the information and re-sell it as their own or place 
it on their own websites. An appropriate form of protection, then, defends 
against unfair competition by anyone, whether a company or private person, 
that may affect the demand for the original product. 
 Media organizations are also users of databases. In order to engage in 
news reporting without incurring high costs in time and money, it is incum-
bent that information be available for free in some circumstances. Stated one 
news organization, “The BBC would wish to be able to quote from a database 
(for example a directory or website) as part of its normal news reporting or 
programme making, without having to obtain permission to do so. Recent 
examples include a programme about the siting of mobile telephone masts, 
where the relevant information was contained in a table.”22 Naturally, it is 
better not to risk legal action in order to report the news.23  
 The primary investment of publishers of dictionaries, encyclopedias, clas-
sified directories and other compilations is also toward adding value to the 
 
22. The British Broadcasting Corporation, “The BBC’s comments on the Commission’s 
evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases,” 10 Mar. 1996, p. 
1. Refer to footnote 6 for availability online. 
23. For a contrary opinion, see Agence France-Press, “Consultation re First Evaluation of 
Directive 96/9/EC.” Refer to footnote 6 for availability online. 
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information itself. According to the European Association of Directory and 
Database Publishers, “For most telephone directory publishers, the raw data 
obtained from telecommunications operators is not usable in the way it is 
received. Consequently, they have to work on the data, verifying, comple-
menting and modifying it if needed. This transformation, which may result in 
the creation of new data, is the principal object of investment and therefore of 
piracy.”24 Other components, such as the search mechanism or the structure 
and arrangement, tend to be more standardized. This is because the nature of 
the information requires little variation in organization. It is what customers 
expect and are willing to pay for.  
 A profit is made in several ways. One method is to sell industry directories 
or reference sources to businesses or libraries and other customers. It is these 
producers who likely need the most protection for their database contents. In 
contrast to other databases, the information contained is vulnerable not only 
to competitors who may take away the original producer’s market, but also to 
individuals who make unauthorized use of the data rather than pay for it. 
Thus, statutory protection, provided by a general prohibition against unau-
thorized copying, is needed for the contents.  
 Access should also be provided, however, since some database creators 
may re-use information. While some producers may re-use proprietary in-
formation, others may depend on information from the public domain.  
 Lastly, there are commercial database makers which harvest, sort through 
and compile information on other databases. They can be termed databases of 
databases. Examples include www.aok.dk, which provides a city guide to 
Copenhagen, Yahoo! Europe, which serves as a management resource to the 
online world and www.rottentomatoes.com, which is primarily a guide to 
movies. These websites offer a valuable service by helping to sort through 
and link to the plethora of information available online. 
 Claiming to be one of the largest database companies in the world, Yahoo! 
has supplied information to the European Commission on its business 
model.25 By providing most of its information and services for free, the com-
pany is angling to be the default webpage through which a user can manage 
their everyday life. Among the features it offers is a search engine capable of 
perusing 20 billion items, an online dating service with more than 350,000 
 
24. EADP, “First evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC EADP Contribution,” § 3.3. Refer to 
footnote 6 for availability online. 
25. Yahoo! “Comments of Yahoo! Europe on the DG Internal Market and Services Work-
ing Paper on the Database Directive,” (no date). Refer to footnote 6 for availability 
online. 
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personals in Germany and the UK alone, updated news and information on 
numerous topics and free email. 
 Competition may be tough for businesses such as Yahoo!. In making a 
decision about whether to offer a particular resource, the company considers 
commercial viability. Because the bulk of its content is free, an obvious in-
come-generating activity is advertising. In the case of personal ads, the ques-
tion is whether there will be sufficient demand so that the service can be paid 
for by listing fees. In other cases, such as with the search engine, income can 
be gathered through sponsored searches in which companies pay to be in-
cluded. 
 Yahoo! Europe adds value to its database by offering a combination of 
services, from email to news to personal listings. It is dependent on being 
able to harvest information from other databases and is not in need of protec-
tion for database contents. In fact, such protection hinders production. Al-
though websites can place technical measures so that Yahoo! web crawlers 
will not take their information, this does not always occur. As a result, Ya-
hoo! risks being sued in regions where database contents are protected.  
2.6 Information Exchange within the Noncommercial Sector  
Educational and research establishments such as schools, universities, ar-
chives, libraries and research facilities comprise part of the noncommercial 
sector. Within this world, the culture revolves around unrestricted informa-
tion exchange. The ability to conduct activities is often dependent on the 
availability of high quality, but cheap, information. Much of the value of the 
work stretches significantly beyond database production and to the advance-
ment of society economically, politically, scientifically and technologically.  
 Libraries are one example. The primary function of a library is to collect, 
organize and preserve information for research purposes. As the European 
Bureau of Library, Information and Documentation Associations put it, “The 
creation and consultation of databases is nowadays the life-blood of research 
activity.”26 The types of databases produced include catalogues, archives, 
documentation services and metadata registries. 
 Libraries work to fulfill their social task of providing information to the 
public. When it comes to database production, the focus is on maximizing 
 
26. European Bureau of Library, Information and Documentation Associations, “EBLIDA 
Response to the Commission on the evaluation of EU rules on databases,” The Hague, 
9 March 2006, p. 2. Refer to footnote 6 for availability online. 
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access and exchange so that databases can be shared, combined and improved 
for the benefit of researchers. Access to databases is not only important for 
individual borrowers but also for cooperation among libraries and other or-
ganizations that facilitate research.  
 Within the digital environment, opportunities are greatly increased for 
cooperation between libraries to merge local, national, regional and interna-
tional resources. Re-utilization is the cornerstone of such database creation. 
For example, the linking or combining of catalogues mandates re-utilization, 
as does cooperative creation of new databases. If database contents are pro-
tected, the formalities of waivers and the clearing of rights could obstruct this 
process. Similar to some commercial re-users, libraries may risk legal action 
in order to fulfill their mandate.27  
 For research in academia, just as with libraries, the advantages of free 
access form the basis of a culture of exchange. Most academics do not expect 
to make a profit. Instead, they have a public interest in the pursuit of knowl-
edge. A more personal motivation is to establish a reputation and gain recog-
nition. The production of databases is not the mainstay of life. Rather, the 
academic wishes to understand, analyze and transform the information con-
tained within a database in order to produce further research. By making 
presentations at conferences, writing articles and books, and teaching, the 
academic makes a significant contribution to society.  
 Databases can be the direct result of research conducted. Examples are a 
compilation of astronomical data, a collection of the world’s intellectual 
property laws or a directory of economic data on world poverty. Databases 
can also be a byproduct of a research activity that is used to publish empirical 
or theoretical claims to be discussed and tested by others. 
 A hypothetical example of research yielding a database is the results of a 
Ph.D. student’s three-year project on the workings of a rat’s brain. While the 
study is progressing, it could be that the information is not made available to 
the public. Thus, copying by competing researchers is not an issue. At the 
 
27. Cooperation can present problems. The main goal of Electronic Information for Librar-
ies is to ensure that their databases remain open to the public even when incorporated 
into commercial ones. Leverage can be difficult to obtain when negotiating with com-
mercial entities. This library group asserts that a legal right to database contents pro-
vides them with leverage because it makes the information more valuable. However, 
there are likely to be other ways to provide leverage that are more specifically tailored 
to database contents and which have a less damaging effect on general access. See 
Electronic Information for Libraries, “First evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the le-
gal protection of databases,” Brussels, 12 December 2005, 21 and 22. 
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same time, the student is likely to consult other databases to conduct his work 
and to improve his scientific understanding.  
 As soon as the researcher is ready to publish, he will release his data. This 
is because it is in his interest to have other researchers analyze it, compare it 
with their data and test the veracity of its results. The researcher’s reputation 
is dependent on others being able to work with his materials. If the results are 
pathbreaking, he hopes that others will use his work and build upon his data-
set.  
 The equivalent of unauthorized copying within the academic world is 
plagiarizing. That is when someone takes an academic’s work and claims it 
as their own. If someone plagiarizes the Ph.D. student’s database, legal pro-
tection is not the remedy of choice. Rather there is a much stronger social 
mechanism in place. Being found guilty of plagiarism can ruin one’s career 
whether one is an economist or a scientist. This prohibition is much more 
effective in stopping copying than any legal remedy.  
 On the other hand, using other people’s work as opposed to plagiarizing is 
a basic building block of the research process. While there are plenty of lone 
researchers such as our hypothetical Ph.D. student, there are also plenty of 
academics that conduct cooperative research on a local, national or interna-
tional level. In such instances, being able to utilize the work of others as-
sumes heightened importance. Within the world of the noncommercial sector, 
then, free access to information is highly valued. Any attempt to charge for 
use of information could damage the productivity of this sector, prevent co-
operative efforts and thwart societal advancement.  
2.7 Distributing Public Sector Information 
Public databases are built by governments using taxpayer dollars. The infor-
mation ranges from compilations of legislation to directories of local gov-
ernment services to collections of raw scientific data such as the weather. It 
can be critical to the smooth running of society, to the resolution of pressing 
societal issues or to further scientific advancement. Because of the impor-
tance of the information contained, access is a priority. 
 The two main types of dissemination are the open access and the cost 
recovery models.28 Under open access, public information is offered at the 
 
28. See Peter Weiss, Borders in Cyberspace: Conflicting Public Sector Information Poli-
cies and Their Economic Impacts, Summary Report (Washington D.C.: US Depart-
ment of Commerce National Weather Service, Feb. 2002), p. 2 
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cost of distribution. Through the cost-recovery model, a government can 
generate revenue by selling the information in order to pay for the creation of 
the database. While the United States pursues an open access policy, some 
European Member States employ a cost-recovery model.  
 A survey of studies conducted in Europe and the United States reveals, 
“the consensus of recent research is that charging marginal cost of dissemina-
tion for public sector information will lead to optimal economic growth in 
society and will far outweigh the immediate perceived benefits of aggressive 
cost recovery. Open government information policies foster significant, but 
not easily quantifiable, economic benefits to society.”29  
 A report prepared for the European Commission on these two models 
substantiates the diverging effects. The European Community invested 9.5 
billion euros in public sector information which generated an economic value 
added of 68 billion euros. The United States, on the other hand, invested 19 
billion in public sector information which resulted in an economic value 
added of 750 billion euros.30  
 An increase in the number of commercial databases has been a priority 
stretching back to the genesis of the Database Directive. In 1985, for exam-
ple, the Commission noted that it was “essentially public bodies or non-
profit-making learned bodies … which market two thirds of the specialised 
data bases produced in Europe for online access today, whereas in the United 
States 75% of the data bases are provided by the commercial sector.”31  
 Legislation has been passed in order to encourage the re-use of public 
sector information.32 One goal is to facilitate fair competition. Towards this 
end, there exists an upper limit on charging for information based on costs 
and a reasonable return on investment, an obligation to avoid discrimination 
between market players and a prohibition against exclusive arrangements 
under certain circumstances. Databases created by the educational, scientific, 
broadcasting and cultural sectors are not covered.  
 
29. Ibid., p. 16. 
30. Pira International Ltd., “Commercial exploitation of Europe’s public sector informa-
tion Executive Summary,” (Luxembourg: The European Commission Directorate-
General for the Information Society, 20 Sept. 2000), pp. 6-9. 
31. Communication from the Commission to the Council,” Work Programme for Creating 
a Common Information Market,” COM (85) 658 final (Brussels: 29 November 1985),§ 
I.9. 
32. Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 
2003 on the re-use of public sector information, OJ(L) 345, 31/12/2003, pp. 0090-
0096. 
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 Both the open access and the cost-recovery models seem to be viable un-
der the Directive on the Re-use of Public Sector Information. The issue of 
whether or not public databases should be commercialized cannot be resolved 
by this thesis. Still, it is worth noting that selling public information some-
times can be counterproductive. As has been illustrated, public data serves as 
an input for commercial producers such as Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis. Any 
efforts to charge for materials would raise costs. And yet, statutory protection 
through the Database Directive makes public information more valuable and 
so could increase the incentives of Member States to privatize their data-
bases.33 
 The free exchange of public information is also necessary for many cul-
tural, educational and scientific endeavors.34 One report presents the follow-
ing sets of questions in determining whether or not the distribution of scien-
tific data should be privatized: (1) Does the scientific research depend on a 
substantial public investment in facilities that generate the data of interest? If 
the sole purpose of the project is to generate data, its collection, processing 
and distribution are typically most efficiently integrated into the same pro-
gram because it is less costly, (2) Is the scientific research coordinated across 
researchers in different countries? In such instances, the database is often the 
mechanism by which researchers communicate with each other and is the 
sole means of professional exchange. Ensuring that the data is free is an im-
portant part of the project itself, (3) Are the producers of the data also the 
users? If so, it could be counterproductive to privatize the distribution system 
because the costs of administration could be higher than the revenues realized 
and (4) Is the user community large enough to support more than one data 
distributor? If not, then commercialization will allow the data to be supplied 
under monopoly conditions.35 
 As the report mentions, privatization of distribution does not change the 
requirement that data acquisition be publicly funded. Instead, it changes the 
 
33. Riis, “Economic Impact of the Protection of Unoriginal Databases,” p. 14. 
34. UNESCO, “Observations,” presented at WIPO Information Meeting on Intellectual 
Property in Databases, Geneva, 17-19 September 1997; World Meteorological Organi-
zation, “Observations,” presented at WIPO Information Meeting on Intellectual Prop-
erty in Databases, Geneva, 17-19 September 1997.  
35. Committee on Issues in the Transborder Flow of Scientific Data, USA National Com-
mittee for CODATA, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics and Applica-
tions and the National Research Council, “Bits of Power, Issues in Global Access to 
Scientific Data,” (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997), chapter 4. Avail-
able at http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/BitsOfPower/ (last visited 9August 
2007). 
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locus of funding from a situation in which publicly funded entities distribute 
the data to researchers at a low cost to a situation in which the researcher 
becomes a consumer who must buy the data. These two situations are not 
equivalent. In the first, public funding goes to large institutions that can lobby 
for more funding for their research. In the second, funding is directed towards 
the individual researcher. The danger is that the individual will not pull the 
same clout needed to capture the necessary funds for data purchasing.  
2.8 Free Access for Commons-based Production 
Another mode of production that has emerged as a result of the digital revolu-
tion is commons-based production.36 This model features free access, produc-
tion, use and control of resources. It can be described as follows: “The inputs 
and outputs of the process are shared, freely or conditionally, in an institu-
tional form that leaves them equally available for all to use as they choose at 
their individual discretion.”37  
 Just as with scientific research, the culture is based on free exchange: 
“This kind of information production by agents operating on a decentralized, 
nonproprietary model is not completely new. Science is built by many people 
contributing incrementally – not operating on market signals, not being 
handed their research marching orders by a boss – independently deciding 
what to research, bringing their collaboration together and creating science. 
What we see in the networked information economy is a dramatic increase in 
the importance and centrality of information produced in this way.”38 
 But unlike scientific research, it is not only the output that is free. All 
inputs – labor, content and computer resources – are also freely contributed. 
Open source software is the quintessential example of this type of production. 
However, databases are also being created. 
 One success story is Wikipedia, a multilingual, free online encyclopedic 
database.39 When comparing it to the Encyclopedia Britannica, the journal 
Nature declared that “the difference in accuracy was not particularly great.”40 
 
36. For more details on commons-based production see Chapter 3. 
37. Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets 
and Freedom (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 62. 
38. Ibid., p. 63. 
39. http://wikipedia.org/. 
40. Ibid., p. 71, citing J. Giles, “Special Report: Internet Encyclopedias Go Head to Head,” 
Nature, 14 December 2005.  
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The database comprises a collaborative authorship tool which allows contri-
butions and additions by anyone, stores all versions so that all changes are 
clearly visible and allows for revision to prior versions. In the event of a dis-
pute, an elaborate protocol begins with recommendations to take a deep 
breath and a break from the site. It ends with resolving the dispute through an 
arbitration committee which can provide an advocate to help if needed. 
 The authorship tool is complemented by a self-conscious effort at neutral-
ity. Social norms and cohesion are created within Wikipedia, using the fol-
lowing components: “an explicit statement of common purpose, transpar-
ency, and the ability of participants to identify each other’s actions and coun-
teract them.”41 Facilitators strive to promote neutrality, as opposed to objec-
tivity, through an explicit statement of purpose, efforts to represent all points 
of view on a subject and explicit declarations when a particular entry is bi-
ased and needs more work.  
 From the point of view of the most ardent commons producer, all informa-
tion should be free. Whether or not one adheres to this philosophy, it is clear 
that the more access that is created, the more room there is for experimenta-
tion in commons-based database production. 
2.9 Recreating the Offline World for Consumers  
The category of consumers is restricted to those who merely consume the 
information contained in a database but do not make productive use of it. A 
basic desire of those who were born before the digital revolution is to repeat 
the experience they have in the offline world. This would require the ability 
to consult, share and gain free access to certain information available on the 
net. Although the needs are the same for consumers who have grown up 
solely in the digital world, their idea of what is possible may be broader. 
Thus, sharing for a young person may mean sharing with a greater number of 
people and free access may mean access to a broader range of items. Of 
course, this discussion is limited to the needs of consumers for unoriginal 
information contained in databases only. 
 Consultation is the first expectation of the consumer. Activities can range 
from looking up a phone number to copying down addresses to jotting down 
information in order to make educated decisions about purchases. Before the 
Internet, one would usually go to the library to accomplish this. Now it can be 
 
41. Ibid., p. 73. 
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achieved at home. When conducted online, consultation is an active process 
which requires clicking on menus and other organizational tools, conducting 
a search, reading the information and writing it down. The term consultation 
thus means making full use of a database: reading, clicking, searching and 
copying down information. It does not mean permanently copying or trans-
mitting all of its contents. 
 Sometimes a user wishes to replicate the experience of browsing in a book 
store. Anyone can walk in, search for a book on the store’s computer system, 
ask a reference clerk for help and locate it. To make a decision about whether 
or not to borrow the book, a person can pick it up, look through its table of 
contents, and read a section here or there. A similar experience is available 
over the Internet. On www.amazon.co.uk, one can search for a book, read the 
available excerpt, look at customer reviews and receive automated recom-
mendations that may be of interest. This model is often available on data-
bases that sell products – consulting is free, but one must pay for the good.  
 Another consumer expectation is free access to certain tools, services or 
goods available in the virtual world. This could include email accounts, tele-
phone services, general news, computer software and websites that aid in 
searching the web. In addition, most people have located a range of free web-
sites to provide information for their personal use. Such a collection could 
comprise a city guide, a dictionary and a free encyclopedia.  
 Finally, consumers expect to share what they have found with others. This 
can be achieved by sending a link, cutting and pasting the information or by 
emailing a copy. Database owners may prefer some methods over others. 
Cutting and pasting could deprive an owner dependent on advertising of an 
important statistic. While acknowledging the basic need to share, owners 
could encourage consumers to use a particular method that counts for adver-
tising purposes. For example, a news article could be sent to a friend by fill-
ing out a form.  
2.10 Conclusion: Policy Implications  
The exploration in this chapter has revealed that the production and use of 
databases is much more complex than the categories of producer and user 
presuppose. If we merely analyze the commercial sphere, it is evident that 
some models are dependent on content protection, while others require sig-
nificant access and still others operate with a combination of both. The story 
gets even more complicated when consumers, the noncommercial and the 
public sectors are added into the picture.  
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 The problem is that the interests of the producer and of the user are pitted 
against each other in regulation battles, with the result being that one side 
wins over the other. But a more nuanced categorization reveals that these two 
stakeholders can share the same interests. Yahoo! Europe provides an obvi-
ous example. Although a creator of databases, it appears that access is critical 
for production and that protection of contents is not.  
 In an effort to accommodate all modes of production and use, a more nu-
anced categorization is required. These categories are producers, re-users and 
consumers.42 Producers can be defined as the original manufacturers of a 
particular database. They are either the first to create the data or the first to 
gather it from its original source, not from another database. One example is 
those who compile sophisticated business information directly from compa-
nies. Another could be a news organization that provides political statistics 
based on its own research.  
 The protection needs of these companies vary according to their business 
model. Pay-per-use databases using technical measures are likely not to need 
any additional protection at all. Databases that feature a model of free content 
funded by advertising are in need of protection against unfair competition by 
competitors who can include private individuals. Producers who add value to 
the data itself and whose contents are unoriginal are likely to be most vulner-
able. Prevention against the taking of their contents by both competitors and 
consumers may be necessary.  
 Re-users exploit databases for other productive uses. This is a broad cate-
gory. It comprises those who re-use contents in order to make value-added 
databases. Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis are two examples, as is Yahoo! Europe. 
The category also includes those who employ contents for other productive 
activities. Librarians, scientists and academics in the noncommercial sector 
are some examples. 
 The access needs of re-users vary widely. While some commercial re-
users survive by taking repeated insubstantial amounts from a large number 
of databases, others rely on free access to government information. Within 
the noncommercial world, re-use of substantial amounts may be necessary in 
 
42. Other academics have employed different categories. Derclaye has used producers, 
users and the public at large. See Estelle Derclaye, “What is a Database? A Critical 
Analysis of the Definition of a Database in the European Database Directive and Sug-
gestions for an International Definition,” Journal of World Intellectual Property 5, no. 
6 (Nov. 2002), p. 982. Virtanen talks about database makers and the world-at-large. 
See Virtanen, Database Rights in Safe European Home, p. 48. 
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order to achieve research goals. Meanwhile, those who engage in commons 
production rely on completely free content. 
 Lastly, consumers are those who simply use a database for their own con-
sumption rather than transform it into something else. They include every 
private individual who hops onto a database in order to perform an activity to 
satisfy their own personal need. Their access requirements include the ability 
to consult databases, to take insubstantial amounts for their own use and to 
share that information with others. 
 Any statutory protection needs to ensure that consumers continue to re-
ceive access. Such needs must also be prioritized for re-users because their 
activities result in concrete and measurable advancements in society, includ-
ing more databases. In Chapter 3, theories on the balance between production 
incentives and information access will be more thoroughly analyzed. The 
lesson to take from this chapter is that the function of a database, and the re-
categorization of the stakeholders involved, signal a need to focus more on 
access.  
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3.1 Introduction: What Is Our Future? 
The celestial jukebox is a compelling symbol of the potential offered by a 
pay-per-use system. “Like a nickel in the old jukebox, and the punch of a 
button,”1 it is a giant database from which tens of millions of people can 
order their news, entertainment and information from a super receiver which 
combines essential tools such as a TV, DVD player and computer. A con-
sumer who wishes to see the famous Danish movie, “The Celebration,”2 
(“Festen”) can type in the name and a powerful search mechanism will sort 
through hundreds of small databases to pull up all versions. The consumer 
can click on his preference – the original Danish, the dubbed German, the one 
with English subtitles or any other. He can click on his preferred use which 
could include a one-time viewing, monthly rental or a permanent download-
ing with potential for making an additional copy. The fee will be immediately 
debited from his bank account or placed on his monthly bill. The jukebox 
functions just as simply for the commercial producer wishing to make a 
profit. Files can be deposited electronically into the system, labeled with the 
price for each work and for each type of use. 
 A re-user may prefer a more decentralized database. He could be an aca-
demic who seeks to write an article on the authenticity of an early map of 
Europe. Using file-sharing technology offered by a university consortium, he 
can locate and download all articles and maps made available by academics 
and university libraries. When his article is finished, he can open it up for 
 
1. Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox, rev. 
ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 187. 
2. “Festen” is famous because it is an excellent early example of the Danish innovation of 
dogma filmmaking in which the entire film is shot with a hand-held camera. Moreover, 
the plot involves a universal taboo – divulging dark secrets during a family celebration. 
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downloading through the consortium’s file sharing network. The academic 
can also archive it under open-access standards so that those not part of the 
university community can retrieve it. He may even decide to publish it in a 
peer-reviewed journal that is freely available online.  
 Such visions of the future inspire every successful theory on how to regu-
late intellectual property, including databases. The choice is vast. The theo-
ries in this chapter illustrate the full range available, starting with private 
property rights in which maximum production incentives are granted, and 
ending with commons-based licensing in which maximum access is facili-
tated. Not all these theories have official names, and the legal scholars cited 
are mere representatives. However, every one of them suggests a vision of 
what kind of incentive is needed to stimulate production, how much access 
should be granted and which type of regulatory mechanism is appropriate. 
 The goal of this chapter is to understand and critique the existing theories. 
It begins with a basic description of the incentive theory of intellectual prop-
erty and with an economic primer on cost-benefit analysis. Then, each theory 
is described in an objective style. This is followed by a critique in the subse-
quent section. A key point of the analysis is that while the idea that more 
protection results in more production may be appealing in theory, it is not 
viable in reality. An equally important point is that there are economic rea-
sons, not just public interest reasons, to support access. In fact, when intellec-
tual property functions as a generic infrastructural input, it may be best to 
regulate it in an openly accessible manner; that is, access for a price, but re-
gardless of identity or use. Armed with an understanding of these theories 
and the range of policy options available, we can more easily evaluate the 
database protection regimes currently operating in the EC and the US.  
3.2 The Incentive Theory  
A database is a form of intellectual property. Like all other intellectual prop-
erty, it is hard to successfully regulate. According to the incentive theory, 
legal protection is needed to provide an impetus for production. This is be-
cause, similar to a copyrighted or patented work, a database features charac-
teristics of a public good. It is nonexcludable, meaning that no one can pre-
vent other people from using it. It is also nonrivalrous because many people 
can exploit the good simultaneously without depleting it.  
 Nonexcludability can dampen production incentives. In the absence of 
protection, a database maker could have trouble identifying those who do not 
pay for a work and either demanding payment or preventing usage. More-
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over, there may be nothing to prevent competitors from taking the product 
and re-selling it at a lower price so that the original producer loses his market. 
The inability to prevent unauthorized copying, sometimes called free-riding 
or pirating, can prevent a database from being created in the first place.  
 The nonexcludability problem is compounded by the fact that intellectual 
property is also nonrivalrous. Because many people can exploit a work simul-
taneously, economic logic suggests that, in the absence of regulation, prices 
should approach zero. Standard economic theory sets prices at marginal cost, 
which is the amount it takes to make an additional unit.3 But due to nonri-
valry, an additional unit should be priced at the cost of distribution, which 
tends to be low for digital works. The problem is that the marginal cost does 
not reflect the investment needed to produce a database in the first place. If 
the database maker believes he cannot recover this initial investment, called 
fixed costs, and make a profit, he will not produce.4 
 A major assumption is that individuals are motivated by profit. This 
means that no one will invest in intellectual creation unless the expected re-
turn exceeds the costs. A production incentive can be created through the law. 
If database rights are too strong, however, access to information contained 
within the database can be stymied. Thus, the economic logic of nonrivalry 
also demonstrates that it is efficient to allow anyone to use a database be-
cause, in the absence of legal protection, access should be priced at the cost of 
distribution. In fact, modern society relies on access to databases to drive 
much more than database production. Information is used to run such parts of 
our basic infrastructure as global weather prediction systems and international 
criminal investigations, to foster revolutionary developments in science and 
technology, and to stimulate continuous innovation in business.  
 In copyright law, one mechanism used to balance production incentives 
with information access is the idea-expression dichotomy. This principle 
states that ideas, processes, systems and facts remain in the public domain 
and are free to use, but that expressions of such materials are copyrightable. It 
is incorporated into international law through various mechanisms including 
Article 9.2 of TRIPS which states that, “Copyright protection shall extend to 
expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathemati-
 
3. Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle 
River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004), p. 218. 
4. Fixed costs are costs that do not vary with output and that must be paid no matter what. 
Ibid., p. 216. 
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cal concepts as such.”5 The rationale behind this principle is that ideas and 
facts form the basic building blocks of all expressive works and thus should 
remain free in order to promote future creativity. Obtaining a monopoly on an 
idea requires meeting the more stringent qualifications of patent law.  
 Ideas and facts comprise the basic building blocks of much more than 
copyrightable works. Major societal advancements could be jeopardized in 
the absence of the idea-expression dichotomy. If researchers suddenly had to 
pay for Einstein’s theory of relativity, for example, the publicly-financed and 
nonprofit sectors could be effectively priced out of scientific development, 
technological innovation and academic research.6  
 Reaching beyond the idea-expression dichotomy, the fact is that unauthor-
ized copying can be productive, “Uncompensated gains are pervasive and 
universal; our well-being and survival depend on them.”7 Moreover, copying 
can be good for competition, “Freedom to imitate, to copy, is a cornerstone of 
competition and operates to minimize monopoly profits.”8 
 Various institutional mechanisms exist to balance production incentives 
with information access. They include exclusive rights such as copyright or a 
sui generis right, the tort of misappropriation (otherwise known as unfair 
competition) and compulsory licenses. Under an exclusive rights model, a 
limited monopoly is granted so that the database maker can control certain 
aspects of a work, such as reproduction and distribution to the public. No 
transfer of these rights can occur without the owner’s consent. Thus, anyone 
who wants to use the work must negotiate a license at market price. The 
granting of exclusive rights provides an economic incentive by allowing the 
 
5. See also, WIPO Copyright Treaty Art. 2 (20 Dec. 1996); the European Council Direc-
tive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs Art. 
1(2), OJ (L) 122, 17/95/1991 pp. 0042-0046; The 1976 Copyright Act of the United 
States, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
6. See Committee on Issues in the Transborder Flow of Scientific Data, USA National 
Committee for CODATA, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics and Appli-
cations and the National Research Council, “Bits of Power, Issues in Global Access to 
Scientific Data,” (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997). Available at 
http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/BitsOfPower/ (last visited 9August 2007). 
7. Wendy J. Gordon, “On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitution-
ary Impulse,” 78 Virginia Law Review 149, Symposium on the Law and Economics of 
Intellectual Property (Feb. 1992), p. 168, footnote 67 citing John P. Dawson, “The 
Self-Serving Intermeddler,” 87 Harvard Law Review 1409, 1412 (1974). 
8. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual 
Property Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 23. 
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rightholder to charge above marginal price in order to recoup initial invest-
ments and make a profit.  
 The following mechanisms can serve to limit exclusive rights and promote 
access: (1) raising the qualification threshold so that only certain works are 
protected, (2) narrowing the scope by restricting it to particular uses, (3) insti-
tuting exceptions in which no authorization for use is needed, such as for re-
search, teaching or news reporting and (4) ensuring that certain parts of a work 
are always free, such as those that are not within the scope of protection.  
 An exclusive rights regime promises several advantages. Depending on the 
specificity of the rights established, it tends to provide more legal certainty and 
stability. In addition, it offers a direct incentive for production – control over 
certain uses for which the owner can charge. The incentive is generally consid-
ered to be broader than that normally provided under an unfair competition 
regime because it can apply to everyone regardless of use. At the same time, 
access tends to be narrower since it must be specifically carved out of the ex-
clusive right. This does not have to be the case, however. An exclusive rights 
regime also can be narrowly drawn and allow broad access. 
 Other policy options have been proposed for database protection. The first 
is a tort of misappropriation, otherwise known as unfair competition. This 
model protects against competitors so that investment in a product can be 
recouped. The entitlement itself does not provide the producer with the right 
to charge for different kinds of uses as it would in the case of an exclusive 
right. Rather, anyone can use the product without permission. But if that use 
violates the owner’s rights, he can sue to obtain a damage award determined 
by the court. This amount can be viewed as payment for use. 
 The incentive granted is assurance that the original producer can reap 
profits without fear of wholesale copying that would interfere with his market 
potential. However, the maker must find his own means to gain customers 
and make an income by, for example, delivering timely and comprehensive 
data or having a sophisticated search engine.  
 The right can be designed so that infringement occurs when the original 
maker’s market or potential market is clearly hurt. The relationship between 
the parties can be analyzed to see whether the defendant’s product substitutes 
for and therefore is taking away income from the plaintiff. In addition, the 
costs and benefits of the use can be weighed for each party and for the gen-
eral social welfare.9 
 
9. Mark J. Davison, The Legal Protection of Databases (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2003), pp. 37-40. 
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 An advantage of an unfair competition model is that judicial decisions can 
be easily tailored to the specific facts of a case. However, a disadvantage is 
that the scope of the right is less certain and secure. The right is generally 
viewed as narrower than that of an exclusive right and as promoting greater 
access. It is not necessarily the case, however. An unfair competition right 
can feature narrow access and a broad scope that encompasses the acts of 
private individuals as well as commercial competitors.  
 A last policy option is compulsory licensing. This model does not allow 
the rightholder to control use of a work. Instead, a work can be exploited 
without consent but with payment. Some argue that a compulsory license can 
thwart production incentives because one cannot necessarily choose who uses 
the product and at what price. As a result, the price tends to be lower than that 
paid under an exclusive rights regime. The purpose of a compulsory license, 
then, is to guarantee access.  
 Despite a general acceptance of the necessity of legal incentives to en-
courage production, empirical evidence is inconclusive as to whether such 
incentives work and what is the most effective balance. Landes and Posner 
maintain that, “the economic arguments that we make for intellectual prop-
erty protection are not based primarily on a belief that without legal protec-
tion the incentives to create such property would be inadequate. That belief 
cannot be defended confidently on the basis of current knowledge.”10 Indeed, 
empirical and theoretical studies on the book and periodical industry, for 
example, offer evidence that certain sectors could function in the absence of 
copyright law.11 Moreover, an empirical study on the effect of performance 
rights royalties on musicians found that no additional incentives were pro-
vided.12 Lastly, in the area of patent law, it has been shown that an increase in 
 
10. Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property, pp. 9-10. 
11. Arnold Plant, “The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books,” Economica 1, no. 2 
(May 1934), pp. 167-195; Robert M. Hurt and Robert M. Schuchman, “The Economic 
Rationale of Copyright,” American Economic Review 56, no. 2 (1966), pp. 421-432; 
Stephen Breyer, “The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies and Computer Programs,” 84 Harvard Law Review 281 (Dec. 1970), pp. 
281-351; and Stephen Breyer, “Copyright: A Rejoinder,” 20 UCLA Law Review 75 
(1973), pp. 75-83. For contrary opinions, see Barry W. Tyerman, “The Economic Ra-
tionale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer,” 
18 UCLA Law Review 1100 (1970-1), pp. 1100-1125 and Goldstein, Copyright’s 
Highway, pp. 13-20. For a general discussion, see Landes and Posner, The Economic 
Structure of Intellectual Property Law, pp. 41-60. 
12. Ruth Towse, “Copyright and Economic Incentives: An Application to Performers’ 
Rights in the Music Industry,” Kyklos 52, no. 3 (1999), pp. 369-390. 
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patent duration may or may not increase innovation depending on the rela-
tionship between competition and innovation in the particular industry.13 
 Because the veracity of incentive theory is inconclusive and it is impossi-
ble to tell where exactly the balance should lie, various opinions exist on how 
much production incentives are needed and how much access should be 
granted. As a result, the incentive-access balance can be seen as a pendulum 
swinging from maximum incentives on the one side to maximum access on 
the other.  
3.3 An Economic Primer 
The theories described in this chapter incorporate an economic analysis of the 
law in which the goal is to promote efficiency through the maximization of 
social welfare. Efficiency can be defined as the allocation of goods and ser-
vices in which those who are made better off could, at least in theory, com-
pensate those who are made worse off.14 Total social welfare is the sum of 
consumer and producer surplus, or the satisfaction of individual preferences 
achieved through market transactions. For consumers, it amounts to how 
much each individual is better off as a result of buying on the market. For 
producers, it is the amount of income received minus the cost to make each 
additional unit of a product.15  
 In the theoretical world of perfect competition, efficiency occurs auto-
matically. The invisible hand is at work. The price of a good will be set where 
demand equals supply. If there are more goods supplied than demanded, 
producers will lower the price. Consumers will want to buy more if the price 
is reduced. But a lower price also means less profit for producers and some 
may leave the market. This will reduce supply and bring it closer to the quan-
 
13. Vincenzo Denicolò, “Patent Races and Optimal Patent Breadth and Length,” The 
Journal of Industrial Economics 44, no. 3 (Sept. 1996), pp. 249-265. 
14. Pindyck and Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, pp. 583-4. Efficiency is defined in several 
ways. Pareto efficiency is the allocation of goods in which no one can be made better 
off unless someone else is made worse off. Under this definition, gainers have to com-
pensate losers for whatever it would take for them to be indifferent. This is difficult to 
implement. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is more operational. It allows exchanges in which 
there are gainers and losers but requires gainers to gain more than losers lose. In the 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency model, compensation only has to be possible in principle. See 
Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 4th ed. (Boston: London Pear-
son Addison Wesley, 2004), pp. 15-17, 48. 
15. Pindyck and Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, pp. 128, 279. 
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tity demanded. Conversely, if demand is greater than supply, consumers will 
be willing to pay more. Producers will then charge a higher price which will 
attract more producers to make the good because their profit will increase. 
This will bring supply up to the level of demand. When the quantity de-
manded equals the quantity supplied, equilibrium is established. If everyone 
trades in this competitive marketplace, all mutually beneficial exchanges will 
be completed and the resulting allocation of resources will be economically 
efficient. 
 Such a perfectly competitive market depends upon a number of assump-
tions. First, there are so many sellers and buyers that their choices do not 
significantly affect price. Instead, everyone is a price taker. In addition, new 
producers can enter and exit the market at will because there are no barriers. 
Lastly, the goods produced in a particular market are perfect substitutes.16 
Additional assumptions are made at the transaction level. For example, eve-
ryone behaves rationally and has the necessary information so they can 
maximize their own private welfare by making the best choice that con-
straints allow.  
 But the real world is imperfect. Market failures occur when prices do not 
provide proper signals to sellers and buyers, so that the production and con-
sumption of goods and services is inefficiently allocated and total social wel-
fare cannot be achieved. An example of a market failure is a monopoly in 
which the sole producer of a good sets the price higher and makes less of a 
product than he would in a competitive market. The undersupply of nonrival, 
nonexclusive goods, such as intellectual property, is also a market failure. 
Finally, externalities, the effects of a particular transaction on third parties, 
are market failures because the price of a good will be lower than if the cost 
of the externality were incorporated.17  
 Legal regulations can be used to correct such market failures and promote 
efficiency. To determine whether a rule is efficient, the requisite costs and 
benefits are analyzed. If the economic gains are greater than the costs, the 
regulation is desirable. The costs of granting an intellectual property right 
include rent-seeking, transaction costs, monopoly pricing, and enforcement 
costs.18 Reductions in production incentives or in access can also be consid-
ered costs. The main benefits of granting a right are, for the purposes of this 
thesis, production incentives and access. However, reducing any of the costs 
mentioned above can also be viewed as a benefit. 
 
16. Ibid., pp. 8, 262-3. 
17. Ibid., pp. 306, 608-9. 
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 Rent-seeking arises when too many producers pay to achieve an intellec-
tual property right even when that investment exceeds the overall social bene-
fit – for example, lobbying and litigation efforts to expand rights. Rent-
seeking can occur when the amount to be gained from a right is significantly 
higher than what it costs to receive it. It can also signal overprotection. The 
stronger the right, the more profit can be made and hence the greater likeli-
hood of rent-seeking. The tendency is exacerbated when it is apparent that 
greater profits can be generated if competition will be minimal once the right 
is captured. Such could be the case in some database industry sectors due to 
exclusive contracts between database makers and information suppliers and 
due to the market power inherent in certain niche sectors.19  
 Transaction costs are impediments to bargaining that can defeat a transac-
tion. There are many types. If there are too many parties involved, a deal may 
be difficult to conclude. This is one explanation for some of the exceptions 
existing in the Database Directive. For example, the high costs involved in 
identifying and collecting payments provide a rationale for allowing insub-
stantial uses of a database. Another transaction cost occurs when a producer 
refuses to sell at a level acceptable to buyers because he thinks he can get a 
higher price, even though in reality the buyers value the good more highly 
than the seller and the reasonable and economically efficient outcome would 
be a sale. Such a situation could arise if an intellectual property right is over-
protected, allowing a rightholder to engage in monopoly pricing. 
 The aim of intellectual property is to permit the producer to charge above 
marginal cost, which is the cost of producing an additional unit, in order to 
recoup initial investments. An obvious problem in overprotection is that it 
allows prices to rise above the competitive norm and toward monopoly pric-
ing. Such a practice results in less output at higher prices which can decrease 
access and result in demand not being met. This outcome is particularly egre-
gious if a right increases a producer’s inherent market power.20 Market 
power, as distinguished from monopoly pricing, not only results in higher 
prices and less output, but also barriers to entry into the relevant market and 
other anticompetitive practices. 
 Yet another impediment is enforcement costs, that is, practices such as 
technical measures, contract provisions, litigation and other efforts by pro-
 
19. See Davison, The Legal Protection of Databases, pp. 245-6 and Thomas Riis, “Eco-
nomic Impact of the Protection of Unoriginal Databases in Developing Countries and 
Countries in Transition,” LEFIC Working Paper (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business 
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ducers to protect their rights. These costs are particularly high in the case of 
intellectual property because of its nonexclusive nature and the difficulties of 
preventing unauthorized copying and of detecting infringement. 
3.4 Property Rights Theory 
The celestial jukebox described by Paul Goldstein is a property right theo-
rist’s bliss. Society as a whole benefits when the greatest variety of copy-
righted works is produced and consumed at the lowest possible price. Instead 
of posing a threat due to the ease of unauthorized copying, Goldstein asserts 
that the digital technology of the jukebox is capable of achieving total social 
welfare through the perfection of market forces.  
 In his book Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Juke-
box, Goldstein advocates that the best prescription for the market is imple-
mentation of a strong copyright that extends to every consumer use. A term 
originally coined by US President Clinton’s Administration in 1995 for what 
was then called the information superhighway, the celestial jukebox purports 
to enable an ideal functioning of the market.21 It can provide a nearly limit-
less supply of entertainment and information to meet all needs, it can keep 
track of and charge for all uses and preferences, and it can prevent exploita-
tion of a work without payment.  
 Goldstein claims, however, that his prescription is nothing new. The aim 
of copyright law in both Europe and the US has always been to subsume 
production of creative works under the control of market forces. Moreover, 
the idea of extending copyright to every use has its origins in the natural 
rights philosophy underpinning authors’ rights, as well as in the “two hundred 
years of practical intuition and economic analysis” of common law copyright 
in the US and England.22 Adherents to copyright optimism, as Goldstein 
terms it, argue that no damage results in extending copyright to all valuable 
uses and, in fact, that it is unfair not to do so. 
 This pay-per-use system is also a producer’s dream. By facilitating com-
pensation for every use, a potential creator can be assured that fixed costs will 
be covered and thus will be provided with adequate production incentives. 
With the prospect of such compensation, he will also be motivated to manage 
his product by making different versions, allowing a variety of uses or as-
 
21. Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway, p. 184. 
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sembling derivative works according to consumer preference. Even if a pro-
ducer decides not to further develop a work despite clear consumer demand, 
he can license that ability to others.  
 Through its tracking, recording and charging system, the celestial jukebox 
can provide the most precise measure of consumer demand. Such an exact 
record of preferences can help direct investments so that all needs will be 
met. Any unpaid uses will weaken the effectiveness of this demand-signaling 
function and diminish the ability to meet consumer needs. If a copyright 
owner creates a work or licenses production for everything consumers are 
willing to buy, both the supply and demand signals are correct and the market 
is functioning smoothly. When that owner meets all consumer demand and 
gets compensated for it, then society’s desires become his own so that private 
welfare and social welfare become one and the same.  
 The system is equally compelling for consumers. Goldstein explains that 
in the non-digital world, the first sale doctrine, in which the copyrightholder 
does not control distribution of a work once it is sold, means that creative 
works cost more because only one charge can be extracted from them. As a 
result, certain consumers are automatically priced out of the market. But 
when every use can be compensated, Goldstein states, prices will be lower 
and nearly all consumer needs will be met. From his perspective, then, price 
discrimination is not only more efficient but more equitable. A clear conse-
quence of the celestial jukebox, he argues, is sharply decreasing prices due to 
expansion of a worldwide audience combined with decreasing distribution 
costs. Other benefits he describes include a more direct role for artists in the 
production and distribution process, a much more varied cultural milieu, 
enhanced wealth and possibly even greater societal freedom.  
 Goldstein notes that in the past, the economics of cultural production and 
distribution have given intermediaries a central role. But computer technol-
ogy offers artists the opportunity to bypass these commercial enterprises as 
well as to bypass distributors such as libraries and retail stores. Goldstein sees 
a limit to this revolutionary potential, however, simply because it is impossi-
ble for users to sort through the mass of copyrighted works available. Thus, 
book publishers, motion picture producers, radio station operators, art critics 
and their equivalents will still play an important role. 
 One of the clearest benefits, according to Goldstein, will be the emergence 
of a much more varied cultural output. Indeed, the celestial jukebox applied 
internationally spells a larger audience of consumers so that copyright owners 
would have an incentive to offer more niche culture. One possible result ac-
cording to Goldstein is that, “the digital environment of the celestial jukebox 
will dissolve the magic that today makes American entertainment fare pre-
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eminent in world markets.”23 Furthermore, reduced costs of production could 
provide opportunities for developing countries to successfully export their 
culture. In fact, Goldstein asserts a connection between free societies and 
strong intellectual property systems. He quotes the current head of the US 
Copyright Office as saying, “We know, empirically, that strong copyright 
systems are characteristic of relatively free societies.”24 
 The technology of the celestial jukebox could solve the two problems 
caused by nonexcludability: how to control uses of a work and how to pre-
vent unauthorized copying. Yet its technological promise could also be its 
vulnerability. Goldstein disputes that the answer is an ongoing war against 
hacking. Indeed, he finds that solution nearly as radical as the solution that 
information must be free and intellectual property rights eliminated. Accord-
ing to Goldstein, pure reliance on technical measures can weaken copyright, 
which posits a system of balances between incentives and access. It “also 
challenge[s] the more fundamental premise of all forms of intellectual prop-
erty, that property law is a less costly and more efficient mediator between 
owners and users than are fences and laws against tearing down fences.”25  
 Believing that the technological arms race can never be won and that su-
ing consumers for private copying from the home is useless and costly, Gold-
stein places his bet on low prices and the creation of norms. If prices were 
drastically reduced, honest people would simply prefer to buy creative works. 
He quotes one MIT professor who explains, “You’re not putting up a barrier 
to prevent copying but a speed bump that will frustrate people who want to 
copy illegally.”26 One role of copyright, then, is to institute societal norms 
geared towards “principles of restraint and permission”27 that are as effective 
as those that operate for real property. 
 Goldstein proposes the standard test used in economic analysis of the law 
to determine when a new use should be covered under copyright: “except 
where transaction costs – the costs to copyright owners and users of locating 
and negotiating with each other – will defeat the practice.”28 There are excep-
tions, however, where “the very decision to extend copyright into corners 
where transaction costs appear to be insuperably high may galvanize the 
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market forces needed to reduce transaction costs.”29 The creation of collec-
tive rights organizations is one example.30  
 What, then, is the impact of the celestial jukebox on transaction costs? 
Negotiating a license, granting full or partial use of goods and services, and 
monitoring and enforcement can all be achieved at a significantly lower cost: 
the mere click of a button. This means that many statutory exemptions which 
exist precisely to lower transaction costs will be unnecessary. One example is 
the ability to quote from a work. States Goldstein, “Indeed, the economic 
logic of the celestial jukebox, when superimposed on the text of the Copy-
right Act, might produce a law that contains no exemptions from liability at 
all.”31 
 Goldstein offers two prescriptions for copyright in the digital world: “ex-
tend copyright into every corner of economic value” and “choose copyright 
subject matter carefully.”32 First, he advocates that all new uses of copyright-
able subject matter should be incorporated into the law provided that transac-
tion costs are lowered as a result. Chief among these is an extension of copy-
right to private uses, including home audio and videotaping.  
 In the past, argues Goldstein, copyright did not cover private uses due to 
impossibly high transaction costs. But because the celestial jukebox drasti-
cally lowers these costs, it makes sense to extend copyright. Otherwise, states 
Goldstein, copyright owners will lose much of the value of their product. 
Reflecting on past failed legislative efforts, he warns that timeliness is the 
most important factor. “By and large, copyright owners suffer and consumer 
electronics companies benefit any time Congress postpones a decision on 
home copying. As time passes, more and more consumers acquire new copy-
ing equipment and, with it, the expectation of free copying. . . . Ideal, bal-
anced laws that might have been possible within a year or two of a new tech-
nology’s arrival in the marketplace can, five years later, be politically impos-
sible.”33 
 Goldstein’s second recommendation is to eliminate exceptions such as fair 
use, the American equivalent to the statutory exceptions detailed in EC copy-
right law, and substitute a registration process. This will solve the problem 
that copyrights cost nothing to acquire but are expensive to license. He argues 
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that the difficulties in locating the owners, some of whom do not even know 
they have a copyright, can significantly increase costs and may prevent crea-
tive production. In documentary filmmaking, for example, Goldstein notes 
that licenses have to be obtained for hundreds of old sound recordings, radio 
broadcasts and TV footage. Fair use is too unpredictable and narrow to re-
solve such problems. Instead, he suggests the imposition of a requirement of 
registration of intent to use a copyright within a specific time period or else 
the right will be extinguished. A registration system would be better than fair 
use, claims Goldstein, because more works would fall into the public domain. 
In order to pass muster under the Berne Convention, Goldstein recommends 
the implementation of a provision to allow a reasonable royalty for non-
registered works.  
 Goldstein concedes that a robust copyright system does a poor job of re-
distributing wealth. He admits that some exemptions under the law are not an 
attempt to lower transaction costs, but are instead a government decision to 
subsidize certain uses that serve the public interest. States Goldstein, “It 
seems clear that if pay-per-use becomes the dominant means for access to 
information, and if ‘free’ sources of information such as broadcasting and 
public libraries decline in quality and quantity, Congress will need to con-
sider the distributional aspects of its copyright agenda and whether to carve 
out new exemptions, or provide overt subsidies, if the country’s have-nots are 
to continue to receive these goods.”34 
 The second prescription offered by Goldstein asserts that, “adherence to 
copyright’s traditional strictures in the digital marketplace offers the surest 
prospect for the production and consumption of creative work in the widest 
possible variety and at the lowest possible price.”35 Goldstein acknowledges 
that copyright’s originality criterion is intended to balance production incen-
tives of first producers against the needs for re-users to exploit copyrighted 
works. This balance is preserved by both the idea-expression dichotomy and 
its corollary, the fact-expression dichotomy, which states that facts are not 
copyrightable but their expression is.  
 Maintaining the balance between incentives to first creators and access to 
subsequent ones is even more important in the digital environment. Databases 
are just one example. Goldstein supports efforts to rebuff “attempts to annex 
new islands of monopoly” such as the US Supreme Court’s refusal to grant 
copyright protection to the white pages of a telephone book in Feist Publica-
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tions v. Rural Telephone Service.36 However, he asserts that protection under 
US copyright law does not provide adequate incentives because it is too thin 
and because it is only triggered after a database maker has decided to invest. 
Therefore, he suggests, “No one will seriously argue that investment in . . . 
databases does not require some form of intellectual property protection. The 
only question is what form of protection will best serve the general wel-
fare.”37 
 Instead of tainting copyright, Goldstein recommends that any new poten-
tial subject matter should be regulated by a sui generis right that can more 
efficiently guide production innovation levels and be specifically tailored to 
particular technological characteristics. He readily deflects any arguments 
against the use of sui generis protection. One objection is that a narrow focus 
can be self-defeating, as in the example of a regulated technology that be-
comes obsolete. But Goldstein retorts that such legislation can be revised just 
as one would amend the copyright law. Another objection is that a new law 
may actually disrupt investment exactly at the time when certainty is needed 
to encourage production. To this Goldstein answers, “The turbulent history of 
copyright protection for databases and computer software suggests that a sui 
generis law that aims at a desired level of innovation, and takes into account 
the special characteristics of its subject matter, will, however uncertain its 
outcome, outperform a copyright law whose undifferentiated embrace and 
low level of protection are of little benefit.”38 
3.5 Is Property Rights Theory Realistic? 
The powerful vision that fuels property rights theory is that intellectual prop-
erty should be regulated as property. This article of faith derives from 
economist Harold Demsetz who in 1967 argued that the primary function of 
private property rights is to guide incentives to internalize externalities.39 
Under ideal circumstances, externalities are taken into account by contracting 
parties. When they are, the pursuit of private welfare simultaneously achieves 
 
36. Ibid., p. 190. For Goldstein’s discussion of Feist, 499 U.S. 340 (1991), see pp. 197-
198. 
37. Ibid., p. 199. 
38. Id. 
39. Harold Demsetz, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” 57 The American Economic 
Review 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-Ninth Meeting of the American Eco-
nomic Association (May 1967), pp. 347-359. 
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social welfare. When they are not, a market failure results in inefficient re-
source allocation and social welfare is not maximized. 
 An example is the effect of factory smoke on the crops of nearby farmers. 
Smoke becomes an externality if the factory fails to absorb the cost of dam-
age to nearby crops, thus resulting in an overproduction of factory goods that 
is not welfare maximizing. The cost of smoke damage may not be internal-
ized because it would be too difficult to negotiate an agreement due to the 
number of farmers involved. But if, for example, a polluter can buy the right 
to pollute, transaction costs become low and the factory owner can factor in 
the damaging effects of smoke, thus resulting in a lower output that maxi-
mizes social welfare. All it takes is the granting of a property right that can be 
exchanged.40  
 Demsetz posits that the establishment of private property rights is an evo-
lutionary process which emerges when the gains of internalization are larger 
than the costs. Triggering events include advancements in knowledge, tech-
nology and modes of production that result in old property arrangements 
becoming inefficient. He points to the development of private hunting 
grounds among Native American Indians in response to a growing fur trade 
as convincing evidence of the veracity of his theory. Before the fur trade 
emerged, it was costly and unnecessary to consider the effects of hunting on 
others. With the growth of the fur trade and the subsequent increase in hunt-
ing, however, overhunting threatened livelihoods. To conserve this scarce 
resource, Indians established private hunting grounds. 
 Private property rights are the most efficient mode of ownership, accord-
ing to Demsetz, because they lower the costs of exclusion, control and trans-
acting. The fact that an owner can exclude others gives him an incentive to 
invest in and develop his resource. An owner can also control how the prop-
erty is exploited and by whom. In addition, the cost of negotiating an agree-
ment for a particular use is reduced. As a result, an owner tends to use his 
 
40. In 1959, Ronald Coase wrote an article called “The Federal Communications Commis-
sion,” in which he explained how the granting of property rights can eliminate differ-
ences between private and social costs which, at the time, economists thought could 
only be abolished through government intervention. See 2 Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics 1 and further clarification in Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Costs,” 3 
Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1960). In his article, “Toward a Theory of Property 
Rights,” Demsetz sought to explain why such a property rights system evolves. See 
Demsetz, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights II,” 31 Journal of Legal Studies 2 
(June 2002), p. 655. 
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property more efficiently than if the resource were communally or publicly 
owned.  
 The logic of the property rights model is that the full internalization of 
externalities will create near perfect welfare maximization. When it comes to 
intellectual property, the goal is to eliminate all possibilities of free riding and 
to capture every use through the constant expansion of intellectual property 
rights. Armed with Demsetz’ thesis that the drive toward increased property 
rights is a natural evolutionary process, property rights enthusiasts forget that 
expansion only should occur when the benefits exceed the costs. Instead, they 
push for absolute intellectual property rights whatever the cost. At the level of 
policymaking, any incursions on these absolute rights are regarded with skep-
ticism. At the level of the individual work, any use of a work without pay-
ment is stealing. 
 There are many problems with the analogy between intellectual property 
and property. From a moral perspective, it would seem there is a natural right 
to one’s creation and that it is just to obtain the benefits of one’s labor. Yet 
while it may be convincing to argue that a gardener has the sole right to the 
fruits of his labor, such an argument is less persuasive in the area of intellec-
tual property. A more sophisticated understanding of creation reveals that all 
intellectual property, whether creative or inventive, is based upon previous 
works. Shakespeare was successful precisely because he copied well-known 
dramas. The aim of scientific research is to explore, refine and surpass previ-
ous work. Recognizing that all intellectual creation results from understand-
ing, analyzing and transforming past creation erodes the moral persuasiveness 
of property rights theorists.  
 The fact is that intellectual property rights are legal constructs in which the 
balance between access and incentives is constantly being readjusted. Under 
strong exclusive rights, the main arbiter of the incentive-access balance shifts 
from policymakers, who are accountable to the public, to businessmen, who 
are accountable to shareholders. Due to the importance of maintaining access 
for further production, it is not clear that decisions regarding the locus of the 
balance should rest in the hands of those motivated by profit.  
 Even if, theoretically, the granting of absolute property rights can result in 
the satisfaction of all desire, it is not possible in reality. Price differentials 
may not be justifiable to the user and there always will be market segments 
whose needs are not satisfied. The inability to perfect demand signals is fur-
ther compounded because many of the positive benefits of intellectual pro-
duction are undervalued or simply cannot be incorporated into market trans-
actions. As a result, these signals underestimate social value. Furthermore, if 
perfecting demand signals is the true goal, then it can only be achieved in a 
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complete monopoly situation. This is the theoretical opposite of perfect com-
petition. The considerable cost of higher prices, lack of competition, lower 
output and less access is clearly not worth the price. 
 Of course, the purpose of intellectual property rights is to allow the owner 
to charge above marginal cost in order to recoup initial investments. How-
ever, an increased price can result in a loss of access. Not only does this inter-
fere with consumption, but it also blocks the ability of re-users to improve 
upon a work or use it to make additional goods and services that benefit soci-
ety. The stronger the right, the greater the possibility that there will be fewer 
productive uses made of a particular piece of intellectual property.  
 In certain markets, a strong right could help to reinforce inherent market 
power. Examples include databases comprised of price quotations, galactic 
data and other scientific or technical information.41 Although in theory some 
of these database types could be compiled by a re-user, the fact is that the cost 
of compilation and servicing is high and the possibility of commercial exploi-
tation limited. These factors operate as significant barriers to entry because 
realistically no re-user will be able to make a profit. Such an anticompetitive 
effect, which results in still higher prices and lower output, could be exacer-
bated by absolute property rights. 
 Absolute property rights can also result in rent-seeking, as when a number 
of database makers invest to become the first to produce a database knowing 
they will have little competition once they gain protection. After obtaining 
these rights, additional rent-seeking will be spent on lobbying and litigation 
in order to protect and expand rights. Such overinvestment has distortive 
effects on the allocation of resources and does not promote social welfare.  
 According to Demsetz, internalization should only occur when the gains 
are greater than the costs. Under a pay-per-use system such as the celestial 
jukebox, the costs of exclusion and control are vastly reduced. This is be-
cause negotiating a license simply requires the click of a button and enforce-
ment may be established through the use of technical measures. Of course, it 
could turn out that upgrading technical measures is expensive. But even with 
a cost savings, the pay-per-use system may not actually be worth the price in 
terms of decreases in access and re-use, losses from monopoly pricing and 
inherent market power, rent-seeking and enforcement costs. Such decreases 
may actually make such a system so inefficient that the benefits are not worth 
the costs. 
 
41. Riis, “Economic Impact of the Protection of Unoriginal Databases,” p. 9. 
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3.6 Recalibrating Efficiency: Balancing Incentives with Access  
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner believe that drawing the parallels 
between intellectual property and real property is a valuable exercise. How-
ever, they caution that the higher costs of establishing exclusive rights in 
intellectual property do matter and should be taken into account. According 
to these two academics: 
(1) “We can expect intellectual property law, to the extent it is guided by a 
concern with economic efficiency, to endeavor to reduce the costs of 
these rights,” 
(2) “One way the law will do this is by imposing limitations on intellectual 
property rights that go beyond what is found in the domain of physical 
property” and 
(3) “The high social costs of intellectual property rights create uncertainty as 
to whether on balance such rights are, from an overall social standpoint, 
cost-justified at all.”42 
They provide a new twist on the incentive-access debate beginning with their 
1989 article on the economic analysis of copyright law.43 The two deliber-
ately narrow their focus in order to explore the effect of copyright protection 
on original producers and copiers. In their model, consumers are left out of 
the picture. By showing that the optimal level of copyright protection is lower 
than that provided by absolute rights, their analysis discredits Goldstein and 
other property rights theorists. It also reveals that the aim of copyright law is 
not “to put that value in the copyright owner’s pocket.”44 Rather, it is also to 
the producer’s advantage to favor a balance between incentives and access. 
As the authors admit, however, the problem is that no one knows where that 
balance lies. 
 In their 2003 book, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, 
these scholars set out to more deeply explore the relationship between the 
optimal level of copyright protection and its effect on total welfare, total pro-
duction and welfare per work.45 While producers are defined as those who 
 
42. Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, p. 21. 
43. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law,” Journal of Legal Studies 18 (June 1989), pp. 325-363. 
44. Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway, p. 4. 
45. A Formal Model of Copyright, Chapter 3 of Landes and Posner, The Economic Struc-
ture of Intellectual Property Law, pp. 71-84. 
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make original expressive works, copiers are those whose income derives 
from copies that range from straight duplications to value-added additions of 
an original work.46 
 The authors begin by discussing the relationship between the level of 
copyright protection and the total number of works made by both copiers and 
producers. In terms of the effect of protection on access to original works for 
copiers, the authors show that there is a negative relationship between the 
level of copyright protection and the production of copies. What this means is 
that the higher the level of protection, the lower the number of copies put on 
the market. Conversely, the lower the level of copyright protection, the higher 
the number of copies created.  
 Why? If, for example, copyright protection is increased, then the marginal 
cost of making a copy will also increase. This is because some copiers will 
have to negotiate and pay for a license which they did not have to before or 
they will have to incur costs trying to find a substitute. The additional ex-
pense will cause some to refrain from producing in the first place because 
they are unable to recoup their costs and make a profit. Conversely, if copy-
right protection is low, then the marginal cost of the copier is equally low and 
it will be cheap to produce copies. The result will be a higher number of cop-
ies on the market. This is because a copier can copy more from the original 
product without paying for a license or incurring costs such as searching for 
other works in order to avoid payment. 
 While the level of protection only affects marginal cost when it comes to 
copiers, Landes and Posner posit that it impacts both the cost of expression 
and the gross profits of producers of original works. The authors define the 
cost of expression as costs incurred before a product is first sold. Gross prof-
its are generally defined as all sales minus all costs to produce a good, both 
fixed and variable.47 The first effect is that a strengthening of copyright pro-
tection increases the costs of expression for the author. Just as with the effect 
on copiers, this is because transaction costs, costs of acquisition and costs to 
find a substitute are higher. The overall effect leads to a decrease in the num-
ber of new works because some producers will lack incentive to create, due to 
fears that they can not recover their costs and make a profit.  
 
46 Copiers may form a narrower group than the definition of re-users used in this thesis. 
While copiers seem to be only involved in duplication or transformation of an original 
work, re-users extend to those who use a work to engage in a completely different ac-
tivity such as scientific research. 
47 Variable costs differ with the level of output. They include wages and raw materials. 
See Pindyck and Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, p. 216. 
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 But, there is a second dynamic at work. As copyright protection increases, 
the producer’s gross profits also increase: they can sell more of their original 
works since there are fewer competing works made by copiers on the market. 
Although the authors do not fully explain the reason in detail, one logical 
explanation is that a decrease in production by copiers will create more de-
mand for the original work and also will make it easier for the producer to 
price according to what the market will bear.  
 The trick is to figure out which effect has the strongest influence. In their 
analysis, these academics place a positive spin on the balance between these 
two effects. Under normal circumstances, they assume that the number of 
original works will increase with copyright protection. However, as they 
specifically warn, their conclusion is “actually ambiguous.”48 
 What will maximize total social welfare? Landes and Posner define total 
social welfare as a function of welfare per work, defined as the sum of con-
sumer and producer surplus generated for each individual work produced, 
plus the total number of works created, both copies and originals.49 The au-
thors posit that welfare per work would, in most circumstances, be lower than 
optimal. This is because greater copyright protection normally results in 
higher prices and the higher the price the lower the level of access for con-
sumers who find substitutes or are unable to pay. But, note the authors, “The 
traditional analysis emphasized the tradeoff between the benefits of copyright 
protection in encouraging the production of works and the losses from reduc-
ing access to the works by consumers. . . . That view stresses losses to con-
sumers from higher prices – a factor that drops out of our analysis.”50  
 Instead, the economic model focuses on the effects of the original pro-
ducer and the copier, not on the consumer. The authors predict that welfare 
per work also decreases in their framework but for different reasons. It is 
because the cost of expression for the original producer and the marginal cost 
of the copier will increase.  
 Total welfare depends not only on welfare per work but also on the total 
number of works created. Landes and Posner note that, “the number of works 
may rise as copyright protection expands even though welfare per work 
falls.”51 The overall implication is that copyright protection is needed to gen-
erate incentives so that producers create original works in the first place. But 
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if protection becomes too strong, the cost of creating a work can be so high 
that a producer cannot cover his costs even though he will have full copyright 
protection for that creation. The key issue, of course, is what level is optimal.  
 The authors use the insights from their formal model to provide sugges-
tions on almost every aspect of copyright law. Because there is no correct 
balance, they advise a pick-and-choose approach to their recommendations. 
One potential package of interest for database protection is a combination of 
short fixed terms, an economic interpretation of the criterion of substantial 
similarity to prove infringement and a broad fair use doctrine. The authors’ 
economic interpretations of the rationale for the protection of derivative 
works and for the idea-expression dichotomy are also intriguing. 
 When it comes to the duration of copyright, the authors advocate short 
fixed terms with unlimited renewals. They declare, “The result might be a 
larger public domain, and in particular fewer restrictions on copying most 
works created recently, than under the current system.”52 This claim is partly 
based on data from 1883–1964 that shows fewer than an 11% copyright re-
newal rate for books at the end of what was then a 28-year term. Of the 
10,027 books published in 1930, only 1.7%, or 174 books, were still in print 
in 2001.53 In a footnote, the authors mention that this recommendation re-
quires the United States to pull out of the Berne Convention.  
 The authors cite many advantages of unlimited renewals. Depending on 
the initial term length and the renewal fees, the system could be used to regu-
late the size of the public domain. In addition, unlimited renewals would 
provide a record of who the copyright owner is and so eliminate tracing costs. 
They caution that transaction costs for copyright licenses may be highest for 
composite works such as anthologies under this system. However, aggregate 
transaction costs would fall with a decrease in the total number of works 
renewed. Lastly, rent-seeking for term extensions would be eliminated. In 
sum, the authors declare, “It has been argued that the optimal duration of a 
patent would be infinite if the scope of patent protection were narrowed ap-
propriately.”54 They suggest that “a narrow construal of substantial similarity 
and a broad construal of fair use would help maintain an ample public do-
main under a system of indefinite renewals.”55  
 In order to prove infringement under US copyright law, a combination of 
access to the original work and substantial similarity between the original and 
 
52. Ibid., p. 210. 
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54. Ibid., p. 218. 
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the allegedly infringing work must be shown. Traditionally, the degree of 
substantial similarity varies according to the type of work involved. However, 
these authors offer an economic test based on unfair competition principles, 
“an alleged copy of a copyrighted work is infringing if it is a close substitute, 
in the market, for the expressive aspect of the work and so would cut signifi-
cantly into the demand for the work.”56 Just as under the ordinary substantial 
similarity test, only copying of the protectable elements of a work can result 
in infringement.  
 To illustrate their test, the authors provide an example of two economic 
textbooks. Clearly, any two books on the same subject are likely to be substi-
tutes for each other in the same market. However, the similarity of the two 
books would be at the level of unprotectable ideas and therefore would not be 
infringing. But if a second book actually copied the wording of the first one 
so that an inattentive reader would not realize they were different, then the 
protectable expression of the first textbook would be copied and it therefore 
would not be allowed. According to the authors, infringement would occur 
even if only the wording of one chapter were taken. 
 The authors provide a whole new twist on fair use analysis inspired by 
their formal model, “The question for an economist is not production or 
transformation versus reproduction or suppression, as such, but the impact of 
the copying on the demand for the original and the potential cost savings and 
other benefits that are likely to arise from reducing the cost of creating a new 
work that builds upon the original copyrighted work.”57 The first factor is 
whether the use saves on the transaction costs of licensing. In other words, 
does it lower the costs of copies? The second factor is whether the use harms 
or benefits the original producer. For example, does it expand demand for the 
product?  
 Several reinterpretations of fair use cases are detailed. They begin with the 
employment of quotations as a clear example of a high transaction cost, no 
harm case. Quoting saves licensing costs and causes no harm to the original 
producer because transaction costs are so high that the producers would not 
be able to capture those benefits anyway. Alternatives to licensing, such as a 
liability rule or a compulsory license, they assert, would be equally expen-
sive.  
 The next series are implied consent, negative harm cases. The easy case 
here is book reviews. Even though the original producer would lose money 
 
56. Ibid., p. 89. 
57. Ibid., p. 123. 
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on a potential licensing fee, book reviews are a form of advertising that can 
increase sales. In addition, book reviewers save on transaction costs.  
 The case of Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios con-
cerns whether or not VCRs facilitate copyright infringement.58 Time-shifting, 
or the taping of TV programs to watch at another time, was considered to be a 
substantial noninfringing use and a benefit to the original producer because 
otherwise that section of the audience would be lost. The decision was criti-
cized because it failed to balance the harm from infringing uses against the 
benefits of noninfringing ones. The authors state, “Striking the correct bal-
ance might be impossible, since from a social standpoint the harm is not the 
reduction in copyright revenues but the reduction in consumer and producer 
surplus caused by the impact of infringement on the creation of new copy-
righted works.”59  
 The economic rationale for the copyright of derivative works is also in-
formative. Derivative works are defined as any transformation, translation or 
adaptation of a work. The right to create derivative works rests with the 
original producer. However, Landes and Posner argue that the economic 
reasoning behind this right is not to recover the costs of initial investment. 
This is because, often, the derivative work serves neither as a substitute nor as 
a complement to the original and therefore does not affect the demand curve 
of the original work. The authors conclude, “Since it is uncertain whether any 
copyright protection, let alone the amount conferred by current law, is neces-
sary to enable authors and publishers to recover fixed costs that must be in-
curred to generate the socially optimal output of expressive works, it would 
be speculative to conclude that without control over derivative works authors 
and publishers would be unable to cover those costs. What is true is that some 
works would not be created without the expectation of revenues from deriva-
tive works.”60 An alternative explanation is offered, which is to lower trans-
action costs.  
 The idea-expression dichotomy is also analyzed from an economic per-
spective. The traditional rationale is to prevent monopolization of an idea. 
The authors focus instead on how such protection reduces the total number of 
works by increasing costs, “Since the investment required to come up with 
the kind of new idea likely to be embodied in an expressive work usually is 
low relative to the costs in time and effort of expressing the idea… and since 
the originator of the idea will probably obtain a normal return in one form or 
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another from being first in the market without receiving copyright protection 
…authors, behind a veil of ignorance, would probably agree to a rule that 
gave legal protection to expression but denied it to ideas.”61 
 The authors begin by analyzing the 1879 case of Baker v. Selden in which 
the idea-expression dichotomy was first articulated in the United States.62 
The Court held that the use of bookkeeping forms was not an infringement. 
Its rationale was that granting a copyright over the forms included in a book 
would grant a monopoly over the bookkeeping system itself. In fact, Landes 
and Posner point out that the inventor probably had alternative methods of 
recouping his expenses such as through a copyright on the explanations of the 
system attached to the forms. A copyright on the forms may be overcompen-
sation, they argue.  
 The authors also believe that the 1991 case of Feist Publications v. Rural 
Telephone Service was correctly decided. It marked the official end in the 
United States of sweat-of-the-brow copyright protection of unoriginal data-
base contents such as the white pages of telephone books. State the authors, 
“Since Rural distributed its phone book free of charge, it is hard to see how it 
could have been injured by Feist’s copying. It may well have been helped; 
Feist’s directory made searching for phone numbers easier and thus may have 
increased phone usage.”63 They conclude, “The point is not that there is no 
free riding in such a case; there may be; and depending on the cost of obtain-
ing the facts, free riding may discourage socially useful activities. But as they 
are activities distinct from expression, the question whether and by what 
means to establish property rights in them should be addressed on its own 
terms rather than answered uncritically by a mechanical extension of copy-
right law to nonexpressive activities.”64  
 The authors view the problem posed in Feist as similar to that of databases 
in general, “The issue is acutely posed by recent developments in the creation 
and copying of digital data. Huge electronic databases are being created at 
great cost yet the copying of an entire database, also electronically, is often 
cheap and virtually instantaneous, inviting massive free riding on large in-
vestments. Copyright is of little help because ... the user’s search replaces the 
compiler’s traditional creative function of arrangement. The question whether 
and in what form to extend property rights to the creators of such databases, 
rather than forcing them to rely on contract enforcement and other self-help ... 
 
61. Ibid., p. 93. 
62. Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
63. Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property, p. 104. 
64. Id. 
Chapter 3. Future Visions – Economic Theories and Policy Options 
 70 
requires careful consideration rather than automatic extension of copyright 
law to electronic databases.”65  
3.7 What is the Correct Balance? 
Landes and Posner provide theoretical evidence that too much copyright 
protection can actually hurt total social welfare. This insight provides a criti-
cal policy guideline and diminishes the validity of property rights theory. The 
rationale behind these academics’ conclusion is that stronger protection in-
creases costs for both the producer and the copier. They thus introduce a 
utilitarian approach to law and economics. Here, the goal of welfare maximi-
zation is to balance incentives with access so that the benefits are greater than 
the costs.  
 However, as the authors themselves mention, their model drops the con-
sumer who merely uses a product. Placing the ordinary consumer back into 
the picture could reinforce their arguments and heighten the rationale for 
additional access.  
 When it comes to regulation of databases, the need for access could be 
even greater. This is because it is unclear whether the authors’ definition of 
“copier” also includes those who re-use a work to make databases for non-
commercial, public or commons purposes. Neither is it clear whether the 
definition extends beyond those who duplicate an original work to re-users 
who transform a work to engage in a completely different activity such as 
scientific research. The incorporation of such re-users back into the model 
could turn it upside down so that access must be heightened in order to pro-
mote total social welfare.  
 The scholars state that an increase in copyright protection decreases wel-
fare per work but increases total social welfare because a greater number of 
works are produced. However, they admit that this determination is specula-
tive. In order to arrive at such a conclusion, it must be demonstrated that the 
benefits of protection are greater than the costs. The benefits of higher protec-
tion are that original producers can meet their fixed costs and make a profit. 
The costs of protection are that production costs will increase for both origi-
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 When it comes to databases, where re-use is an important factor in produc-
tion, stronger protection may decrease total social welfare. For example, if 
the cost of production is high, it could be that more original producers than 
anticipated stop production. This proposition does not seem so unreasonable 
given that the authors admit their assumption that producers will create more 
with more protection is “purely speculative.” In addition, so many copiers 
could stop creating that total production actually drops. This could be the case 
if the re-users and consumers mentioned above, were included in the model. 
 The bottom line is that we simply do not know what the impact of stronger 
protection is, especially for a subject matter such as databases where access 
may be a priority and the need for protection is unproven. The fact is that the 
logic of a standard law and economics analysis, which is to provide incen-
tives by allowing the producer to capture all consumer surplus, may be in-
adequate when all re-users are factored back into the picture.  
3.8 Infrastructural Theory: A Demand-Side Analysis 
When it comes to the production of intellectual property for commercial use, 
Brett M. Frischmann and Mark A. Lemley believe in the efficiency of the 
market system and the establishment of exclusive property rights to balance 
access with incentives. But, they argue, a supply-side model may not allocate 
resources efficiently under certain circumstances. This is because focusing on 
increasing production incentives through internalizing externalities ignores 
the economic benefits of those externalities that are positive. Instead, they 
argue that there are economic reasons, not just public interest reasons, to 
promote these positive externalities. 
 Advocating the motto, “if infrastructure, then commons,” the authors aim 
to develop a demand-side theory in order to establish that when intellectual 
property functions as a generic infrastructural input, its use should be guaran-
teed through open access.66 The authors define open access as access to any-
one regardless of identity or use. It does not mean that a product is free. The 
authors outline their nascent theory in a series of articles, first separately and 
then jointly, and contrast it with a property rights model.67 Their theory is 
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valid for all forms of intellectual property, they assert, and can be subjected to 
both normative and descriptive analyses.  
 When it comes to production incentives, the authors state that the inter-
nalization of positive externalities, which they also call spillovers, is not re-
quired to provide adequate production incentives. In fact, such an approach 
can interfere with productive use and distort market behavior. Instead, they 
advocate minimum incentives, which they define as enough to recoup the 
fixed costs that subsequent producers do not face and no more.  
 In an article entitled, “Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding,” 
Lemley explains that no businessperson ever expects to capture the full social 
value of even their real property.68 Because intellectual property rights are not a 
response to scarcity like real property rights, but actually a conscious decision 
to create scarcity, efforts to capture the full social value are even more suspect. 
Problems include pushing markets away from the competitive norm, interfering 
with the ability of other creators to make use of a work, high enforcement costs 
and rent-seeking. Thus Lemley posits, “Granting intellectual property rights 
imposes a complex set of economic costs, and it can be justified only to the 
extent those rights are necessary to provide incentives to create.”69  
 When it comes to access, Frischmann and Lemley describe how under a 
property rights model spillovers are considered uncaptured benefits for which 
a producer should receive compensation in order to increase investment in-
centives. When such benefits remain uncompensated, they are seen as distort-
ing demand signals. These two academics believe that such an analysis over-
states the benefits and understates the costs of internationalization. They 
claim that economic analysis of intellectual property law has not reconciled 
the fact that spillovers encourage greater productivity and social value. Their 
goal is to explain this relationship and how it should affect policymaking.  
 A major error occurs when considering the example of a good used as an 
input to make other products. The problem is that a buyer’s willingness to 
pay reflects the private value they expect to realize by creating their particular 
product. It does not reflect the value others will realize from the result of 
using that product. By definition, then, any demand-signaling function in a 
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traditional supply-side analysis will be inaccurate. The fact that the demand 
function is too low makes it difficult for suppliers to manufacture what is 
socially optimal. This failure is compounded if there are noncommercial, 
public or commons-based creators who are dependent on the input but who 
do not make goods of immediate commercial use. 
 Frischmann and Lemley posit that when externalities are significant and 
cannot be measured within the market structure, inputs should be managed in 
an openly accessible manner. They argue that this should occur when intel-
lectual property functions as a generic infrastructural input. To qualify, the 
following three demand-side criteria must be satisfied: (1) the good is nonri-
valrous, (2) it is used as an input and (3) it is generic.  
 The first criterion is that the product is nonrivalrous. Although all intellec-
tual property satisfies this criterion, it is precisely because of this quality that 
the possibility of an inaccurate measurement of demand becomes evident and 
the market mechanism becomes suspect.  
 The second criterion is that the resource is used as an input. If so, the case 
for open access becomes even stronger. This is because most of the societal 
value comes from the outcome of any productive use, yet the scope of this 
value cannot be measured through a private transaction between a seller and a 
buyer. One way to think about such productive use is that the resource is an 
enabling foundation on which others can build.  
 The defining criterion is that the input is generic. This means that it can be 
used as a building block for a wide variety of goods and services, including 
private, public and nonmarket goods, and in a variety of production modes, 
from commercial to noncommercial to commons-based. Here, the societal 
value is derived from the abundant variety of potential products as well as 
from the benefits of use of those products, none of which is encompassed in a 
typical commercial transaction. In the eyes of the authors, a nonrival infra-
structural input that is generic is an airtight case for market failure under the 
traditional supply-side market mechanism and a candidate for open access.  
 Frischmann elaborates on the application of these criteria in his article, 
“An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management.”70 He 
posits that commercial infrastructural resources that are used to produce rival 
goods do not qualify. All private property qualifies as rivalrous because use 
by one person prohibits use by anyone else. A nail is an example of a rival 
good. So is the idea of a nail because any output is a commercially produced 
rival good. Neither qualifies as a generic infrastructural input. 
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 What about the cure for a particular disease? While a cure may be nonri-
valrous and an input, it does not qualify because it is not generic – the range 
of outputs is narrowed to the actual cure and some related research avenues. 
Thus, Frischmann asserts that even though there could be strong social justice 
grounds for open access in the case of a cure, he would not classify it as a 
generic infrastructural input.  
 So what does qualify? Basic research qualifies because it is nonrivalrous, 
its value comes primarily from its use as an input and it is generic because 
there is a wide variation of productive uses to create other public, commercial 
and nonmarket goods. Additional examples include the Internet, operating 
systems, abstract ideas and peer-to-peer file sharing technology.  
 When something is a generic infrastructural input, such as basic research, 
the introduction of property rights could drive owners to favor uses expected 
to generate income rather than those that generate positive externalities,  
“These costs evade observation because basic research is often an input into 
and output from cumulative processes involving multiple inputs, multiple 
outputs, multiple actors, and multiple research avenues heading in different 
directions.”71 Open access can facilitate these additional productive uses. 
 So how should generic infrastructural inputs be regulated? The three basic 
institutional approaches mentioned by Frischmann are privatization, govern-
ment intervention and commons. When commercial infrastructure is involved 
to produce rival goods, he suggests that the traditional market system is ap-
propriate. But for generic infrastructure inputs, he recommends that open 
access be considered. Rather than focus on the use of a particular institutional 
approach, Frischmann proposes that the goal should be to ensure access, 
“Tying form and function together obscures the fact that access can be pro-
vided for or restricted by a variety of institutional forms, which are often 
mixed (property and regulation, private and communal property, etc.), and 
not necessarily through one particular form of property rights.”72 
 The authors state that the degree of accessibility is flexible and adjustable. 
However, in making a policy decision, they argue that there is a need to move 
beyond the incentive-access paradigm. For the authors, many public policy 
debates boil down to which externality-producing activities to be concerned 
with and which institutions should regulate and promote them. In addition, 
efforts should concentrate on allocating private and public open access rights 
and promoting both commercially valuable and socially valuable activities.  
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 While their infrastructure theory provides strong reasons for establishing 
and maintaining a commons, the authors also realize that producers must 
continue to receive legal incentives. In some cases, such as with basic re-
search, they support a solution that includes government funding in order to 
eliminate the incentive-access problem altogether. But in other instances, they 
suggest that intellectual property law can be recalibrated.  
 According to Frischmann, “Ultimately, the optimal degree of openness or 
restrictiveness depends upon a number of functional economic considerations 
related to the nature of the resource in question, the manner in which the 
resource is utilized to create value, institutional structures and the community 
setting.”73 What then is the optimal level? The authors admit that the appro-
priate level is difficult to determine. What they feel they can say with cer-
tainty is that the level is greater than zero. 
3.9 Applying Infrastructural Theory: How Much Access? 
Frischmann and Lemley turn supply-side analysis on its head by providing 
compelling economic reasons for why positive externalities are beneficial and 
should be promoted. Under their theory, positive externalities are not some-
thing bad that should be stamped out and treated as free riding, but rather 
something to be encouraged, particularly when intellectual property functions 
as a generic infrastructural input.  
 The serious demand-side malfunctions these academics highlight clearly 
need to be incorporated into policymaking efforts. Moreover, their principle 
that generic infrastructural inputs should be regulated through open access is 
pathbreaking. Despite these significant contributions, however, there is a lack 
of clarity on how to determine what precisely qualifies as a generic infra-
structural input and how to implement an open access policy. 
 When it comes to commercial use, the authors generally agree with the 
supply-side analysis of how to get the market signals correct. But, they assert 
that minimum production incentives should be granted and no more. They do 
not discuss how to implement a minimum incentives regime for commercial 
production. Yet, it would be worth hearing these two academics’ view on 
where this balance lies. 
 A problem emerges in clarifying when demand signals distort enough to 
require open access. The authors state that in terms of commercial produc-
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tion, the demand signals can be adequately calibrated according to willing-
ness to pay. But it could also be true that demand signals are wrong for a 
commercial product. For example, a private good could be used as an input 
for noncommercial production. Or use of a good could benefit third parties in 
such a way that the value to society is not met by satisfying private demand. 
The question then becomes when is demand so important that open access is 
required, and why draw the line at generic infrastructural inputs? 
 Frischmann and Lemley reveal that there are solid economic reasons to 
guarantee access when intellectual property functions as a generic infrastruc-
tural input. Their efforts to develop a demand side theory that incorporates 
these insights are significant. However, the authors do not focus specifically 
on database content protection. As a result, an exploration of the kinds of 
policy options available to promote access is missing. 
 Despite this lack of clarity, it behooves us to consider whether databases 
qualify as generic infrastructural inputs, particularly due to the importance of 
re-use in the industry. As already explained, a database is a type of intellec-
tual property and is therefore, by definition, nonrivalrous. Moreover, the 
discussion of re-use in Chapter 2 reveals that a database functions as a build-
ing block for an innumerable number of purposes, many of which cannot be 
captured in an ordinary market transaction. Lastly, it is generic because a 
database is employed for different types of goods and services using a variety 
of production modes. However, additional proof is needed, such as the em-
pirical evidence of the current legal regimes, before a final determination will 
be made in Chapter 7. 
3.10 Free Access and the New Networked Economy 
In a boldly-titled book, The Wealth of Networks, Yochai Benkler attempts to 
substantiate the birth of a post-industrial production system which he terms 
the networked information economy.74 Benkler argues that near ubiquitous 
ownership of a connected computer is enabling behavior everyone has en-
gaged in all their lives – social sharing – to fuel a new mode of economic 
production. He posits that this economy can be more efficient at producing 
information, culture and knowledge than the previous capital-intensive indus-
trial model. More importantly for Benkler, it has the potential to advance 
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values critical to modern democratic societies including individual freedom, a 
more participatory political system and a more transparent and critical cul-
ture. Benkler is convinced that whether such an admittedly utopian society 
emerges depends, first and foremost, on how many people participate. But 
policy decisions that support these developments, including those concerning 
intellectual property rights, can also make or break the outcome. Based on 
past experience, Benkler suggests that we have about ten years to make these 
decisions. 
 According to Benkler, for the past 150 years the production and dissemi-
nation of information, culture and knowledge has featured a highly capital 
intensive, producer-to-receiver design. It was spurred by the invention of new 
communication technologies, beginning with the printing press and continu-
ing beyond the television set, that allow high volume production. The model 
is capital-intensive simply because the production technologies and the estab-
lishment of distribution channels are expensive. Because it is marked by high 
up-front costs, investment in production seems reasonable only if a substan-
tial income can be generated to cover the costs. Mass production is the most 
efficient manner of achieving this goal. The ability of individuals to engage 
freely in the production process or to provide feedback is limited by the high 
capital requirements and by the producer-to-receiver organizational model.  
 Benkler states that the institutional mechanism that best perpetuates this 
model is an intellectual property system with strong exclusive rights. It en-
courages producers to acquire more intellectual property in order to minimize 
costs and to capture the bulk of revenues through exploitation of these rights. 
Benkler asserts that the result is greater concentration within each industry 
and greater commercialization.  
 In the industrial age, Benkler claims that, “market-based proprietary pro-
duction has often seemed simply too productive to tinker with.”75 But the rise 
of the networked information economy has dramatically altered the factors of 
production so that it is no longer highly capital-intensive. The development of 
new technology enables a transition from the one-way communication of 
mass culture to one in which every member of society has the capacity to 
actively create, take, share and comment on information and cultural produc-
tion. Whereas under the industrial model, production is market-based, com-
mercial and proprietary, under the networked information economy, it is 
commons-based, social and non-proprietary. 
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 The inputs of the networked information economy are: (1) the networked 
computer, (2) free content and (3) human creativity and organizational capac-
ity. A computer equipped with an Internet connection has replaced the expen-
sive physical capital of the industrial age with one that is cheap, easily ob-
tainable, and almost universally owned, at least within the Western world. 
This technology vastly reduces the cost of production and places tools di-
rectly in the hands of ordinary persons who can explore, contribute to and 
take from the information environment. The low capital requirements of ob-
taining a networked computer and its universal presence, asserts Benkler, are 
enabling production through social sharing on a scale never before possible.  
 While the ubiquitous, cheap computer is the core technologically enabling 
production input, existing information, knowledge and culture is the key 
content input. In Benkler’s model, access to information is not a critical issue 
because content is free. This means that anyone can use the information for 
any purpose whatsoever. He asserts that the rationale behind this state of 
affairs is that intellectual works are nonrival public goods. As a result, it is 
economically efficient to allow free access. Unless exclusive rights or some 
other regulatory policy makes it expensive, explains Benkler, the fact that 
content is free means that it can be employed and built upon for any reason, 
not just to make a profit.  
 With both the basic physical input and content being free or nearly so, the 
most valuable and scarce factor of production in Benkler’s eyes is human 
creativity and organizational capacity. According to the economic theory of 
the industrial model, more money means more production. But with the free 
inputs and outputs of the non-proprietary, non-market model, where do pro-
duction incentives come from? Benkler argues that we intuitively know the 
answer. At times, “we choose to act in some way that is oriented towards 
fulfilling our social and psychological needs, not our market-exchangeable 
needs. It is that part of our lives and our motivational structure that social 
production taps, and on which it thrives.”76 He points to a variety of socio-
logical, psychological and economic theories and to empirical evidence in 
order to substantiate his argument. The bottom line is “recognition that there 
is some form of social and psychological motivation that is neither fungible 
with money nor simply cumulative with it.”77 
 Benkler describes how social production is organized to exploit free time 
as a scarce resource through a combination of social norms, sophisticated 
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technical capabilities, multifarious peer review and innovative institutional 
arrangements. His analysis focuses on large-scale commons-based peer pro-
duction.  
 Simply put, a person who can spend just 5-20 minutes a day commenting 
on a news piece, co-moderating a discussion or co-managing a project is 
more likely to participate. Technological organizational capacities have de-
veloped to take a person’s limited time into account. A key is the ability to 
break down a project into pieces that can be separately produced – the tinier, 
the better – and then to integrate them back together. One example is the 
NASA Clickworkers, which hosted 85,000 volunteers in its first six months 
to help mark craters for space research. The work of professional scientists 
was replaced by breaking down the complex project to small independent 
modules, by building in redundancy and automated mechanisms for eliminat-
ing errors and by recompiling the work. The result was deemed by NASA as 
“virtually indistinguishable from the inputs of a geologist with years of ex-
perience.”78 
 The final element in social production is the creation of supporting institu-
tional mechanisms to perpetuate the system. According to Benkler, com-
mons-based production occurs when “the inputs and outputs of the process 
are shared, freely or conditionally, in an institutional form that leaves them 
equally available for all to use as they choose at their individual discretion.”79 
Efficiency and stability give rise to the market system through private owner-
ship, which enables individual satisfaction through the price system. Within 
commons-based peer production, individual satisfaction occurs through a 
collective system of self-selected individual action. It is devoid of intellectual 
property rights.  
 The primary legal tool is the General Public License, originally developed 
in the world of open-source software. The key provision requires anyone who 
uses the information to license it under the same terms as the original so that 
free access is perpetuated. This principle became known as copyleft. Various 
adaptations and varieties of GPL licenses exist, including those with provi-
sions for attribution only or for noncommercial use only. Even though the 
inputs and outputs to commons-based production are free, one can still make 
a profit. For example, Benkler states that in 2003, IBM made double the 
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money from its Linux-related services than it did on all its patent-related 
sources.80 
 Benkler posits that the social production model can be more efficient both 
quantitatively and qualitatively than the industrial model. In terms of a quan-
tity, he divines massive potential, “A billion people in advanced economies 
may have between two billion and six billion spare hours among them, every 
day. In order to harness these billions of hours, it would take the whole work-
force of almost 340,000 workers employed by the entire motion picture and 
recording industries in the United States put together, assuming each worker 
worked forty-hour weeks without taking a single vacation, between three and 
eight and a half years!”81 Qualitatively, Benkler also argues that social pro-
duction is more efficient because those who perform the jobs select them-
selves and as a result tend to be more motivated and skilled. Although he 
asserts that such a production system is efficient, he also states that this is 
beside the point because social production is self-sustainable and does not 
require outside expenses. 
 For Benkler, the important issue is not whether social production is effi-
cient but whether it promotes the values of democratic societies. These in-
clude individual freedom, meaningful political participation, a critical culture 
and social justice. For example, Benkler describes how the networked infor-
mation economy makes culture more writable and transparent, “The basic 
tools enabled by the Internet – cutting, pasting, rendering, annotating, and 
commenting – make active utilization and conscious discussion of cultural 
symbols and artifacts easier to create, sustain and read more generally.”82 
One example discussed by Benkler is a search for the word “Barbie” on the 
Internet. The Google site, which orders results according to the number of 
links to a particular website, reveals a Barbie which is more than a doll and a 
symbol of glamour. By highlighting the oppressive nature of Barbie, sites 
such as “AdiosBarbie.com” reveal the complexity of a cultural icon that can 
have multiple and conflicting meanings.83 By providing a more complex 
experience than what one would get at the toy store, the networked informa-
tion economy expands our possibilities.  
 The main policy challenge is to ensure that social production can not only 
survive but flourish. When it comes to content, Benkler asserts that strong 
intellectual property rights and enforcement of them favors the industrial 
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production model. The effect is to increase the cost of information inputs and 
to constrain further development. For example, when it comes to database 
content protection, he views the ten-year experience of the United States and 
Europe as clear evidence that “exclusive rights are detrimental to various 
downstream industries that rely on access to data.”84 Such protection is justi-
fied, according to Benkler, by traditional incentive theory which states that 
intellectual property rights are needed so that producers can recover their high 
upfront costs. The correct policy option in his view would be not to protect 
database contents. 
 Other important policy questions are: (1) to what extent should informa-
tion be governed as a commons free for all to use? and (2) to what extent 
should it be proprietary? In making a determination, Benkler says that the 
guideline should be to allow free access to content, “whenever it is possible 
to produce information in a way that allows the producer – whether market 
actor or not – to appropriate the benefits of production without actually 
charging a price for use of the info itself.”85  
 Another key is to ensure that the inputs to social production – the con-
nected computer, free content and human capacity and creativity – are not 
encumbered by restrictions that either discourage individuals from participat-
ing or make it ineffective. States Benkler, “We must understand these new 
modes of production. We must learn to evaluate them and compare their 
advantages and disadvantages to those of the industrial information produc-
ers. And then we must adjust our institutional environment to make way for 
the new social practices made possible by the networked environment.”86 
3.11 Can All Content be Free? 
Benkler provides an exciting and substantiated vision of how the information 
network economy delivers social production into the hands of ordinary peo-
ple. Contrary to the other legal academics, he seriously considers the impact 
of technology on intellectual production processes and explains its revolu-
tionary impact. While his careful research establishes that social production is 
here to stay, problems in his analysis highlight possible limitations to its pro-
liferation.  
 
84. Ibid., p. 450. 
85. Ibid., p. 48. 
86. Ibid., p. 58. 
Chapter 3. Future Visions – Economic Theories and Policy Options 
 82 
 The most serious limitation is Benkler’s assumption that existing content 
is free. When he establishes free content as one of the major inputs, he seems 
to mesh the descriptive with the normative. What Benkler seems to be saying 
is that information should be free. A lack of access to free content places a 
clear restriction on the viability of the model. At its very worst, it could be 
that social production remains on the periphery as intellectual property law 
becomes stronger and the majority of works cannot be used without a license. 
 Given that free content may be scarcer than anticipated, a discussion about 
how policymakers could take a more active role in encouraging social pro-
duction would have been welcome. Although Benkler provides concrete 
recommendations on how to regulate the physical and logical layers of the 
Internet, his recommendations on how to regulate the content layer fall short. 
Instead, he spends more time illustrating how intellectual property rights 
promote the industrial production model and stamp out social production. 
From the perspective of database creation, then, the most that can be said is 
that efforts should be made to encourage, or at least to accommodate, social 
production.  
 At the same time, Benkler cites examples where social production co-
exists with and is incorporated into the industrial mode. Several questions 
naturally emerge. For example, are there limits to what can be created 
through social production or can most intellectual works be made in this 
way? In addition, what kind of policy options should be put in place to en-
courage such mixed production at the content level? The answers to these 
questions are important to policymakers so they can define the government’s 
role.  
 Given the available inputs, Benkler argues that social production can be 
more efficient both quantitatively and qualitatively. As an illustration of 
quantitative efficiency, he provides a hypothetical regarding the amount of 
information that can be generated. Yet expecting one billion people in one 
day to use two to six hours of their spare time engaging in social production 
is an overestimate.  
 As Benkler mentions, the aim of social production may not be economic 
efficiency or the promotion of social welfare in an economic sense of the 
term. Instead, it may be the promotion of individual freedom, a more partici-
patory political system, a more transparent critical culture and social justice. 
This adds further fuel to the argument that there is a clear role for government 
as a provider of funds in the service of the public interest. It also provides 
additional grounds to increase access. Yet without a clearer vision of how 
two diametrically opposed models can co-exist and mix, and of the govern-
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ment’s role in facilitating this blend, it is hard to see how social production 
will thrive. 
3.12 Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter has been to explore the various theories and policy 
options available for the protection of databases. An important conclusion is 
that there are economic reasons, not just public-interest reasons, to support 
access.  
 The vision that propels property rights theory, as represented by Goldstein, 
is the pay-per-use system of the celestial jukebox. The goal is to perfect mar-
ket signals through absolute property rights. While access to materials is 
provided through price discrimination, production incentives are stimulated 
by ensuring compensation for every use.  
 It has been shown, however, that the underlying philosophy of the more 
protection, the more production is not viable in reality. From an access per-
spective, perfect price discrimination is impossible in the absence of a mo-
nopoly position. Equally important, it is to the original maker’s advantage to 
promote access. Therefore the strongest form of property rights may not only 
discourage full access but also depress creation.  
 While Landes and Posner have shown that it is even to the producer and 
copier’s advantage to promote access, they still posit that, in the main, greater 
protection will yield greater production. Yet their economic model is based 
on a number of assumptions, which if not true, could turn the model upside 
down. Indeed, the nature of the database industry leads to the conclusion that 
protection should be lower than that for copyright. Given the costs of exclu-
sive property rights and the lack of clarity on their benefits, it seems reason-
able to look for other alternatives. 
 Towards this end, Lemley and Frischmann fill the gap by positing that 
when intellectual property qualifies as a generic infrastructural input, de-
mand-side signals are so inadequate that open access should be considered. 
Although this theory is a likely candidate for the regulation of database con-
tents, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, the authors do not provide enough 
guidance on appropriate regulatory options.  
 Rounding out the theoretical survey is Benkler’s theory of social produc-
tion. But because this theory posits the existence of free information, its ap-
plication may be limited. Moreover, the major policy recommendation to 
encourage this type of production is to stop regulating. While Benkler has 
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clearly established the importance of social production, the only lesson that 
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4.1 Introduction: Creating the Information Society 
The birth of the information society in the 1980s brought global recognition 
that “information constitutes now more than ever an element of power, in 
business, in society and between nations.”1 Throughout the world, the crea-
tion, transformation and exploitation of information goods and services had 
the potential to bring significant competitive advantage. Information was 
evolving into a highly valuable commodity which could contribute signifi-
cantly to gross national product and could employ a considerable sector of the 
population. But the volume of information produced sparked an urgent need 
for investment in advanced information processing and retrieval tools to bet-
ter understand, analyze and transform the data available.2  
 One tactic was the creation of a vibrant database industry. The European 
Community decided that large economies of scale were needed to recoup the 
significant costs required to develop and generate databases. But the realities 
of legal, technical and linguistic barriers made such economies of scale hard 
 
1. European Commission, Communication from the Commission together with a draft 
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to achieve. Conditions hospitable to a community-wide market in commercial 
databases needed to be fostered.3  
 Member States offered a variety of models that could form the basis of a 
potential directive. At the time, probably the strongest property right existed 
in England and Ireland where factual database contents were safeguarded by 
sweat-of-the-brow copyright. Under the Nordic Catalogue Rule, Scandina-
vian countries prevented reproduction of large collections of data for 10 
years, while in the Netherlands unoriginal database contents were protected 
through the text right.4 Narrower forms of protection also existed. In some 
countries, factual database content did not qualify for copyright, but the selec-
tion and arrangement, if original, did. Nations such as France and Germany 
also prevented slavish copying by competitors through unfair competition 
law.5 
 In 1988, policymakers began to explore avenues to encourage further 
growth through harmonization.6 Attention was directed toward providing a 
production incentive to database makers, ensuring that competitors and other 
re-users could make transformative use of database contents and guaranteeing 
access for consumers. The interests of all stakeholders was embodied in the 
first draft of the Directive in 1992 and contributed to a healthy balance be-
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 http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/procedure/index_en.htm (last visited 9 August 2007). 
4.1 Introduction: Creating the Information Society 
 87 
tween incentives and access.7 This balance was preserved throughout most of 
the four years of drafting and through six of the eight preparatory documents 
submitted.8 
 But the balance swung drastically in the 1995 Common Position offered 
by the Council.9 The right to prevent unauthorized extraction and re-
utilization was expanded while access guarantees to re-users and consumers 
were gutted. Many of the key changes occurred without explanation, in a lack 
of transparency that has been criticized.10 By 1996, the final Database Direc-
tive had been transformed into a strong property right with flexible produc-
tion incentives and narrowly drawn access provisions.11  
 The battle to recalibrate the balance soon flared up again at the European 
Court of Justice.12 In Finland, Sweden and Greece, representatives of the 
British and Scottish Football leagues sued state-owned betting monopolies 
for printing their data on betting coupons. Meanwhile, the British Horserac-
ing Board sued an online sports betting facility, William Hill, for indirectly 
using its factual data without permission.  
 The ECJ responded by raising the qualification threshold for protection 
and holding that the databases in question did not qualify. As the pendulum 
 
7. The European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection 
of databases,” OJ (C )156/4 23/6/92. (hereinafter The 1992 Proposal). 
8. While the first draft was promulgated in 1992, the final Directive was completed in 
1996. Ten preparatory documents were released during this period, but two were ex-
planatory documents. Thus, of the eight documents that represented drafts or amend-
ments to the Directive, six kept the initial balance of the first draft. 
9. Council of Europe, Common Position (EC) No. 20/95 adopted by the Council 10 July 
1995 with a view to adopting Directive 95/ /EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of … on the legal protection of databases, OJ(C) 288/14, 30/10/1995. (herein-
after The 1995 Common Position). 
10. See Annette Kur, Reto M. Hilty, Christophe Geigerand and Matthias Leistner, “First 
evaluation of the directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases – Comment by 
the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, Mu-
nich,” International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 37, no. 5 
(2006), pp. 551-558 and Perttu Virtanen, Database Rights in Safe European Home: 
The Path to More Rigorous Protection of Information (Ph.D., Lappeenranta University 
of Technology, 2005). 
11. See The Database Directive, Chap. III on the Sui Generis Right. 
12. See British Horseracing Board Ltd and Others v. William Hill Organization Ltd, ECJ 
case C-203/02, 9 Nov. 2004 (from England). The three other cases are: Fixtures Mar-
keting Ltd v. Oy Veikkaus Ab, ECJ case C-45/02, 09 Nov. 2004 (from Finland); Fix-
tures Marketing Ltd v. Organismos prognostikon agonon podosfairou AE, ECJ case C-
444/02, 09 Nov. 2004 (from Greece); and Fixtures Marketing Ltd. v. Svenska Spel AB, 
ECJ case C-338/02, 09 Nov. 2004 (from Sweden). 
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swung back toward access, advocates of strong protection were surprised and 
disappointed. But the ECJ’s judgments may have restored some of the bal-
ance.  
 The effect is two intertwining regimes. Those database contents that are 
not protected are subject to a system similar to that in the United States. The 
implications of such a regime will be discussed in Chapter 6. Meanwhile, 
those that do qualify for protection are offered a strong right. Such a pattern 
of a high qualification threshold coupled with strong protection is typical of a 
civil law system. However, the problem is that the database right may be so 
strong that it jeopardizes production. This is due to the difficulty of engaging 
in a wide range of re-use under the database right. While access is narrow and 
difficult to alter, there is significant flexibility built into the producer’s right 
so that it can be even further strengthened. Bluntly put, as it stands now, it 
may not be the type of regulation that can foster the most growth and value in 
situations where re-use of database content is critical. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to explore the evolution of the Database 
Directive and the ECJ case law in order to understand its transformation. It 
begins with a narrative of the legislative process. Focus will be placed on the 
first draft, a description of the final Directive and a detailing of the subse-
quent case law. This will provide the necessary substantive background for 
Chapter 5, where further evaluation of the relevant law will enable the pro-
posal of a series of amendments to restore the balance.  
4.2 The 1988 Green Paper Sets the Stage 
Policymakers at the Commission first officially floated the idea of harmoniz-
ing database protection in a 1988 Green Paper on Copyright and the Chal-
lenge of Technology.13 Their inquiry reflected concern over the challenges 
posed by the digital revolution in the re-use (storage), access (retrieval) and 
protection of databases. As a result, the needs of all stakeholders including 
the re-user, consumer and producer were taken into account. Comments were 
solicited on whether copyright protection or a sui generis right should extend 
to the “mode of compilation,” or structure and arrangement, of unoriginal 
databases.14 Protection for database content was not articulated as part of the 
 
13. European Commission, Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology – 
Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action, COM (88) 172 final, (Brussels: 7 June 
1988), (hereinafter The 1988 Green Paper). 
14. Ibid., ¶ 6.6.2. 
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agenda. Policymakers cautioned that, “the scope of protection and the re-
stricted acts would have to be carefully considered lest access to computer-
ized information be unjustifiably restricted.”15  
 Since the inquiry occurred before the harmonization of copyright law, 
some of the issues raised are now moot. Still, it is important to understand the 
spirit in which the right first evolved. At that time, it was unclear whether or 
not the incorporation of smaller parts of a protected work in databases consti-
tuted a restricted act. While bibliographical information, indexes and refer-
ences from published works could be employed, it was unclear how much 
other information, such as abstracts, extracts, or summaries could be used. 
Policymakers predicted, “Uncertainty as to whether such abstracts can be 
inserted in a data base without the consent of the author or his successor in 
title may have a negative impact on the development of this particular kind of 
data base.”16 Although such insubstantial use is now patently legal under the 
Information Society Directive on Copyright and Related Rights (the InfoSoc 
Directive), other types of re-use remain restricted under the database right.17 
 A second problem was access, or the retrieval of information from elec-
tronic databases. While some Member States considered all downloading a 
restricted act, others made a distinction between consulting and downloading. 
Although subsequent intellectual property legislation has legalized temporary 
copying necessary for normal use, such a provision is arguably still missing 
from the text of the database right.18 
 The last problem was that unoriginal selection and arrangement of a data-
base was not protected, even though it took skill and effort to create and often 
was the most convenient mode of organization for the consumer. According 
to policymakers, “In cases where protection does not follow from the applica-
tion of ordinary copyright law, by reason of the work’s brevity or lack of 
creativity, or its nature, or because the term of protection has expired, it 
would still seem desirable that protection against copying of the mode of 
compilation should be available.”19 Because the buying and selling of factual 
 
15. Ibid.,  ¶ 6.4.8. 
16. Ibid.,  ¶ 6.3.7. 
17. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmoni-
zation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ 
(L) 167/10, 22 May 2001 (hereinafter The InfoSoc Directive). 
18. See Art. 6.1 of The 1996 Database Directive in regards to copyright in a database, Art. 
5.1 of The InfoSoc Directive and Art. 5.1 of the European Council Directive 
91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs, OJ (L) 
122, 17/95/1991. 
19. European Commission, The 1988 Green Paper, ¶ 6.4.9. 
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data was seen as a growth industry, the need for legal protection was consid-
ered critical. The Commission noted that, “to combat data piracy, such a right 
may prove to be an important tool.”20 
4.3 The First Draft Balances Stakeholders’ Needs 
In 1992, the first draft of the Database Directive was introduced by the 
Commission. Policymakers clearly strove to balance access and incentives for 
the three major interest groups: producers, re-users and consumers. This bal-
ance is evident in the general objectives of the proposal and in the specific 
objectives of the sui generis provision for database contents, also called the 
unfair extraction right. As a result, databases are treated as important resource 
tools, the manufacture and utilization of which must take into account the 
needs of all stakeholders.21 In addition, the purpose of the unfair extraction 
right reflects the incentive theory of intellectual property: “to safeguard the 
position of makers of databases against misappropriation of the results of the 
financial and professional investment incurred in obtaining and collecting 
data.”22 
 The right granted amounts to more than the mere protection of unoriginal 
structure and arrangement as envisioned in the 1988 Green Paper.23 Instead, it 
is designed to correct legal gaps by extending protection to unoriginal data-
base content which would otherwise remain unprotected. Member States are 
directed to “provide for a right for the maker of the database to prevent the 
unauthorized extraction or re-utilization, from that database, of its contents, in 
whole or in substantial part, for commercial purposes.”24 
 Many of the right’s features are derived from unfair competition law. For 
example, the right applies only to the commercial use of electronic databases. 
It is intended to prevent infringement when a database is used directly as a 
source with or without adaptations.25 Indirect use is not actionable. In addi-
 
20. Ibid.,  ¶ 6.4.10. 
21. European Commission, The 1992 Proposal, Recitals 8-10. 
22. Ibid., Recital 28. 
23. No explanation is provided as to why. 
24. European Commission, The 1992 Proposal, Art. 2.5. 
25. European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal on the legal protec-
tion of databases, Com (92) 24 final (13 May 1992), Part Two, ¶ 1.2 (hereinafter Ex-
planatory Memorandum to the 1992 Proposal). 
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tion, the only example of infringement provided is when the results of the 
unauthorized use substitute as a source for the original materials.26 
 To benefit from the right, two criteria must be satisfied. First, the object of 
protection must be a database. In Article 1.1, a database is defined as “a col-
lection of works or materials arranged, stored and accessed by electronic 
means, and the electronic materials necessary for the operation of the data-
base such as its thesaurus, index or system for obtaining or presenting infor-
mation.” It can comprise: “collections of works, whether literary, artistic, 
musical or other, or of other materials such as texts, sounds, images, numbers, 
facts, data or combinations of any of these.”27 It does not include three-
dimensional objects.28 Protection does not apply to computer programs used 
in the making or operation of a database.29  
 The second criterion is that the individual materials assembled in a data-
base must not be protected by copyright or a neighboring right. The rationale 
behind this bar is to avoid the imposition of a compulsory license on works 
otherwise protected. The unfair extraction right can apply if the structure and 
arrangement of a database is copyrighted, however. It also applies if there is 
no other form of protection whatsoever.30 
 The duration of protection lasts 10 years. It is unclear whether a new term 
can be triggered and, if so, how.31 According to Article 9.4, “Insubstantial 
changes to the contents of a database shall not extend the original period of 
protection of that database by the right to prevent unfair extraction.” Accord-
ing to Article 1.4, “‘insubstantial change’ means additions, deletions or al-
terations to the selection or arrangement of the contents of a database which 
are necessary for the database to continue to function in the way it was in-
tended by its maker to function.” 
 Because the definition of insubstantial change only discusses alterations in 
the structure and arrangement, it is clearly aimed toward renewal of the copy-
 
26. Ibid.,  Part Two, ¶ 8.4. 
27. European Commission, The 1992 Proposal, Recital 16. 
28. European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the 1992 Proposal, Part Two, 
¶ 1.2. 
29. European Commission, The 1992 Proposal, Art. 1.1. 
30. European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the 1992 Proposal, Part Two, 
¶ 2.5. 
31. The following other issues are unclear: (1) whether the term of protection begins when 
the database is first made or when it is first made available to the public, (2) the defini-
tion of insubstantial changes for database contents because the definition provided re-
fers only to changes in the structure and arrangement. See European Commission, The 
1992 Proposal, Articles 1.3, 9 and 12. 
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right term. Does this mean that the right to prevent unfair extraction is in-
tended to last just 10 years with no renewal? The Explanatory Memorandum 
implies that the right of unfair extraction is limited: “The one finite period of 
protection begins on incorporation of the work or material into the database 
and continues for a period of 10 years from the time when the database was 
made publicly available. At the end of the 10 year period, the contents of that 
particular database are no longer protected by the right to prevent unfair ex-
traction.”32 
 Various mechanisms exist to provide free access for those who wish to re-
use database contents. Under Article 8.4, a lawful user may, without authori-
zation, extract and re-utilize insubstantial parts of works or materials from a 
database for commercial purposes provided there is attribution. A lawful user 
is defined as “a person having acquired a right to use the database.”33 As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the term “acquired” can be interpreted to include 
direct, indirect or implied use such as by operation of law. 
 An insubstantial part is defined as “parts of a database whose reproduc-
tion, evaluated quantitatively and qualitatively in relation to the database 
from which they are copied, can be considered not to prejudice the exclusive 
rights of the maker of that database to exploit the database.”34 No fixed limits 
are mentioned as to the volume of material which can be taken. Examples 
include: “small extracts from a database, by quotation or by reference to the 
information.”35 
 Consumers are also provided with an exception. Under Article 8.5, a law-
ful user can extract and re-utilize insubstantial parts for personal private bene-
fit without authorization or attribution. This exception is further elaborated. 
First, the material must be for personal use and may not be given to third 
parties. In addition, it can only be employed in the domestic sphere and not in 
the professional or commercial environment. Examples include: “incorporat-
ing the extracts into other material which is not for commercial use, creating 
new materials based on knowledge gained from the database and so on.”36  
 “In the interests of competition and greater consumer choice” and in order 
“to avoid a monopoly position being abused by dominant information pro-
 
32. European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the 1992 Proposal, Part Two,¶ 
9.3. 
33. Ibid., Part Two, ¶ 8.4. 
34. European Commission, The 1992 Proposal, Art. 1.3. 
35. European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the 1992 Proposal, Part Two, ¶ 
8.4. 
36. Ibid., Part Two, ¶ 8.5. 
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viders,” two compulsory license provisions are included.37 The rationale for 
these provisions is to correct access problems that can arise through the pro-
tection of unoriginal database contents. It is intended as a substitute for the 
idea-expression dichotomy which operates under copyright law.38 
 Two types of compulsory licenses are granted. The first is for commer-
cially produced databases that are made available to the public. According to 
Article 8.1, “if the words or materials contained in a database which is made 
publicly available cannot be independently created, collected or obtained 
from any other source, the right to extract and re-utilize . . . shall be licensed 
on fair and non-discriminatory terms.” Such licenses should be made avail-
able if “the works or materials so licensed are used in the independent crea-
tion of new works and providing that no prior rights in or obligations incurred 
in respect of those works or materials are infringed.”39 Member States must 
implement an arbitration mechanism when a license is refused or where the 
terms are neither fair nor non-discriminatory.40 
 According to Recital 33, compulsory licenses should not be requested for 
reasons of commercial expediency such as economy of time, effort or finan-
cial investment. Moreover, “the wholesale copying of the contents of the 
database with a view to commercializing a competing product, without any 
independent effort in the collection and verification of the material is not 
permitted.”41  
 The second type of compulsory license is granted “if the database is made 
publicly available by a public body which is either established to assemble or 
disclose information pursuant to legislation, or is under a general duty to do 
so.”42 For example, this provision would apply to a database of legislative 
texts composed by a national administration under the following conditions: 
(1) if the texts were not subject to copyright, (2) if the database had been 
made publicly available and (3) if that public body had a specific or general 
duty to make such information available. In the event that a public body has 
 
37. Ibid., Part One, ¶ 4.2.5. 
38. Ibid., Part Two, ¶ 2.5. 
39. European Commission, The 1992 Proposal, Recital 31. 
40. European Commission, The 1992 Proposal, Art. 8.3 and European Commission, 
Explanatory Memorandum to the 1992 Proposal, Part Two, ¶ 8.3. 
41. European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the 1992 Proposal, Part One, ¶ 
5.3.7. 
42. European Commission, The 1992 Proposal, Art. 8.2. 
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commercialized its database, then the granting of a compulsory license is 
subject to Article 8.1 for commercial databases.43 
4.4 Initial Problems that Plague the Final Directive 
The first draft evidences a heightened sensitivity to the importance of promot-
ing new investments, reducing barriers and stimulating re-use within the 
database industry and beyond. Access is encouraged in a variety of ways. The 
sui generis provision is narrowly tailored in that it only provides against sub-
stantial commercial extraction or re-utilization of electronic databases. All 
noncommercial databases remain unregulated. At the same time, significant 
attention is paid to ensuring that re-users can employ commercial database 
content for productive use – either within the database industry or within 
other sectors of the economy. The needs of consumers to consult, freely ac-
cess and share contents are also taken into account.44  
 Despite these positive components, three major problems emanate from 
the first draft that continue to plague the final Directive. They are the confu-
sion caused by establishing a hybrid right, the problem of how to maintain a 
balance between incentives and access and the ongoing debate over whether 
the Directive provides a right to the content itself.  
 The new legal regime was intended to comply with the following prereq-
uisites: (1) the preservation of certainty and stability, (2) the protection of 
acquired rights and the encouragement of further investment, (3) the exten-
sion of coherence with similar legal regimes such as copyright, (4) interna-
tional reciprocity and compatibility with international law and (5) the estab-
lishment of a balance between the needs of creators and users.45 
 Policymakers considered the applicability of various legal regimes includ-
ing a sui generis right and unfair competition law. Rejection of a sui generis 
right was explained as follows: “A sui generis regime could fulfill some of 
these requirements but not all. It could be adapted to the specific characteris-
tics of databases but would provide neither certainty nor stability since a 
considerable period of time would elapse before any jurisprudence could 
 
43. European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the 1992 Proposal, Part Two, ¶ 
8.2. 
44. One problem, however, is that contractual provisions can override the right of unfair 
extraction as well as its exceptions. This was corrected in Article 15 of the final version. 
45. European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the 1992 Proposal, Part One, ¶ 
5.1.1. 
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develop to give a constant interpretation of the text of new legislation in such 
a complex technical field.”46 This comment turned out to be prescient.  
 The rationale for the refusal to create a prohibition against unfair competi-
tion was less than convincing. Given that an unfair competition law did not 
exist at the European level, drafters commented, “It serves little point to at-
tempt to harmonize in respect of database protection by means of a regime 
which manifests itself in widely differing forms throughout the Community 
and which is largely based on case law. Nor would it be possible through a 
sectoral directive on a single product, a database, to regulate unfair competi-
tion law generally in the Member States.”47 
 A second reason provided was that unfair competition law regulates com-
petitors rather than suppliers and users, but that the drafters wished to create a 
right to regulate unauthorized use by everyone.48 Given the innovativeness 
and creativity of the final database right, it is difficult to accept this reasoning. 
Unfair competition laws can be designed so that the actions of private indi-
viduals can be interpreted as competitive acts if the producer’s market is 
threatened. For example, the European Parliament in the First Reading pro-
posed a definition of commercial as “any use – whether domestic or collec-
tive – aiming at economic activity or a remunerated transaction.”49  
 Instead of adopting either of these approaches, a sui generis provision was 
introduced under the rubric of copyright law. Although it functioned like an 
exclusive right, the accompanying commentary indicated that it was inspired 
by the principles of unfair competition. Questions in the final Directive re-
garding how to interpret the right and how to determine infringement reflect 
this initial confusion. For example, is the currently operating database right 
an economic right like that under unfair competition law or is it an exclusive 
right under copyright law? 
 The fact that the sui generis provision is not a pure unfair competition 
right means that maintaining an adequate balance between consumers, re-
users and producers is critical. This is because an exclusive right grants own-
ership over certain uses for which users can be charged. Any attempts to 
 
46. Ibid., Part One, ¶ 5.1.2. 
47. Ibid., Part One, ¶ 5.3.9. 
48. Ibid., Part One, ¶ 5.3.10. 
49. European Parliament, Decision of the European Parliament on the 1st Reading con-
cerning the proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of databases, OJ 
(C) 194/144, 19/07/1993, Amendment No 7, Article 2a (hereinafter 1993 Decision on 
the 1st Reading). 
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create access must then be carved out of the right. This is not so in a narrowly 
designed unfair competition right where no right of ownership is granted.  
 Furthermore, because it was an exclusive rights provision, it became more 
easily manipulated into an even stronger one. As a result, there may have 
been a failure to adequately discuss the larger regulatory issues behind such 
an expansion. In reality, an investigation should have been conducted to ex-
amine the nature of database protection throughout the Community and to 
ascertain its impact on production. At the very least, there should have been a 
determination regarding how strong a right was needed. 
 The original drafters were concerned that the unfair extraction right “does 
not imply an over-protection of the rightholder at the expense of his competi-
tors nor of consumers as a whole.”50 Neither should it “prevent the flow of 
information.”51 It was reasoned that the idea-expression dichotomy avoided 
this problem under copyright law. This is because “the protection of the data-
base by copyright prevents no-one from acquiring the right to publish works 
or materials or from creating such works or materials himself.”52 For exam-
ple, “a producer or broker of information, whether it be stock exchange fig-
ures, weather data, bibliographical information is free to create, collect and 
sell that information to others who may wish to distribute it against payment 
to end users. Equally a competing producer of information may perform the 
same collecting operation or generate his own information which can be sold 
to competing brokers.”53 However, “this does not apply where the works 
which form the contents of the database are themselves databases containing 
unprotected works or materials.”54 
 To avoid this danger, there was a deliberate effort to ensure that the new 
sui generis provision “is not to be considered in any way as an extension of 
copyright protection to mere facts or data.”55 Furthermore, Recital 30 of the 
first draft states that the new right “should not give rise to the creation of any 
independent right in the works or materials themselves.” The purpose of the 
compulsory licenses was to avoid this problem. But because these provisions 
were eliminated, concern over whether a right is provided in the content itself 
remains a problem in the final Directive. 
 
50. European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the 1992 Proposal, Part One, ¶ 
4.2.1. 
51. Ibid., Part One, ¶ 3.2.8. 
52. Ibid., Part One, ¶ 4.2.3. 
53. Ibid., Part One, ¶ 4.2.2. 
54. Ibid., Part Two, ¶ 2.5. 
55. European Commission, The 1992 Proposal, Recital 29. 
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4.5 Subsequent Revisions Produce a Strong Right  
Up through the Commission’s Amended Proposal, the spirit of the first draft 
remained largely intact. For example, while the unfair extraction right had 
been slightly revised, it was still only valid against commercial use. Mean-
while access for re-users, such as the compulsory licenses and the insubstan-
tial commercial use exception, remained, as did the private use exception for 
consumers.  
 It is possible to trace a slow evolution from a narrow to a broad right. It 
did not happen in one sitting. The most significant changes, however, were 
adopted in 1995 by the Council in its Common Position.56 These revisions 
were added with little explanation. The subsequent European Parliament’s 
Second Reading and the Opinion of the Commission generally followed the 
Council’s lead.57  
 Before discussing the ultimate legislation, it is worth exploring what 
amendments were made in the critical areas of the legislation over time. The 
following will be discussed: (1) the qualification threshold, (2) the scope of 
the right, (3) access for re-users and (4) access for consumers. They will be 
detailed in broad strokes here because the most important changes are further 
explored in Chapter 5.  
 In the first draft, a database qualified for the sui generis provision if it 
satisfied the definition of an electronic database and if there was no other 
form of protection over the contents, such as through the Nordic Catalogue 
Rule. In the Council Position, coverage was expanded to non-electronic data-
bases and the right harmonized to include all contents whether or not pro-
tected by another right.  
 In addition, a new qualification threshold was created. Now a database 
was eligible when it “shows that there has been qualitatively and/or quantita-
tively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presen-
tation of the contents.”58 The Council’s reasoning was to ensure that the 
qualification conformed to the purpose of the right, which was to safeguard 
 
56. Council of Europe, The 1995 Common Position. 
57. European Parliament, Decision of the European Parliament on the 2nd reading con-
cerning the proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of databases, OJ 
(C) 17/164, 22/01/1996; European Commission, Opinion of the Commission 10.1.1996 
regarding the proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the legal 
protection of databases, Commission COM (96) 2 final-COD 393. 
58. Council of Europe, The 1995 Common Position, Art. 7.1. 
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the position of database makers against misappropriation of their invest-
ment.59  
 The Council portrayed the new threshold as a restriction. Whether it was a 
restriction at the time it was proposed is difficult to judge. This is because all 
databases, rather than merely electronic ones, could qualify. But, as it turned 
out, the threshold became one of the most important levers to narrow the 
right.  
 The actual right also became stronger. In the First Reading of the Euro-
pean Parliament, it was proposed that the name be switched from unfair ex-
traction to unauthorized extraction which is what the right is officially called 
today. This was not a dramatic change. Even though it was called the right to 
prevent unfair extraction in Article 1.1 of the first draft, the actual description 
in Article 2.5 mandated the prevention of “unauthorized extraction or re-
utilization.” In its Amended Proposal, the Commission accepted this revision 
and reorganized the legislation into two separate rights, that of the structure 
and arrangement under copyright and that of the contents under the now un-
authorized extraction right.60  
 It was in the Amended Proposal that the right was first dubbed a sui 
generis right rather than a sui generis provision. Although the reason is not 
specifically addressed, one explanation may be that “it is acknowledged in 
the report of the Legal Affairs Committee to be a sui generis right, subject to 
its own specific provisions as set out in the proposed Directive and not linked 
to any existing legal regime or international Convention.”61 What this meant 
was that all the problems anticipated by the drafters in the commentary to the 
first draft would become a reality. The priority of certainty and security of the 
law had been scrapped. 
 With the declaration of a new sui generis right, protection became even 
stronger. The grant in the Commission’s Amended Proposal read, “Member 
States shall provide for a right for the owner of the rights in a database to 
prevent the unauthorized extraction or re-utilization, from that database, of its 
contents, in whole or in substantial part, for commercial purposes.”62  
 
59. Ibid., Statement of Reasons, ¶ 14. 
60. European Commission, Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protec-
tion of databases OJ (C) 308/1, 15/11/93 (hereinafter The 1993 Amended Proposal). 
61. European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum of the Amended proposal for a 
Council Directive On The Legal Protection of Databases, COM (93) 464 final – SYN 
393, 4/10/1993, p. 3 (hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum to the 1993 Amended 
Proposal). 
62. European Commission, The 1993 Amended Proposal, Art. 10.2. 
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 Once again, dramatic changes in the Council’s Common Position tran-
spired. The new right was as follows: “Member States shall provide for a 
right for the maker of a database . . . to prevent acts of extraction and/or re-
utilization of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or 
quantitatively, of the contents of that database.”63 An additional right was 
also granted against “the repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-
utilization of insubstantial parts of the contents of the database.”64 The word-
ing of both prohibitions was altered somewhat in the ultimate version, but the 
scope remained the same.  
 In the interest of clarity, the Council added the definitions of extraction 
and re-utilization. Moreover, protection was no longer extended for commer-
cial purposes only. Now it applied across the board to both commercial and 
noncommercial uses. However, this latter change was not mentioned in the 
Statement of Reasons provided by the Council.  
 Another revision was that a substantial taking could be infringing either 
qualitatively or quantitatively. Under the first draft, the database right was 
meant “to prevent the unauthorized extraction or re-utilization, from the data-
base, of its contents, in whole or in substantial part, for commercial pur-
poses.”65 No definition of a “substantial part” was provided. Instead, an in-
substantial part was defined as “parts of a database whose reproduction, 
evaluated quantitatively and qualitatively in relation to the database from 
which they are copied, can be considered not to prejudice the exclusive rights 
of the maker of that database to exploit that database.”66  
 What the Council did was eliminate the definition of insubstantial uses 
and then take the notion of qualitative and quantitative and add it to the con-
cept of a “substantial part.” The resulting right then prevented “acts of extrac-
tion and re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualita-
tively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that database.”67 A “substantial 
part” was not defined. 
 Once again, the Council portrayed its changes as restrictions.68 It stated 
that under the original version, the taking of an insubstantial part could be 
infringing. This construction is difficult to accept for several reasons. First, 
the original draft did not protect against an insubstantial taking. In fact, it 
 
63. Council of Europe, The 1995 Common Position, Art. 7.1. 
64. Ibid., Art. 7.5. 
65. European Commission, The 1992 Proposal, Art. 2.5. 
66. Ibid., Art. 1.3. 
67. Council of Europe, The 1995 Common Position, Art. 7.1. 
68. Ibid., Statement of Reasons, ¶ 14. 
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stated directly that the right prevented a taking of the contents “in whole or 
substantial part.”69 Thus, it is hard to imagine how an insubstantial part could 
have been construed as an infringement. In addition, many of the changes not 
mentioned in the Council’s Statement of Reasons served to broaden the right. 
The expansion from commercial to all uses is one example. 
 Yet it was these so-called restrictions that caused the Council to reduce 
access. The result was that while the right got stronger, access got weaker. 
One big change that nearly escaped notice was the fact that the database right 
came to include noncommercial acts. This meant that noncommercial re-
users who make valuable contributions to society could risk legal action by 
conducting their normal activities if they required substantial use. Consumers 
were also deprived of making substantial use of such databases. 
 Two complementary exceptions had been provided for the re-user and 
consumer in the first draft. The re-user was granted a right to use insubstan-
tial portions for commercial purposes with attribution under Article 8.4. The 
private use exception under Article 8.5 allowed a consumer to employ insub-
stantial parts of a commercial database without attribution.  
 The Council deleted both. Instead, it added a right to the lawful user which 
allowed insubstantial use for any purpose whatsoever. No attribution was 
required. This new user right was redundant, however, because it was implied 
in the right to prevent unfair extraction. Under new Article 15, the right to use 
insubstantial parts could not be overridden by contract. This was a major 
concession. Lastly, three narrow exceptions were added under new Article 9.  
  The Council also deleted the compulsory license provisions. It claimed 
that the restriction of the right plus the addition of the Article 9 exceptions 
meant that compulsory licenses were no longer necessary. Instead it included 
Recital 47, which stated that the right should not result in abuses of a domi-
nant position. In addition, it required regular evaluations of the issue in Arti-
cle 16. 
 Even if the revisions narrowed the right, the fact is that it did not resolve 
the problem of sole-source databases. The compulsory license provision was 
originally implemented because the idea-expression dichotomy does not 
apply when unoriginal contents are protected. No matter how broad or nar-
row the right, or whether or not a few exceptions are incorporated, the prob-
lem of sole-source databases remains. In this context, then, it could be argued 
that data can be protected.  
 
69. European Commission, The 1992 Proposal, Art. 2.5. 
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 The term of protection also was revised during the course of the prepara-
tory phrase of the legislation. It started out as a 10 year period. More impor-
tantly, it was arguably finite. The European Parliament proposed an extension 
of the period to 15 years and provided a definition of insubstantial as well as 
substantial changes for renewal.70 These revisions were accepted by the 
Commission, which stated that that the longer period corresponds better to 
the need of the industry to recover investments and is more proportionate to 
the copyright term of 70 years.71  
 The Council explained that it, too, accepted the proposal to extend the 
term. Moreover, in order to establish a link between the sui generis right and 
the term extension, changes amounting to a substantial new investment were 
required.72 The result is that perpetual protection is allowed, in stark contrast 
to the idea of a limited term of protection.  
4.6 The 1996 Database Directive is a Strong Property Right 
For the final Database Directive, a strong property rights model was selected. 
The first draft was narrowly tailored to protect databases in electronic format 
against commercial competitors. In the final Directive, however, all databases 
are protected regardless of format and all users can potentially infringe.  
 According to Article 1.2, a database is “a collection of independent works, 
data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and indi-
vidually accessible by electronic or other means.” The definition includes: 
“collections, sometimes called ‘compilations’ ... which are arranged, stored 
and accessed by means which include electronic ... processes” and extends to 
nonelectronic databases.73 Compilations and collections of literary, artistic or 
musical works are examples of databases, as are collections of materials with 
texts, sound, images, numbers, facts and/or data.74  
 The second component of the definition emphasizes accessibility. A data-
base must include a method of retrieving its contents. It may comprise the 
materials necessary for operation or consultation, such as a thesaurus or in-
 
70. European Parliament, 1993 Decision on the 1st Reading, Amendment 24, Art. 9(3).  
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73. The 1996 Database Directive, Recitals 13, 14. 
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dexation system.75 It also embraces electronic databases which are not physi-
cally stored in an organized manner.76 Presumably a search engine could 
provide the access function. However, computer programs are not pro-
tected.77  
 The most stunning contribution of the Database Directive is the creation of 
the new sui generis right. The database maker is granted rights to prevent: (1) 
the “extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part, 
evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the contents of that database” 
and (2) “the repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-utilization of insub-
stantial parts of the contents of the database implying acts which conflict with 
a normal exploitation of that database or which unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the maker.”78  
 Two definitions are provided. Extraction is “the permanent or temporary 
transfer of all or a substantial part of the contents of a database to another 
medium by any means or in any form.”79 Re-utilization means “any form of 
making available to the public all or a substantial part of the contents of a 
database by the distribution of copies, by renting, by on-line or other forms of 
transmission.”80 
 Infringement can attach “not only to the manufacture of a parasitical com-
peting product but also to any user who, through his acts, causes significant 
detriment, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, to the investment.”81 
Permission is also required when an online display of a database necessitates 
extraction which is the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial 
part of the contents to another medium.82 However, the database right “does 
not in any way constitute an extension of copyright protection to mere facts 
or data.”83 Nor does it “give rise to the creation of a new right in the works, 
data, or materials themselves.”84  
 Only certain databases qualify for the sui generis right. To be eligible, the 
database maker must show “that there has been qualitatively and/or quantita-
tively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presen-
 
75. Ibid., Recital 20. 
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tation of the contents.”85 Investment can be both financial and professional 
and can include “the deployment of financial resources and/or the expending 
of time, effort and energy.”86 According to Recital 19, the compilation of 
musical recordings on a CD does not meet the substantial investment crite-
rion.  
 If protection is granted, the term lasts for 15 years.87 It is renewable under 
the following conditions: “Any substantial change, evaluated qualitatively or 
quantitatively, to the contents of a database, including any substantial change 
resulting from the accumulation of successive additions, deletions or altera-
tions, which would result in the database being considered to be a substantial 
new investment, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively.”88 A substantial 
verification can trigger an additional term.89 The database maker has the bur-
den of proving when a database is completed and when a substantial modifi-
cation should be considered a substantial new investment.90  
 A small amount of information access is granted. The only mandatory 
right allows the lawful user to freely take insubstantial parts of database con-
tents “for any purposes whatsoever” as long as it does not “conflict with 
normal exploitation of the database or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the maker of the database.”91 Any contractual provisions contrary 
to this limitation are void.92  
 Under Recital 52, Member States that protected their database contents 
under previous regimes such as the Nordic Catalogue Rule, can choose to 
retain their traditional exceptions. In addition, the three optional exceptions of 
Article 9 allow the lawful user to employ substantial parts: “(a) in the case of 
extraction for private purposes of the contents of a non-electronic database;” 
(b) “in the case of extraction for the purposes of illustration for teaching or 
scientific research” of a noncommercial nature and (c) “in the case of extrac-
tion and/or re-utilization for the purposes of public security or an administra-
tive or judicial procedure.”93 According to Recital 36, scientific research 
comprises both the natural and human sciences. However, Member States 
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may further limit the teaching and research exception to specific categories. 
Furthermore, there are no provisions against using contractual provisions to 
override the Article 9 exceptions. 
4.7 Testing the Database Right at the ECJ 
The new Directive did not define key concepts necessary for the implementa-
tion of the sui generis right. Questions included: (1) what is the definition of a 
database?, (2) what types of investment count towards obtaining, verification 
and presentation of the contents?, (3) what is a substantial investment qualita-
tively and/or quantitatively?, (4) what is the scope of infringement of both a 
substantial and an insubstantial part of a database? and (5) can extraction and 
re-utilization be both direct and indirect? These and other definitional gaps 
led to litigation in England, Finland, Greece and Sweden.94  
 The lawsuits also reflected ongoing debate in Europe about the balance 
between production incentives and information access within the Directive. 
Advocates of the spin-off theory contended that databases generated as mere 
by-products of the primary activity of a business, for example, a database of 
TV listings produced by a broadcaster, should not qualify for protection and 
thus remain in the public domain.95 Others supported a lower criterion more 
akin to that required in the United Kingdom for sweat-of-the-brow copyright 
so that most database contents would receive protection.96  
 
94. See British Horseracing Board v. William Hill Organization ECJ, C-203/02, 9 Nov. 
2004, Fixtures Marketing LTD v. Oy Veikkaus Ab ECJ, C-45/02, 9 Nov. 2004, Fix-
tures Marketing Limited v Organismos Prognostikon Agonon Podosphairou AE, ECJ, 
C-444/02, 9 Nov. 2004, and Fixtures Marketing Ltd. V. AB Svenska Spel, ECJ, C-
338/02, 9 Nov. 2004. 
95. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, “Program Schedules, Event Data and Telephone Subscriber 
Listings under the Database Directive – The ‘Spin-Off’ Doctrine in the Netherlands 
and elsewhere in Europe,” paper presented at Eleventh Annual Conference on Interna-
tional IP Law & Policy, Fordham University School of Law, New York, April 2003, 
14-25.  
96. See Jens Gaster, “The Legal Protection of Chronological Lists of Football Matches and 
Compilations of Data Related to Horseracing under the Database Right – Or How 
Your Judge Might Get it Right or Wrong,” Computer und Recht International 2 (2001-
3), pp. 74-78. For a contrary opinion, see Gunnar W.G. Karnell, “The European Sui 
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 In retrospect, this debate was critical because it helped to determine what 
was protected by the sui generis right and what remained free in the public 
domain. In lieu of compulsory licenses and other mechanisms granting ac-
cess, the ECJ’s ultimate resolution has been referred to as the idea-expression 
dichotomy of the database right.97 
 The spin-off doctrine probably emerged during debates within the Dutch 
parliament prior to the implementation of the Directive.98 Parliamentary 
Members and the Minister of Justice agreed that databases such as a list of 10 
Michelin-star restaurants, a radio or TV listing, or a compilation of stars in a 
newly discovered galaxy would not meet the substantial investment criteria.  
 The logic behind the spin-off theory is that since the purpose of the sui 
generis right is to promote investment in databases, only those in which a 
direct link can be established between the investment and the making of the 
database should be protected. Otherwise consumers would end up paying 
twice: once for the primary activity of the business and a second time for the 
spin-off activity of generating a database. Other examples of databases that 
should not qualify include sport fixtures, rail and airline schedules, telephone 
directory listings, events schedules, examination scores, stock exchange data 
and scientific research data.  
 While Dutch national courts were divided on the issue,99 defendants in the 
Finnish and Swedish cases that were heard by the ECJ adhered to the spin-off 
theory. While the plaintiffs argued that their football fixture lists were pro-
tected as databases, the defendants asserted that the investment made was to 
organize football matches and not to make databases. Because the databases 
were a mere by-product of the principal activity of organizing games, they 
did not fulfill the substantial investment requirement.  
 A preliminary question on the validity of the spin-off argument was pre-
sent in all four cases which went up to the European Court of Justice. In 
Sweden, the lower court ruled that the fixture list was a protected database 
but that there was no infringement. The Swedish appeals court did not rule on 
the issue of qualification but stated there was no infringement. A similar 
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result was found by the courts in Finland. In contrast, the parties in British 
Horseracing Board agreed that the database qualified for protection. Still, the 
lower British court provided its opinion on the issue.  
 Because the bulk of the ECJ’s ruling is contained in the British case, dis-
cussion is focused on its details and consequences. All three opinions will be 
discussed beginning with the lower British court to the Advocate General to 
the final determination of the ECJ. The reason for detailing these decisions is 
to understand the trend in some courts to lower the threshold and strengthen 
the right. Because such a strengthening could jeopardize re-use and decrease 
database production, suggestions are made in Chapter 5 on how to suppress 
this tendency in judicial efforts to determine both the qualification threshold 
and infringing activities. 
4.8 The Facts of British Horseracing Board 
The case of British Horseracing Board v. William Hill challenged the balance 
between information access and production incentives. British Horseracing 
Board (BHB) is the governing authority of the British horseracing industry. It 
creates the yearly fixture list that determines horse races. The list normally 
takes five months to compile and costs over 5.89 million euros per year to 
produce. It contains the venues, dates, times, race conditions, entries and 
competing horses for each race. The fixture list forms a part of a larger BHB 
database which holds 214 tables with more than 20 million records.  
 William Hill is a leading off-track bookmaking service in the United 
Kingdom which earned over 116 million euros in 1999. It provides betting 
services through a national network of 1,526 trading locations and through 
the telephone. The company pays a monthly license fee for racing informa-
tion used for its telephone betting service and a substantial fee for permission 
to display it at each trading unit. In 2000, William Hill started both domestic 
and international Internet betting sites. By the time racing data is displayed on 
the Internet sites, it has already been made public through newspapers and 
teletexts since the day before the actual race.  
 In the first case involving the interpretation of the Database Directive in 
England, the BHB alleged that its database qualified for protection under the 
sui generis right and that William Hill’s activities violated both Article 7(1) 
on extraction and re-utilization of a substantial part of a database and Article 
7(5) on repeated and systematic extraction and re-utilization of an insubstan-
tial part.  
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 William Hill put forth various arguments including that the data is already 
in the public domain by the time it is published on its website and is therefore 
free to all. It also claimed that the company does not take a substantial part or 
even a repeated and systematic insubstantial part of the contents of the data-
base but only a small part that is non-infringing.  
4.9 Thresholds are Lowered in the First Instance 
In February 2001, the High Court of Justice Chancery Division of London 
considered the case.100 Neither party disputed that the Board’s database quali-
fied for the sui generis right. Nevertheless, the court attempted to flesh out 
the prerequisites. After analyzing the objectives of the Directive, the court set 
the following threshold: (1) investment must be substantial enough to justify 
protection but (2) the qualifying level of investment is fairly low.  
 The court’s definition of “obtaining” qualified the BHB database for pro-
tection. “Obtaining,” it said, referred to the gathering of existing data into a 
database but did not include the actual creation of that data. The court noted, 
however, that it may be difficult to distinguish between these two activities. If 
a company creates information that is directly entered into its database, then 
both obtaining and creating occur simultaneously and can be counted. In 
opining on the criteria for qualification under the sui generis right, it con-
cluded that “whatever the level, it is not suggested that the investment in the 
BHB Database falls below it.”101  
 The heart of the case was whether or not William Hill had breached the 
database right. Under Article 7.1, infringement consists of “extraction and/or 
re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively 
and/or quantitatively, of the contents of the database.” The court pointed out 
that the significance of the data to the alleged infringer may shed light on 
whether it is an important part. Since the ultimate purpose of the database is 
to facilitate racing, the crucial part is the data relating to races. The court 
concluded, “William Hill is relying on and taking advantage of the complete-
ness and accuracy of the information taken . . . in other words the product of 
BHB’s investment in obtaining and verifying that data. This is a substantial 
part of the contents.”102  
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 A successful lawsuit requires proof of extraction and re-utilization. The 
claimant defined extraction as copying and re-utilization as making the mate-
rial available in any form to the public. But William Hill argued that extrac-
tion and re-utilization are limited to the first removal of data. Once material is 
available to the public, through a newspaper for example, no one can infringe. 
The court disagreed. It held that extraction and utilization can be direct or 
indirect and that William Hill had engaged in both.  
 The court also considered whether or not Article 7(5) had been violated. 
This article prohibits “the repeated and systematic extraction and/or re-
utilization of insubstantial parts of the contents of the database implying acts 
which conflict with a normal exploitation of that database or which unrea-
sonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker.”  
 The British Horseracing Board argued that even if what William Hill took 
during a given day was not substantial, its repeated and systematic taking was 
infringing. Such extraction prejudiced the Board’s legitimate interests be-
cause a significant part of its income is derived from selling racecard infor-
mation to bookmakers and to newspapers in order to facilitate betting. The 
court agreed, stating that all bookmakers in the country pay for the informa-
tion. Therefore, to allow the defendant to maintain an Internet betting site 
without paying undermined the value of the licenses.  
4.10 The Advocate General Generally Confirms 
The British Court of Appeal stated that it would likely agree with the lower 
court’s ruling, but referred the case to the ECJ.103 The Advocate General 
submitted an opinion in June 2004 which provided guidelines for evalua-
tion.104 The opinion generally supported the British decision. 
 The Advocate General began by specifying how a database qualifies for 
protection. She emphasized a clear distinction between resources used to 
create data, which do not count towards qualification, and resources used to 
obtain, verify and present existing materials, which do. Similar to the British 
decision, however, the Advocate General mentioned that obtaining could 
include the creation of data if it took place at the same time as its processing 
and was inseparable from it.  
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 In defining substantial and insubstantial, the Advocate General set low 
thresholds. She explained that the purpose of sui generis protection was not to 
harmonize the law but to create a new right. Previous drafts of the Directive 
contained definitions for substantial and insubstantial but they had been re-
moved. According to the Advocate General, this signified that the legislature 
wanted courts to develop their own interpretations.  
 In evaluating whether a substantial part of a database has been taken, she 
stated that there is no minimum level in terms of quantity. It could be meas-
ured as an absolute comparison against the whole of the database or as a por-
tion of the relative part taken. Quantitative and qualitative valuations also 
could be combined. Relevant economic factors in the evaluation of a qualita-
tive part of a database could include the importance of the data to the in-
fringer and the investment made by the maker, particularly the cost of obtain-
ing the data.  
 The Advocate General stated that the prohibition against use of insubstan-
tial parts of a database functions as a protection clause to avoid circumven-
tion of the right to prevent substantial uses. Thus, what is considered a sub-
stantial part of a database forms the upper limit of what can be regarded as 
insubstantial. The lower limit is defined by the general principle that the Di-
rective does not cover individual data.  
 In interpreting infringement of an insubstantial part, the Advocate General 
said the objective of this particular right is to protect the return on investment. 
Repeated and systematic is a cumulative concept so that there is a kind of 
sliding scale of infringement, “If the interval is less and the affected part 
small, the act will have to be carried out more frequently for the part affected 
overall to fulfill one of the two requirements.”105  
 The requirement of normal exploitation was given a broad definition and 
low threshold. The prohibition kicks in even in the case of negative effects on 
a limited scale. It covers all acts which conflict with the exploitation of the 
database by the maker and can include, but is not limited to, potential mar-
kets. The Advocate General attempted to distinguish unreasonable prejudice 
by stating that it extends beyond legal interests. One starting point for as-
sessment is the actual or anticipated income of the maker. 
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4.11 The ECJ Raises the Qualification Threshold 
In November 2004, the ECJ issued a judgment that shocked supporters of 
strong database rights. The key to its decision was in raising the threshold to 
qualify for protection. The ECJ agreed with William Hill’s interpretation that 
the purpose of the Directive was “to promote and protect investment in data 
“‘storage’ and ‘processing’ systems.” Similar to the Advocate General’s 
analysis the Court stated that, “the expression ‘investment in ... the obtaining, 
verification or presentation of the contents’ of a database must be understood, 
generally, to refer to investment in the creation of that database as such.”106  
 Just as the lower British court and the Advocate General urged, the ECJ 
determined that investment in obtaining the contents of a database refers to 
investment in finding and collecting existing data to put into a database. It 
does not refer to the creation of the actual data. Instead of pointing to Recital 
19 to advocate for a low qualification threshold, however, the ECJ explained 
that a music CD does not qualify because there is not sufficient investment in 
collecting the music.  
 The ECJ held that the BHB database similarly lacked sufficient invest-
ment to qualify. The part taken consisted primarily of a list of horses sched-
uled to race. The Board’s investment in that part included: “selection, for the 
purpose of organising horse racing, of the horses admitted to run in the race” 
and “prior checks as to the identity of the person making the entry, the char-
acteristics of the horse and the classification of the horse, its owner and the 
jockey.”107 This investment comprised resources used to create the list of 
horses and not resources used to collect the data. The Court concluded, “It 
follows that the resources used to draw up a list of horses in a race and to 
carry out checks in that connection do not represent investment in the obtain-
ing and verification of the contents of the database in which that list ap-
pears.”108  
 Similar to the two other opinions, the Court declared that creators of data 
can receive protection for their databases. However, in stark contrast to the 
previous opinions, the ECJ stated that producers must show that there has 
been substantial investment independent of any resources used to create the 
data itself. This could consist of “the collection of those data, their systematic 
or methodical arrangement in the database, the organization of their individ-
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ual accessibility and the verification of their accuracy throughout the opera-
tion of the database.”109  
 The Court then turned to the definitions of substantial and insubstantial 
parts of a database which are needed to prove infringement. First, it examined 
the objectives of the sui generis right. According to Recital 42, the right is 
intended to prevent a situation in which a user “through his acts, causes sig-
nificant detriment, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, to the invest-
ment.” The implication, stated the ECJ, is that the assessment of both sub-
stantial and insubstantial parts refers to “the investment in the creation of the 
database and the prejudice caused to that investment by the act of extracting 
or re-utilizing.”110 In a complete departure from previous opinions, it stated 
that the intrinsic value of the materials affected does not constitute a relevant 
criterion. Its conclusion was based on the principle that individual data is 
never protected. 
 The definition of a substantial part evaluated quantitatively concerns the 
volume of data extracted, stated the Court. It must be accessed in relation to 
the whole contents and not just a part. A quantitatively significant part has 
been taken if that part required the deployment of substantial resources. The 
definition of “substantial part, evaluated qualitatively,” on the other hand, 
concerns the scale of the investment, regardless of quantity. Under this crite-
rion, a small part of the contents could comprise substantial human, technical 
or financial investment. Any part which does not fulfill the definition of sub-
stantial falls within the definition of an insubstantial part.  
 The Court then evaluated whether William Hill took a substantial part of 
the contents. The company used “the names of all the horses running in the 
race concerned, the date, the time and/or the name of the race and the name of 
the racecourse.”111 The issue was whether the human, technical and financial 
efforts in obtaining, verifying and presenting that data constituted a substan-
tial investment. The British Horseracing Board argued that the data was of 
crucial importance because, without the lists of runners, the races would not 
take place. But the ECJ noted that the fact that the data is vital to the organi-
zation of horse races is irrelevant. It concluded that the Board did not put in a 
substantial investment independent of the resources required for the creation 
of the data. Thus, William Hill did not take a substantial part of the BHB 
database.  
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 The Court next analyzed whether or not the sui generis right protects 
against direct and indirect extraction and/or re-utilization. To answer this 
question, it returned to the objectives of the right. Examining Recitals 42 and 
48, it determined that protection is aimed to prevent “acts by the user which 
go beyond [the] legitimate rights and thereby harm the investment of the 
maker” and that its economic justification was to guarantee a return on the 
database maker’s investment.112 An important implication, stated the Court, 
is that the act protects against direct as well as indirect use. Otherwise the 
maker would not be protected from unauthorized use of a copy of a database. 
 Extraction was defined as the transfer of the contents of the database to 
another medium and re-utilization as the making available to the public of the 
contents of a database. In analyzing the case at bar, the Court held that the 
defendant carried out both acts. 
 In the process of formulating the definitions of extraction and re-
utilization, the Court created a new right of consultation by the lawful user. A 
database maker can control who has access to his database. But once a data-
base is made available to the public, either by the database maker himself or 
by an authorized third party, the right of consultation is triggered and a lawful 
user cannot be prevented from consulting a database. A lawful user was de-
fined as “a user whose access to the contents of a database for the purpose of 
consultation results from the direct or indirect consent of the maker of the 
database.”113 The Court said that the cost of re-utilization can reflect any 
anticipated consultation by lawful users. 
 Finally, the Court turned to infringement by repeated and systematic tak-
ings of insubstantial parts of a database. Agreeing with the Advocate General, 
the ECJ stated that this protection was designed to prevent circumvention of 
the right against use of a substantial part. Thus, it “prohibits acts of extraction 
made by users which, because of their repeated and systematic character, 
would lead to the reconstitution of the database as a whole or, at the very 
least, of a substantial part of it, without the authorization of the maker,” re-
gardless of what kind of activity the contents will be used.114 It also prohibits 
acts of re-utilization by making insubstantial parts of the contents of the data-
base available to the public in a systematic and repeated manner.  
 The Court stated that the acts of extraction and re-utilization carried out by 
William Hill concerned insubstantial parts of the database. But because such 
acts were not intended to circumvent the prohibition against use of a substan-
 
112. Ibid., ¶ 45-46. 
113. Ibid., ¶ 58. 
114. Ibid., ¶ 87. 
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tial part of the database, “there is no possibility that, through the cumulative 
effect of its acts, William Hill might reconstitute and make available to the 
public the whole or a substantial part of the contents of the BHB database and 
thereby seriously prejudice the investment made by BHB in the creation of 
that database.”115  
 In sum, although William Hill had engaged in extraction and re-utilization, 
the fact was that the part it took did not represent a substantial or insubstantial 
part of the BHB database. More critical to the outcome of the case, the claim-
ant’s database did not qualify for sui generis protection. Therefore, William 
Hill could continue its use without authorization. 
4.12 Conclusion 
The legislative history of the Database Directive followed a hazardous course 
in which the balance between production incentives and information access 
swung from side to side throughout the process. It began as an attempt to 
seize the opportunity presented by the information revolution and ended as an 
attempt to guard against its dangers. Although the stated objectives changed 
little during the eight years of its formulation, the final version clearly shifted 
focus from a narrowly tailored right against unfair extraction to a strong 
property right in database contents. 
 The first draft was designed to fill in the existing legal gaps in electronic 
database protection. The right to prevent unfair extraction was aimed toward 
commercial competitors. It applied to databases whose contents were not 
already protected through existing national law. By providing such narrowly 
tailored rights, the drafters intended to stimulate continued investment. Since 
only direct misappropriation by competing businesses was prohibited, re-
users could be encouraged to enter the industry and be guaranteed access to 
database contents. Other noncommercial database sectors, such as the re-
search and educational communities and public entities, would remain largely 
unaffected. Moreover, the traditional privileges granted to private users, such 
as copying for personal use, also remained. 
 In contrast, the final Directive provides broad rights in database content 
combined with a few narrow exceptions. For example, the right extends be-
yond the manufacture of a parasitical competing product to “any user who, 
through his acts, causes significant detriment, evaluated qualitatively or quan-
 
115. Ibid., ¶ 94. 
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titatively, to the investment.”116 Whereas the first draft aimed only at safe-
guarding electronic databases, the final Directive covers all types of databases 
in which there has been a substantial investment. Furthermore, since data-
bases require constant updating and checking, it is conceivable that the term 
of protection could last forever. 
 Like the first draft, the overarching goal of the Database Directive is to 
stimulate the growth of a strong database industry. By creating the sui generis 
right, lawmakers may have achieved greater harmonization. But the very 
strength and predictability of the new right reveals a weakness. It may be so 
broad that the balance between production incentives and information access 
is threatened.  
 Under the Directive, information access is limited. Substantial uses with-
out authorization are only allowed in three very specific circumstances in-
volving teaching or scientific research, public security or administra-
tive/judicial procedures. Meanwhile, the rights and obligations of lawful users 
are redundant and are authorized only if the use does not hurt the database 
maker’s interests. 
 This imbalance between overbroad production incentives and a lack of 
information access could be counterproductive. Granting exclusive rights 
without creating avenues of information access may discourage re-users who 
wish to add value to a database or to create a new resource for an entirely 
different market. Overprotection could cause original database makers to 
charge a high license price that only the well-funded can afford. Fewer pro-
ducers would mean less competition and innovation. This could lead to even 
fewer databases at still higher prices. Competition and innovation would be 
further stymied by the tendency over time to expand exclusive rights as illus-
trated by the opinions of the Lower British court and the Advocate General 
and by the general trend toward the expansion of copyright. 
 In recognition of these dangers, the ECJ judgment significantly narrowed 
the type of database that qualifies for protection by completely separating the 
calculation of investment in the creation of data from that of the obtaining, 
verifying and presenting of data. This narrowed interpretation contributes to a 
significant amount of information access that could allow re-users to develop 
other database products that do not mimic the original database, but merely 
make use of some of the information in it. The result could allow for the de-
velopment of a strong database industry. 
 
116. The 1996 Database Directive, Recital 42. 
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 One problem posed by raising the qualification threshold is what would 
happen to those who do not qualify. Some may cease to rely on the Database 
Directive as the primary method of protection. Instead, they may turn to con-
tract law and technical measures. Special consideration should be given to 
protect information access in the wake of such efforts. On the other hand, 
some database makers may switch to a model, such as advertising with free 
content, in which content protection is not needed. If this becomes the case, 
then the regime of no protection can be beneficial. Further explanation is 
provided in Chapter 6. Here, it is only important to mention that careful 
monitoring is needed to ensure a positive future. 
 A balance between production incentives and information access can be 
maintained by narrowing the right of protection and its interpretation, intro-
ducing further user rights and limiting the term of protection. The goal of the 
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5.1 Introduction: The Commission’s Evaluation 
Article 16.3 of the Database Directive mandates the Commission, “on the 
basis of specific information supplied by the Member States,” to submit a 
report in which “it shall examine in particular the application of the sui 
generis right, including Articles 8 [on rights and obligations of lawful users] 
and 9 [on exceptions to the sui generis right], and shall verify especially 
whether the application of this right has led to abuse of a dominant position 
or other interference with free competition which would justify appropriate 
measures being taken.”  
 In its first report submitted on 12 December 2005, the Commission con-
cludes: (1) “The economic impact of the ‘sui generis’ right is unproven,” (2) 
“‘Sui generis’ protection comes close to protecting data as property” and (3) 
“The ‘sui generis’ right is difficult to understand.” 1  
 According to a 2005 Commission survey of 101 stakeholders, the sui 
generis right helped Europe catch up in terms of investment but it did not 
result in greater production. Increased investment occurred primarily in the 
areas of additional information technology and staff. Since 1996, the annual 
increase of 49% of respondents was more than 20%. The increase in invest-
ment was 0-20% for 37% of the respondents and 15% reported that it stayed 
the same or decreased.2  
 However, the Commission states that “there is thus no conclusive data 
available as to whether European database production has been significantly 
influenced by the Directive.”3 Citing statistics compiled by the Gale Direc-
tory of Databases, it notes that the European Union’s share in global database 
 
1. European Commission, “First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection 
of databases,” (Brussels, 12 December 2005), §§ 5.1-5.3, (hereinafter The 2005 Eva-
luation). 
2. Ibid., § 4.2.2. 
3. Ibid., § 4.2.3. 
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production increased from 22% in 1996 to 24% in 2004. Meanwhile, the US 
share rose from 62% to 72%. The Commission cautions that the figures com-
piled in the Gale Directory may be inaccurate and suggests that further em-
pirical research is necessary to definitively conclude whether or not the right 
has had any effect.  
 Still, the Commission relays that producers wish to retain the right. Of the 
75% of respondents of the 2005 survey who are aware of the sui generis 
right, 80% feel protected or well-protected, 90% feel that EU-level protection 
is important and 65% believe legal protection is higher now than before the 
Directive.4 The Commission asserts that, “while this endorsement of the ‘sui 
generis’ right is somewhat at odds with the continued success of US publish-
ing and database production that thrives without ‘sui generis’ type protection, 
the attachment to the new right is a political reality that seems very true for 
Europe.”5 
 While the Commission states several times that the empirical analysis 
from the Gale Directory is subject to uncertainty, it fails to acknowledge that 
its 2005 survey involving 101 respondents may not be conclusive.6 Thus, any 
efforts to use the survey results in order to forward a particular policy solu-
tion must be viewed critically. Furthermore, it is entirely obvious that some 
producers would prefer to keep the right because it is they who profit from it. 
Clearly, an independent evaluation which thoroughly analyzes the economic 
impact on all stakeholders, including re-users, is needed.  
 In its analysis of access, the Commission mentions fears that information 
may be locked up to the detriment of users. It also pledges to analyze 
“whether the objectives of the Directive have been achieved effectively and 
 
4. Ibid., § 4.1.3. 
5. Ibid., § 5.3. 
6. At times, the Commission provides arguably misleading interpretations of the informa-
tion from the survey. Its comments on the creation of business opportunities is a case 
in point. In the introductory summary, the Commission states that “most respondents 
to the on-line survey believe that the ‘sui generis’ right …created more business oppor-
tunities.” § 1.4. In the fourth section on the impact of the Directive, the Commission 
reiterates that stakeholders believe more business opportunities have been created. 
Two sentences later, the Commission states that some believe that the negative conse-
quences of the right include “fewer business opportunities.” § 4.1.3. In the section 
which evaluates investment in production, the Commission reveals “30% of the re-
spondents think that the ‘sui generis’ right created more business opportunities.” § 
4.2.2. In assessing whether database production has increased as compared to the US, 
the Commission further affirms, “very few respondents believe that the ‘sui generis’ 
right has created more business opportunities.” § 4.4. The Commission then concludes 
in its analysis section that the right has created more business opportunities. § 5.3. 
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efficiently, that is without triggering unnecessary costs for the academic 
community or industries that depend on the availability of data and informa-
tion.”7 But although concluding that “sui generis protection comes close to 
protecting data as property,” the Commission fails to evaluate the unneces-
sary costs that may have been imposed. Instead, it tackles user interests by 
citing the results of an independent study from 2002.8  
 According to the study, libraries, academic organizations, re-users and 
consumers were concerned that the scope of the right may be too broad. 
Members of the academic and scientific community argued that the excep-
tions were too restrictive and that this can reduce public benefit from research 
and innovation. Re-users sought for the application of traditional copyright 
exceptions, such as for commentary or quotation. Consumers wished to en-
gage in private use. Yet, rather than separately addressing these access issues, 
the Commission refers to the ECJ judgments as allaying “the fear of those 
who believed that the Directive would lock up information otherwise publicly 
available, at least with respect to those databases which contain data ‘created’ 
by the database maker himself.”9  
 Such a conclusion does not allay all fears. Even though the ECJ decisions 
may prevent abuse by some sole-source databases makers, they do not ad-
dress other possible restrictions to information access. These include the 
broad scope of the right, the fuzzy definition of a lawful user, the lack of 
traditional copyright exceptions and the possibility of unlimited term renew-
als.  
 The Commission asserts that, “the ECJ in November 2004 significantly 
curtailed the scope of ‘sui generis’ protection, thereby pre-empting concerns 
that the right negatively affects competition.”10 But this is not necessarily the 
case, either. As mentioned by the Commission, producers will try to bypass 
the qualification threshold.11 For those whose databases qualify, overprotec-
tion can result in a restriction of competition through mechanisms such as 
higher prices that are not generally resolved by competition law. 
 In its discussion of the difficulty of understanding the database right, the 
Commission summarizes developments in national case law. For example, 
 
7. Ibid., § 1.2. 
8. See “The implementation and application of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection 
of databases” at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/ 
etd2001b53001e72_en.pdf (last visited 9 August 2007). 
9. European Commission, The 2005 Evaluation, § 4.3. 
10. Ibid., § 1.5. 
11. Ibid., § 5.1. 
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differences exist on what is a substantial investment and on the extent to 
which re-use is infringing. Concludes the Commission, “Divergences of in-
terpretations seem to arise especially in jurisdictions that did not have any 
right comparable to ‘sweat of the brow’ copyright. On the other hand, the 
English courts appear to have interpreted the Directive in a manner consistent 
with its intention.”12  
 The Commission also explores whether the “ECJ’s interpretation of the 
scope of the ‘sui generis’ right devalued the uniform levels of protection 
achieved for ‘non-original’ databases.”13 Although noting that producers such 
as British Horseracing Board will lose 142 million euros a year as a result of 
the decisions, the Commission states that 43% of the stakeholders in the 2005 
survey believe that their legal protection will be the same or even reinforced 
after the rulings.14 The Commission observes, “while going against the 
Commission’s original intention of protecting ‘non-original’ databases in a 
wide sense, the judgements have the merit of pointing to the serious difficul-
ties raised by attempting to harmonise national laws by recourse to untested 
and ambiguous legal concepts.”15  
 Though the Commission should be commended for its candor,16 it fails to 
provide an explanation of why the database right may not be fulfilling its 
objectives. One reason may be that the productive potential of re-users is 
being undervalued. This is contrary to the nature of the subject matter, which, 
as shown in Chapter 2, requires access. It is also against the economic theory 
discussed in Chapter 3, which further substantiates that the priority should be 
placed on access.  
 The unexpected conclusions of this legislative initiative have spawned 
efforts to revise the database right. The Commission has forwarded the fol-
lowing policy options: (1) repeal the entire Directive, (2) withdraw the sui 
generis right, (3) amend the sui generis right or (4) maintain the status quo.  
 
12. Ibid., § 4.1.2. 
13. Ibid., § 4.1.4. 
14. Id. 
15. Ibid., § 4.1.4. 
16. Some academics have praised the Commission’s honesty but gently chastised policy-
makers for not thoroughly doing their homework before passing the Directive. See 
Annette Kur, Reto M. Hilty, Christophe Geigerand and Matthias Leistner, “First eva-
luation of the directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases – Comment by the 
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, Munich,” In-
ternational Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 37 no. 5 (2006), pp. 
551-558. 
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 The purpose of this chapter is to provide a more nuanced evaluation of the 
relevant law and to provide suggestions for change. An important assumption 
is that amending the database right is the correct policy choice. This is be-
cause repeal of the right or of the entire Directive would defeat efforts at 
harmonization. Such a path may be short-sighted due to the importance of 
facilitating economies of scale and of encouraging the development of a 
European-wide database industry. On the other hand, returning to the drawing 
board and designing a completely new right may also be unwise. This is be-
cause of the lack of certainty and stability inherent in introducing entirely 
new and untested concepts.  
 The chapter will proceed as follows. First, a legal analysis of the general 
purpose of the Directive and the function of a database will be conducted. 
This exploration adds further fuel to the argument that a database operates as 
a generic infrastructure input. The implication is that access ought to receive 
high priority. Following this explanation, a section-by-section evaluation of 
the Directive will be conducted from the perspective of adequately balancing 
incentives and access. In order to conduct this analysis, an interpretation of 
the relevant law will be provided. It is based on the plain meaning of the 
statute, the legislative history, the insight of academic experts and on practi-
cal issues of policy.  
 Because suggestions of what the law ought to be are so intertwined with 
its interpretation, a discussion of possible amendments is submitted simulta-
neously in each section. This exploration focuses on both substantive changes 
that should be made to the Directive itself and suggestions for legal interpre-
tations by a court. The chapter will end with a series of recommendations to 
encourage a more satisfactory balance.  
5.2 The General Purpose  
The general purpose of the Directive balances production incentives with 
information access.17 The emphasis on incentives begins with recognition of 
the need for investment due to “the exponential growth, in the Community 
and worldwide, in the amount of information generated and processed annu-
 
17. The legal justification for the Directive is the need to promote the freedom of move-
ment of goods and services through harmonization of the database protection regime. 
Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 
on the legal protection of databases OJ (L) 77/20, 27/03/1996, Recitals 1-4 (hereinaf-
ter The 1996 Database Directive). 
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ally in all sectors of commerce and industry.”18 According to Recital 11, 
“there is at present a very great imbalance in the level of investment in the 
database sector both as between the Member States and between the Com-
munity and the world’s largest database producing countries.”19 The argu-
ment concludes that, “investment in modern information storage and process-
ing systems will not take place within the Community unless a stable and 
uniform legal protection regime is introduced.”20  
 The need for a production incentive is balanced against the need for ac-
cess. A database is identified as “a vital tool in the development of the infor-
mation market.”21 Furthermore, it is stated that “this tool will also be of use in 
many other fields.”22 Although it is not expressly written in the Recitals, the 
implication is that databases are important in all sectors of the economy so 
that the “exponential growth” in the “amount of information generated and 
processed annually” can be accessed and used in “all sectors of commerce 
and industry.”23 
 Clearly, however, the creation of a database right represents a rejection of 
the idea-expression dichotomy as one of the major mechanisms through 
which unoriginal content is freely available and remains in the public domain. 
Instead, policymakers seem to be looking toward the United Kingdom, where 
sweat-of-the-brow protection yielded the most databases in all of Europe. 
Embracing such a policy at the Community level requires the provision of 
enough access to unoriginal material in lieu of the idea-expression dichot-
omy.  
 Toward this end, various Recitals in the Directive are written to ensure 
that access is promoted in the implementation of the database right. Recital 
45 states that the database right “does not in any way constitute an extension 
of copyright protection to mere facts or data.” Under Recital 46, it is declared 
that the right “should not give rise to the creation of a new right in the works, 
data or materials themselves.” Lastly, it is noted in Recital 47 that the right 
 
18. Ibid., Recital 10. 
19. This seems to indicate that the lack of investment is viewed to be of paramount impor-
tance due to its effect on European competitiveness and economic dependency both 
within the Community and at the global level. It is well known that the United States 
was one of the large database producing countries to which legislators were referring.  
20. The 1996 Database Directive, Recital 12. 
21. Ibid., Recital 9. 
22. Id. 
23. Ibid., Recital 10. 
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“must not be afforded in such a way as to facilitate abuses of a dominant 
position.”  
5.3 The Function of a Database 
The legal definition of a database correctly parallels its technical nature. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the three components of a database are: (1) the con-
tents, (2) the logical schema and (3) the data management system. In Article 
1.2 of the Directive, a database is defined as: (1) “a collection of independent 
works, data or other materials” (the contents), (2) “arranged in a systematic or 
methodical way” (the logical schema) and (3) individually accessible by elec-
tronic or other means” (the data management system).24 
 The ECJ further clarifies this definition in the Greek fixture list case.25 
First, a database must be a collection of independent materials “which are 
separable from one another without their informative, literary, artistic, musi-
cal or other value being affected.”26 Second, the independent materials must 
be “systematically or methodically arranged and individually accessible.”27 
This implies that the collection should be contained in a fixed base and 
should include means that “allow the retrieval of any independent material 
contained within it.”28  
 A distinction between databases and traditional copyrighted materials is 
noted by the Court. A recording of an audiovisual, cinematographic, literary 
or musical work is different from a database because the components that 
comprise the recording cannot be separated without losing the value of the 
 
24. The first draft seems to have slightly jumbled the technical components. In Article 1.1, 
a database is defined as 1. “a collection of works or materials” (the contents), 2. “ar-
ranged, stored and accessed by electronic means” (the logical schema and the database 
management system) and 3. “the electronic materials necessary for the operation of the 
database such as its thesaurus, index or system for obtaining or presenting informa-
tion” (the logical schema and the database management system). The European Com-
mission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of databases,” OJ 
(C)156/4 23/6/92. (hereinafter The 1992 Proposal). 
25. Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Organismos prognostikon agonon podosfairou AE, ECJ case 
C-444/02, 09 Nov. 2004. 
26. Ibid., ¶ 29 
27. Ibid., ¶ 30. 
28. Id. 
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work.29 In contrast, the function of a database stems from its ability to store 
an unlimited number of independently valuable items.  
 The Court stresses this functional nature: “various aspects of the directive 
demonstrate that the term database within the meaning thereof is more spe-
cifically defined in terms of its function.”30 As evidence, the Court quotes 
Recitals 10 and 12 which state that given the “exponential growth, in the 
Community and worldwide, and in the amount of information generated and 
processed annually in all sectors of commerce and industry,” the Directive is 
intended to encourage the development of systems performing a function of 
“storage” and “processing” of information.31 Other corroboratory factors not 
mentioned by the Court are that databases are recognized in Recital 9 of the 
Directive as “a vital tool in the development of an information market within 
the Community; whereas this tool will also be of use in many other fields.” 
Moreover, Recital 13 lists the function of a database as including arranging, 
storing and accessing by means which include electronic processes.  
 This functional distinction signals a difference in the value of databases to 
society. In Chapter 2, it was argued that a database resembles the Internet 
more than it does a book. Both are tools that aid in facilitating the understand-
ing, analysis and transformation of information. In Chapter 3, it was sug-
gested that databases may qualify as generic infrastructural inputs. The fact 
that the legal definition and the ECJ’s interpretation both recognize this func-
tional nature makes the argument for access even stronger. 
5.4 Should Non-electronic Databases be Protected? 
Ideally, the definition of the object of protection should advance the purpose 
of the legislation. According to the ECJ, the definition of a database is in-
tended to be broad without any formal, technical or material considerations 
such as originality or a large number of materials.32 Evidence includes that 
under Article 1.1, protection encompasses databases “in any form.” 
 
29. Ibid., ¶ 29 and The 1996 Database Directive, Recital 17. 
30. Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Organismos prognostikon agonon podosfairou AE, 09 Nov. 
2004, ¶ 27. 
31. Ibid., ¶ 28. 
32. Ibid., ¶20. In the first reading, the European Parliament proposed adding “a large 
number of data to the definition.” European Parliament, Decision of the European Par-
liament on the 1st Reading concerning the proposal for a Council Directive on the le-
gal protection of databases, OJ (C) 194/144, 19/07/1993, Amendment 3 and Art. 1.1. 
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 In fact, the definition was extended from the first draft to cover non-
electronic databases.33 But the original version restricted protection to elec-
tronic databases in order to address the altered nature of the digital context. It 
was in the production of electronic databases that the Commission wished to 
maintain a competitive edge. Knowing this historical intent, can we say that 
the extension to non-electronic databases is justified? 
 The Economic and Social Committee was the first to suggest the inclusion 
of non-electronic databases.34 At that time, the database right did not apply to 
contents which were already protected by copyright. The Committee hinted 
that only covering electronic databases could result in some deserving subject 
matter remaining unprotected. The example cited was a telephone directory 
in hardcopy that was protected under sweat-of-the-brow copyright and con-
verted into digital form. According to the Committee, the electronic version 
could not be considered an original copyrighted work because there was no 
intellectual creation involved in the act of conversion. But neither would it 
receive protection under the database right because the underlying work was 
copyrighted. 
 This analysis is incorrect. A telephone book converted into electronic form 
does not lose its protection. Once something is copyrighted, the right extends 
to all reproductions no matter the medium. As one British scholar com-
mented, “If the reasoning in the Committee’s Opinion were correct, it would 
apply equally to the second and subsequent hardcopies of the directory.”35 
 The Committee was also concerned that restricting protection to electronic 
databases would result in different regulations applying to the same database 
in different forms. This unease was later repeated in the Council’s decision to 
include non-electronic databases. Three grounds for the extension were pro-
vided. First, the Council said that this solution was simpler because all medi-
ums were treated in the same manner. In addition, the extension was com-
patible with international treaties and conventions which do not distinguish 
 
The Commission rejected this suggestion by stating that “it would give rise to prob-
lems of interpretation” and is inconsistent with international conventions and ongoing 
discussion about database protection at the international level. European Commission, 
Explanatory Memorandum of the Amended proposal for a Council Directive On The 
Legal Protection of Databases, COM (93) 464 final – SYN 393, 4/10/1993, p. 3. 
33. Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Organismos prognostikon agonon podosfairou AE, 09 Nov. 
2004, ¶ 22, and The 1996 Database Directive, Recitals 14 and 22. 
34. Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive on 
the Legal Protection of Databases, 93/C 19/02, 24/11/1992, §§ 1.1.3-1.1.5 and 3.3.2. 
35. Mark J. Davison, The Legal Protection of Databases (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2003), p. 63. 
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between mediums. Lastly, it would be inappropriate if two different forms of 
a database did not enjoy the same protection.36  
 The inclusion of non-electronic databases is understandable. If they are 
not protected by any legal right, competitors could escape infringement by 
scanning and converting them into electronic form. The rationale for protec-
tion, then, is that unauthorized copying is just as likely to occur with hard-
copy versions as with electronic ones. 
 On the other hand, restricting the protection of the database right to elec-
tronic databases, including their paper and any other form, may be a missed 
opportunity to encourage digitalization and enhance access. Such a require-
ment would quickly stimulate the production of electronic databases. It was 
precisely the desire to remain competitive in the electronic world that 
prompted this legislation in the first place. Since electronic databases are 
accessible to more people than hard copy forms, digitalization would also 
advance the policy goal of information access. 
 The database right could be amended so that it is restricted to “an elec-
tronic database and all its other forms” in Article 7 of the Directive.37 Such a 
 
36. Council of Europe, Common Position (EC) No. 20/95 adopted by the Council 10 July 
1995 with a view to adopting Directive 95/ /EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of … on the legal protection of databases, OJ(C) 288/14, 30/10/1995, State-
ment of Reasons, ¶ 8 (hereinafter The 1995 Common Position). 
37. Some academics argue that the current definition extends to museum collections, gene 
banks and libraries. Although this does not advance the purpose of the legislation, this 
interpretation may be technically correct. For example, a real library clearly has mate-
rials – books, music and films – and each individual work possesses its own independ-
ent value. The works are systematically or methodically arranged through a classifica-
tion system such as the Dewey Decimal System. They are contained within the fixed 
base of the library’s physical boundaries. Lastly, retrieval of any item is possible 
through technical means which is the classification system combined with shelf mark-
ings.  
  Yet, tangible items should not be protected for several reasons. From a theoretical 
point of view, it sends a signal that real property and intellectual property should be re-
gulated similarly. This opens the door for arguments for even stronger intellectual pro-
perty rights and it encourages rent-seeking. 
  Empirically, tangible collections do not need this production incentive. Applica-
tion of the right could have unintended consequences. This is because in the tangible 
world, protection would include the system used to operate or consult the database. In 
a store, it would be the aisle signs. Since the variety of such signs used in a drug store, 
for example, is limited, such protection could be used to force out the competition.  
  The goal of such protection is to prevent an unauthorized party from making a 
catalog or list of a tangible collection. There is a much cheaper and simpler solution 
according to Derclaye. The risk is easily thwarted by the museum collector or shop 
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change could be justified by Article 1.1, which states that protection is avail-
able in any form. Moreover, this change would be compatible with other 
intellectual property rights. Once a work is protected, the right is extended to 
all mediums.  
 Contrary to the Council’s reasoning, restricting the database right to “an 
electronic database and all its other forms,” would not result in a more com-
plex legal regime or provide for different types of protection of the same 
database. Neither would it contravene international law. This is because the 
copyright in the structure and arrangement of the Database Directive need not 
be amended and, hence, will continue to apply to non-electronic databases.  
 What an amendment for application of the database right to electronic 
databases could do, however, is generate a rush to digitize. In the event that 
certain producers can prove that they lack funds, efforts could be made to 
provide public support for such endeavors. This may be money well spent. 
5.5 Re-interpreting the Qualification Threshold 
The qualification threshold is one of the most critical components of the da-
tabase right. It functions as a gauge that can be raised or lowered in order to 
determine what is protected and what is in the public domain. Yet even after 
the ECJ decisions, it is not entirely clear which databases are protected, what 
types of investments count and whether there is a floor threshold.  
 The first question to consider is whether the concept of substantial invest-
ment is an appropriate criterion. In copyright law, qualification is determined 
by looking at the work itself. Although it may be unclear what part or aspect 
is actually protected, there is at least a direct connection to the work in mak-
ing a determination. Not so with the database right. Does this present a prob-
lem?  
 
owner themselves. They can simply make a catalog or list of their wares. If it fulfills 
the requirements of a database, that catalog or list will be protected. The fact is the ex-
planatory memorandum of the first draft restricted the definition of a database to not 
include three-dimensional objects. This restriction should be reinstated. European 
Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal on the legal protection of da-
tabases, Com (92) 24 final (13 May 1992), Part Two, ¶ 1.1 (hereinafter Explanatory 
Memorandum to the 1992 Proposal). For further discussion, see Estelle Derclaye, 
“What is a Database? A Critical Analysis of the Definition of a Database in the Euro-
pean Database Directive and Suggestions for an International Definition” Journal of 
World Intellectual Property 5, no. 6 (Nov. 2002), pp. 981-1011. 
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 To answer this question, it may be worth referring to the purpose of the 
right. It articulates the incentive theory in which protection is needed to pre-
vent unauthorized copying so that the producer can recoup his investment. 
Since the purpose is purely economic, one could argue that a copyright crite-
rion is not appropriate because it involves a level of originality. This is a 
measurement that is decidedly not economic. In contrast, the protection of the 
database maker’s investment is eminently suitable because it is geared toward 
the cost of making the database. It is a right with an economic purpose and an 
economic qualification.  
 Clearly, there are some practical costs to an economic criterion. For the 
database maker whose burden it is to prove qualification, it spells increased 
administration.38 According to one association representing 80 UK directory 
and database publishers, for example, “The investment in database informa-
tion technology has been included in company wide IT budgets not specific 
content, editorial or production cost centres.”39 Obviously, administrative 
practices must be altered.  
 An economic criterion also contributes to legal uncertainty about what is 
protected and what is not. Since the qualification threshold is so fluid, a data-
base maker may not be sure if his product is protected. A user will have no 
idea simply because they do not have knowledge of the maker’s financial 
investments. Qualification could become an issue to be predicted by lawyers 
and financial experts in the midst of a legal dispute. One solution is to estab-
lish a registration system and a date-stamping requirement, as will be dis-
cussed in Section 5.14. It is also suggested that the ECJ provide more guid-
ance on the issue. 
 Although it is unclear which databases are protected, it is evident that the 
following databases do not qualify: (1) the football fixture lists of the English 
and Scottish league football, (2) the British Horseracing Board’s database and 
(3) under Recital 19 of the Directive, “a compilation of several recordings of 
musical performances on a CD.”40 This does not automatically rule out simi-
 
38. The 1996 Database Directive, Recitals 53. 
39. Data Publishers Association, “Submission from the DPA to the European Commission 
DG Markt [sic] in response to the Working Paper ‘First Evaluation of Directive 96/9 
on the legal protection of databases,’” Brussels, 10 March 1996, pt. 6.a.  
40. See British Horseracing Board Ltd and Others v. William Hill Organization Ltd, ECJ 
case C-203/02, 9 Nov. 2004 (from England); Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Oy Veikkaus 
Ab, ECJ case C-45/02, 09 Nov. 2004 (from Finland); Fixtures Marketing Ltd v. Organ-
ismos prognostikon agonon podosfairou AE, ECJ case C-444/02, 09 Nov. 2004 (from 
Greece); and Fixtures Marketing Ltd. v. Svenska Spel AB, ECJ case C-338/02, 09 Nov. 
2004 (from Sweden). 
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lar databases. Proof of a substantial investment in obtaining, verification or 
presentation of the contents qualifies any database.41 
 A variety of commentators have strived to determine which databases will 
be protected and which will not.42 According to the Commission, likely can-
didates comprise publishers of directories and listings or maps as long as their 
data is obtained and not created. Those that may not be protected include 
databases constructed by sports bodies, broadcasting organizations, soccer 
fixture lists and real estate or employment agencies.43 Those adhering to the 
spin-off theory would expand the list to include rail and airline schedules, 
telephone directory listings, events schedules, examination scores, stock ex-
change data and scientific research data.44  
 It is well-recognized that there is no bright line in these demarcations. This 
means that the spin-off theory does not apply automatically. Rather, the focus 
is on whether a particular database maker has substantially invested in obtain-
ing, verifying and presenting the data. As a result, those who create data can 
still be protected. For example, a fixture list that has been sold to another 
company which subsequently invests in making the database user-friendly 
could possibly qualify. On the other hand, a public agency that is required to 
produce a directory in which the businesses themselves make the corrections 
is likely not to.45  
 It is submitted, on the other hand, that the threshold is neatly structured to 
enable a case-by-case evaluation by any court. When applied correctly, this 
flexibility can be a bonus. For example, an individual court can apply the 
incentive theory to the facts of a particular case by asking the following ques-
tions: (1) Does the producer depend on database content protection to recoup 
 
41. Estelle Derclaye, “Database Sui Generis Right: What is Substantial Investment? A 
Tentative Definition,” International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law 36, no 1 (2005), p. 6. 
42. See Andreas Wiebe, “Database Protection in Europe in the Aftermath of William Hill 
and Fixtures,” Medien und Recht International: The Magazine of European Multime-
dia Law and Policy 1 (2004), pp. 38-44; Mark J. Davison and P. Bernt Hugenholtz, 
“Football Fixtures, Horseraces and Spin-offs: The ECJ Domesticates the Database 
Right,” European Review of Intellectual Property no. 3 (2005), pp. 113-118, European 
Commission, The 1995 Evaluation, § 4.1.4. 
43. European Commission, The 1995 Evaluation, § 4.1.4. 
44. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, “Program Schedules, Event Data and Telephone Subscriber 
Listings under the Database Directive – The ‘Spin-Off’ Doctrine in the Netherlands 
and elsewhere in Europe,” paper presented at Eleventh Annual Conference on Interna-
tional IP Law & Policy, Fordham University School of Law, New York, April 2003, 
14-25.  
45. Wiebe, “Database Protection in Europe,” Medien und Recht International, p. 41. 
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his investment? and (2) If not, would the granting of a right facilitate access 
by adding additional value to the information so that it can be understood, 
analyzed and transformed? As will be seen, the answers to these questions fit 
neatly into the requirements outlined in the Directive and further detailed by 
the ECJ. 
 It is acknowledged that economic interpretations are not generally ac-
cepted within the European legal framework. However, as argued in the in-
troductory chapter, the database right is an economic right with an economic 
purpose and an economic qualification. Therefore, it only makes sense to 
interpret it in economic terms. As previously noted, national courts are al-
ready applying economic analysis to construe this right. Moreover, it is ar-
gued that the use of economic analysis can aid in forwarding a more balanced 
policy.  
 The first question in applying incentive theory can be answered by looking 
at the football fixture lists involved in the litigation at the ECJ. Were the pro-
ducers dependent on content protection to recoup their investment? From the 
evidence provided, the answer is no. This can be verified by taking a deeper 
look into whether investment went into creating, verifying and presenting the 
data to coordinate games or whether it went into compiling a database. As 
stated by the Court, the majority of the investment went into organizing the 
games. Any investment in making the database itself was insubstantial. As a 
result, it can be argued that no incentive is required. Instead, the investment 
can be recouped by selling game tickets.46 A judge could move on to question 
two. 
 The first question could be affirmatively answered in a hypothetical ex-
ample of a start-up firm. The firm sells a specialized business directory data-
base offered on a subscription basis. It receives the bulk of its income from 
these sales. The primary investment goes towards collecting, verifying, up-
dating and ensuring that the information is comprehensive. Other features, 
such as the structure, arrangement and search mechanism, must be conven-
tional because that is what customers expect and will buy. In this case, it 
could be argued that the producer put a substantial part of his investment in 
the database. Depending on his business model, it can be argued that he is 
dependent on protection of the contents to recoup his income. 
 A court could use the following methodology in determining whether or 
not there has been a substantial investment, qualitatively and/or quantita-
 
46. This, of course, sounds like an application of the spin-off theory. As described further 
on in this section, however, if the answer to the second question is yes, then this data-
base could be protected. 
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tively. First, it could look at the costs of making the database. It could be 
argued that the majority of the investment was allocated toward obtaining and 
enriching the data. For example, a researcher could have gone to the library, 
looked at the business directories available and picked out those companies 
that best fit the directory profile. Another researcher could have called or 
visited the businesses, verified their data and asked for information about 
other companies. The cost of research could be calculated to determine the 
quantitative component of the investment. 
 It could be that the compilation of such a specialized business database 
requires inside knowledge and savvy about a particular industry. Maybe it is 
not something that can be put together by anyone but would rather require a 
person with a Ph.D. in business or 10 years of working on the market. This 
would be difficult to quantify and would be better categorized as the energy 
and effort measured through a qualitative investment. 
 But what if a substantial part of the company’s investment, both qualita-
tively and quantitatively, went into the making of the database, and that total 
amount is calculated to be a mere 500 euros? Does such a database deserve 
protection? It could be argued that small databases are not worth protecting 
because the money could be better spent elsewhere. But it is precisely this 
type of database maker that needs an incentive in order to grow, flourish and 
create more databases. Such a conclusion would be reinforced by positively 
answering the first question. According to the facts provided, this type of 
producer appears to depend on content protection to recoup his investment.  
 This brings us to the issue of whether or not there is an absolute or relative 
floor to the threshold. When measured in absolute terms, it is worth exploring 
if some producers or re-users who need an incentive do not receive it. An 
obvious example would be the above-mentioned hypothetical of the database 
produced by a start-up company for 500 euros. This is the type of compiler 
who may be most in need of protection simply because he is just starting out 
and may not have as many options to generate an income. Because protection 
might not be granted under an absolute criterion, the better answer is that the 
threshold should be measured in relative terms. In our hypothetical example 
then, protection would result. No further questions need to be answered. 
 Tackling the first question also aids in resolving the sticky issue of what 
can be considered obtaining and what can be considered creating. Is scientific 
data created or obtained? In its commentary accompanying the original draft, 
the Commission explored whether or not scientific information should be 
subject to a compulsory license. This discussion is relevant for the qualifica-
tion threshold because one of the issues both the compulsory license and the 
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heightened threshold are intended to address is the locking-up of information 
contained in sole-source databases.  
 At the time, the Commission implied that scientific information should 
qualify as obtained information and thus be eligible for the sui generis right. 
According to Recital 33 of the first draft, compulsory licenses should not be 
requested for reasons of commercial expediency such as economy of time, 
effort or financial investment. The operation of this requirement is further 
detailed in the Explanatory Memorandum: “So if, for example, the contents 
of a database are data obtained by the use of an earth observation satellite, it 
will be necessary for the second database maker to collect his own observa-
tion data or to buy them from others who are willing to obtain them on his 
behalf.”47 In other words, such information would not be subject to a compul-
sory license because another database maker could gather the same informa-
tion and create his own database. 
 Some scholars support this position.48 Those who adhere to the spin-off 
theory, on the other hand, would retort that scientific research does not qual-
ify because making a database is not the primary activity; conducting scien-
tific research is.  
 In fact, there are a variety of arguments beyond the spin-off theory for 
why scientific discovery should not qualify as obtaining. One can begin by 
answering the first question of whether or not a database maker needs this 
protection to recoup his investment. It seems clear that even if the outcome of 
the research is a database, protection is not needed for the continuation of this 
endeavor. Quite clearly, the purpose of conducting science is not to create 
databases in order to sell them. The purpose of science includes discovering 
things and proposing theories about the world around us. 
 There is also a practical argument against granting protection for scientific 
information. Even if theoretically the data can be re-collected by a second 
database maker, the fact is that such activities are prohibitively expensive. In 
the real world, the expense would stop others from “discovering” the infor-
mation themselves. This means that these scientific databases operate, in 
effect, as sole-source databases. The result is higher prices and less access. 
 A good example of the prohibitive expense involves the selling of Landsat 
satellite photos in the United States which were used to perform basic science 
 
47. European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the 1992 Proposal, Part Two, ¶ 
8.1  
48. See, for example, Estelle Derclaye, “Databases Sui Generis Right: Should We Adopt 
The Spin Off Theory,” European Intellectual Property Review 26, no. 9 (2004), p. 
411-2. 
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in geography, agriculture and the environment. At first, the satellite was pub-
licly owned and the photos provided at the cost of distribution. But it was 
sold to a company who became a virtual monopolist because there were no 
competitors. The photo price rose from approximately US $400 per image to 
US $4,400 per image. The impact on basic research was disastrous enough 
that Congress passed legislation to return the satellite to public ownership. 
Although this example does not involve databases, it shows how ownership 
can create access problems.49 An overprotective right within the Database 
Directive could have a similar impact. 
 It is also important to explore what policy is being promoted. It is not that 
we want more people putting up satellites to collect information to make 
databases. What we want is more databases in which value has been added to 
the content so that it can be better understood, analyzed and transformed. 
Since scientific information is so critical for the advancement of society, 
access should be prioritized. Thus, what we want is for potential producers to 
add value to that scientific information by making user-friendly databases out 
of it. If those producers make a substantial investment in the obtaining, pre-
senting and verifying of that information, then they deserve protection. That 
would be achieving the goal of the Directive.  
 The purpose of the second question, then, is to ensure that those database 
makers who do not need an incentive to recoup their initial costs will none-
theless further invest in adding value to their databases. The heightened quali-
fication threshold grants protection to businesses which spend substantial 
money on databases. This is valuable if it results in greater accessibility of the 
information through better organization, more accuracy and heightened user-
friendliness. It is in this manner that a database in which a substantial invest-
ment has been made in obtaining, verifying and presenting can promote ac-
cess. 
 It could be possible that a data creator simply sells their information to a 
subsidiary which then is granted a database right as a result of a substantial 
 
49. Committee on Issues in the Transborder Flow of Scientific Data, USA National Com-
mittee for CODATA, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics and Applica-
tions and the National Research Council, “Bits of Power, Issues in Global Access to 
Scientific Data,” (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997), chapter 4, box 
4.3. Available at http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/BitsOfPower/ (last visited 
9August 2007) (hereinafter Bits of Power). 
Chapter 5. Revising the Database Right 
 134 
investment in obtaining the data.50 Such a possibility has been already men-
tioned. Yet this type of activity is not dependent on a production incentive 
and protection would not result in a more valuable database for society. In-
stead, attempts to bypass the law can be viewed as a form of rent-seeking in 
order to obtain protection. The investment used to obtain the right does not 
result in promoting the greater social welfare. From an economic perspective, 
then, it is wasteful and should be eliminated. 
 One step toward preventing such an outcome might be to require that the 
qualifying threshold include a substantial investment in at least two of the 
three categories of presentation, verification and obtainment. This principle 
should apply to all database owners seeking protection or renewal. The func-
tion of such a requirement would be to prevent rent-seeking and to encourage 
the production of and investment in databases that promote greater accessibil-
ity. 
 This brings us back to the football league which clearly did not need an 
additional incentive to produce. If, for example, the league decides to sub-
stantially invest in creating a database, it could devise a presentation that is 
not based on organizing the football games but is rather meant to create a 
user-friendly database. It could also obtain additional information about the 
football league not required to arrange games but rather to attract database 
users. In this case, the answer to the second question of whether or not the 
granting of such a right facilitates access would be yes. 
5.6 Restricting the Scope of the Right  
The purpose of the database right resolves the classic “free rider” problem 
identified by incentive theory. According to Recital 7, “the making of data-
bases requires the investment of considerable human, technical and financial 
resources while such databases can be copied or accessed at a fraction of the 
cost needed to design them independently.” The gap in protection that allows 
unauthorized copying is then identified, “technology exposes the database 
maker to the risk that the contents of his database may be copied and rear-
ranged electronically, without his authorization, to produce a database of 
identical content which, however, does not infringe any copyright in the ar-
 
50. Or it could be that a sports organizer claims that it has obtained information by creat-
ing an official stamped list. See British Horseracing Board, Ltd v. William Hill Or-
ganization Ltd, Court of Appeal, Case No. A3/2001/0632, London, 13 July 2005. 
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rangement of his database.”51 Next the gravity of the problem is described, 
“The unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization of the contents of a data-
base constitute acts which can have serious economic and technical conse-
quences.”52  
 To plug this gap a new right is established, “In the absence of a harmo-
nized system of unfair-competition legislation or of case-law, other measures 
are required in addition to prevent the unauthorized extraction and/or re-
utilization of the contents of a database.”53 Therefore, the purpose of the sui 
generis right is to “safeguard the position of makers of databases against 
misappropriation of the results of financial and professional investment.”54  
 If a database qualifies for protection, the producer can prevent: (1) the 
extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part of the 
contents of the database and (2) the repeated and systematic extraction and/or 
re-utilization of insubstantial parts of the contents of the database.55  
 From its inception, the database right was intended to be interpreted nar-
rowly. For example, infringement was to be evaluated through the prism of 
unfair competition. In addition, it only extended to commercial acts.  
 Article 7.5 was proposed later in the game by the Council in its Common 
Position. Although it can be construed in either a broad or narrow fashion, the 
Council favored a narrow interpretation, “the Council has chosen to restrict 
the extent of the protection afforded by the sui generis right . . . on the 
grounds that the extraction and/or re-utilization of insubstantial parts of those 
contents was unlikely adversely to affect the maker’s investment.”56 It stated 
that the purpose of the prohibition was to introduce “a safeguard clause.”57 
 Bearing this intent in mind, the ECJ provided further clarification. The 
nature of the right is to prevent the repeated and systematic insubstantial use, 
“the cumulative effect of which is to reconstitute and/or make available to the 
public . . . the whole or a substantial part of the contents of that database and 
thereby seriously prejudice the investment by the maker.”58 It is these acts 
 
51. The 1996 Database Directive, Recital 38. 
52. Ibid., Recital 8. It is unclear what legislators meant by technical consequences.  
53. Ibid., Recital 6. 
54. Ibid., Recital 39. 
55. Ibid., Art. 7.1 and 7.5.  
56. Council of Europe, The 1995 Common Position, Statement of Reasons, ¶ 14. 
57. Id. 
58. British Horseracing Board, ECJ case C-203/02, 9 November 2004, ¶ 95. 
Chapter 5. Revising the Database Right 
 136 
and these acts alone which “conflict with a normal exploitation of [a] data-
base or which unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the maker.”59  
 According to the ECJ interpretation, then, the phrases “normal exploita-
tion” and “unreasonably prejudice” do not provide additional leeway to 
broaden the scope. Any broadening of the right is unnecessary and could 
affect access.  
 This narrow interpretation should be consistent throughout. Although the 
Council views all its revisions to the database right as restrictions, some of 
them in fact have a broadening effect. This includes the shift from an unfair 
competition interpretation to a broader exclusive rights approach, and the 
extension of protection to all acts, whether noncommercial or commercial. 
These changes will be evaluated in turn. 
 The first issue is whether or not the database right should be interpreted in 
the spirit of an unfair competition right or whether it should be more broadly 
interpreted, as is typical under copyright law. From the beginning, it was 
clearly an exclusive right. But the interpretation provided in the first draft 
reflected the spirit of unfair competition. It is acknowledged that proof of 
legislative intent is not necessarily found in the original. However, because 
that first draft strove to adequately balance the interests of producers, re-users 
and consumers, it provides a convincing model for possible amendments. It is 
submitted that it may actually be more useful to look at the first draft than to 
rely on something totally new, simply because language from that first ver-
sion is by now familiar. 
 The commentary on the original version is rife with observations that the 
database right resembles an unfair competition right. For example, it was 
initially called an unfair extraction right. It was also described as “a special 
sui generis provision” derived from regimes such as unfair competition law 
or the law repressing parasitic behavior.60 Moreover, the only example of 
infringement put forth an unfair competition analysis: “substituting as a 
source in its own right for the work or materials in question.” In discussing 
implementation by the Member States, the Commission stated, “It is unlikely 
however that existing copyright or neighbouring rights legislation would be 
an appropriate vehicle since the right in question is clearly not either of these, 
but is something more similar to unfair competition or parasitic behaviour 
legislation.”61 
 
59. Ibid., ¶ 89. 
60. European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the 1992 Proposal, Part One, ¶ 
5.3.6. 
61. Ibid., Part Two, ¶ 10.  
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 By the time the Council came out with the Common Position, the right 
had broadened so that its unfair competition spirit was largely suppressed. 
This evolution occurred with no commentary. The result is a kind of hybrid 
right – with an economic motivation, qualification threshold couched in eco-
nomic terms, but with the interpretation of the right as possibly broader and 
more similar to copyright.  
 There is ample reason to continue interpreting the scope of the right in 
unfair competition terms. By sticking to such an analysis, the needs of pro-
ducers, re-users and consumers can be more fairly balanced. For example, 
infringement can occur if unauthorized uses affect demand. As will be shown 
in the following sections, such an interpretation would adequately protect the 
producer and at the same time adequately address access needs. Moreover, 
this type of analysis is not strange or unknown. It is precisely the type of 
reasoning used by Landes and Posner in their evaluation of US copyright 
law.62  
 In the spirit of forwarding an unfair competition approach, the first ques-
tion to tackle is whether or not the right should be returned to commercial 
uses only. In answering, it may be worthwhile to explore why the right was 
restricted like that in the first place. 
 The encouragement of commercial production provided a strong impetus 
in the decision to create the Database Directive. In its 1987 action plan on the 
information services market, the Commission wrote, “Almost 70% of Euro-
pean databases are still being produced by the public sector or by non-profit-
making organizations, whereas in the United States 75% belong to the private 
sector.”63 When it first proposed database protection, the Commission con-
tinued to focus on commercial databases: “‘Information broking,’ that is, the 
buying and selling of data bases containing factual information is indeed a 
growth industry, which requires a clear legal framework within which to 
develop.”64  
 
62. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual 
Property Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 89. 
63. European Commission, Communication from the Commission together with a draft 
decision concerning The Establishment at Community Level of a Policy and a Plan of 
Priority Actions for the Development of an Information Services Market, COM (87) 
360 final/2, (Brussels: 2 September 1987), § I.3. 
64. European Commission, Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology – 
Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action, COM (88) 172 final, (Brussels: 7 June 
1988), ¶ 6.4.7, (hereinafter The 1988 Green Paper). 
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 Upon justifying the database right granted in the first draft, the Commis-
sion stated, “This protection against parasitic behaviour by competitors, 
which would already be available under unfair competition law in some 
Member States but not in others, is intended to create a climate in which 
investment in data processing can be stimulated and protected against misap-
propriation.”65 The focus on a right to protect databases against unauthorized 
commercial use continued up until the Council Common Position when it 
was removed without explanation. 
 In fact, there was never any discussion about the term “for commercial 
purposes” in relation to infringement throughout the legislative process. One 
argument for why the right was extended could be that it was believed that 
commercial use could not encompass the activities of private individuals. 
This could have serious repercussions in the digital world where unauthorized 
copying by consumers is easy and widespread.  
 Such an argument could be justified by the Council’s account for its deci-
sion to restrict the private use exception to non-electronic databases only. 
This discussion may be applicable simply because the exceptions help to 
determine the right’s scope. According to the Council, “no exception should 
be allowed for reproduction for private purposes of electronic databases, in 
particular in view of the ease with which they can be reproduced.”66 Yet 
without clear evidence, this theory on why the phrase was dropped is mere 
speculation.  
 In fact, various definitions of noncommercial and commercial were intro-
duced in the preparatory documents. The Parliament in its first reading de-
fined commercial use as “any use – whether domestic or collective – aiming 
at economic activity or a remunerated transaction.”67 Clearly, private activi-
ties can be encompassed in the definition of commercial purposes. 
 Another possibility as to why protection was extended may be that there 
was a desire to encourage the commercialization of databases. In making 
such a decision, it must be determined whether the benefits are greater than 
the costs. Given the analysis of the production and access needs of database 
re-users and consumers, this may not be the case. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
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re-users such as scientists, academics and libraries are not focused on making 
a profit. Rather they are interested in promoting the public interest through 
science, education and research. Such positive externalities should be encour-
aged rather than thwarted.  
 One of the fears of these communities is being priced out of using data-
base contents such that re-users cannot continue their activities.68 Indeed, 
increasing the value of noncommercial databases by granting exclusive rights 
is potentially harmful. Some noncommercial or public producers could de-
cide to charge for their data at a level that is prohibitive to other cash-strapped 
noncommercial users. Depending on the type of information and the industry, 
this could threaten innovation in science, technology and other research areas 
that are dependent on information sharing.  
 Indeed, not every type of scientific information should be commercialized. 
Two examples of failed commercialization are the Landsat satellite and Cel-
era’s attempt to sell human genetic information. Thus, extreme care must be 
taken to determine whether or not such commercialization should occur.  
 What these communities need is to be able to fully extract and re-utilize 
databases in order to achieve their goals. With the database right covering 
noncommercial uses, this means risking legal action. According to one library 
group, “Europe has succeeded in working with the extraordinarily wide scope 
of the Database Directive by almost totally ignoring it.”69 The activities of 
these groups contribute so much to society that it seems extremely short-
sighted to force them into such a position. 
 The costs of denying access to these noncommercial groups should be 
weighed against the benefits of protection. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
type of protection needed depends on the business model used. For example, 
producers who rely on pay-per-use may not need database content protection 
simply because they have other means at their disposal, including technical 
measures. Other commercial producers who gain their income from advertis-
ing offer their content for free. Therefore, the type of protection they need is 
against competitors who copy their model and take away their customers. 
Still others rely primarily on the investment in the contents of their databases 
to produce an income. It is these producers who may need a stronger form of 
protection that extends to consumers who gain access to but do not pay for 
their databases.  
 
68. Bits of Power, Chap. 4. 
69. European Bureau of Library, Information and Documentation Associations, “EBLIDA 
Response to the Commission on the evaluation of EU rules on databases,” The Hague, 
9 March 2006, p. 2. Refer to Chapter 2, footnote 6 for availability online.  
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 Rather than having to make a choice between this segment of database 
producers and the noncommercial world of scientists, academics and librar-
ies, there is an easy solution. The database right could be restricted to com-
mercial use to allow the noncommercial sector to continue engaging in their 
activities without risking infringement. But the definition of commercial 
could be tailored in such a manner to include the activities of private users 
that threaten demand for the database producer’s product. The best definition 
that fits this purpose is the one suggested by the European Parliament, “any 
use – whether domestic or collective – aiming at economic activity or a re-
munerated transaction.” While non-commercial activities can continue un-
abated, private activities that have a commercial impact would be prohibited. 
5.7 Interpreting Extraction and Re-utilization 
The main question that comes to mind when thinking about the nature of 
“extraction” and “re-utilization” is what exactly these terms mean. Are they 
different than the definitions of “copying” and “making available to the pub-
lic” in copyright law? If not, it is understandable that the language of copy-
right may have come into use because it is already familiar.  
 Indeed, the ECJ does state that re-utilization is similar to making available 
to the public in copyright law.70 This concept, thus, seems fairly self-
explanatory and familiar. Is there also a relationship between copying and 
extraction? Copying is duplication. Extraction is defined as “the permanent or 
temporary transfer of all or a substantial part of the contents of a database to 
another medium by any means or in any form.”71 Whereas copying does not 
affect the integrity of the original, extraction is arguably a more active proc-
ess. These differences in meaning, however, can simply exist because the 
word extraction was adapted to the online context in which one typically cuts 
and pastes. This, of course, entails transferring from one medium to another, 
which is precisely the meaning of extraction.72 
 
70. British Horseracing Board, ECJ case C-203/02, 9 November 2004, ¶ 51. 
71 The 1996 Database Directive, Art. 7(2). 
72. The ECJ refers to extraction as appropriating. See British Horseracing Board, ECJ 
case C-203/02, 9 November 2004, ¶ 51. Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines this 
as “to take exclusive possession of” or “to take or make use of without authority or 
right.” But this means that misappropriation and appropriation are the same and, there-
fore, seems more confusing than helpful. 
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 The term “extraction” is still problematic, however, because transferring 
can be temporary or permanent. Currently, the database right offers no provi-
sion to allow substantial extraction by lawful users, if necessary, in their 
normal course of using a database. Recital 34 contains a normal use provi-
sion, “once the rightholder has chosen to make available a copy of the data-
base to a user, whether by an on-line service or by other means of distribu-
tion, that lawful user must be able to access and use the database for the pur-
poses and in a way set out in the agreement with the rightholder, even if such 
access and use necessitate performance of otherwise restricted acts.” Even 
though this Recital is located in the section concerning copyright, it could be 
argued that the normal use provision applies to the database right. 
 The problem is that in the section concerning the database right, a contra-
dictory statement is contained in Recital 44, “when on-screen display of the 
contents of a database necessitates the permanent or temporary transfer of all 
or a substantial part of such contents to another medium, that act should be 
subject to the rightholder.” Since Recital 44 is placed in the section on data-
base rights, and it contradicts Recital 34, it is evident that the normal use 
provision does not apply. This argument is even more convincing when one 
examines the definition of extraction, which includes temporary or permanent 
extraction. 
 The absence of a normal use provision is contrary to Article 6.1 of the 
Database Directive in regards to copyright in a database, to Article 5.1 of the 
Computer Software Directive and to Article 5.1 of the InfoSoc Directive.73 It 
also goes against the intention of the preparatory documents. From the first 
draft to the Commission’s Amended Proposal, there was no distinction made 
between temporary or permanent extraction. At that time, two Recitals pro-
vided for the right of the lawful user to perform any of the restricted acts 
necessary for access to and use of the database whether or not an agreement 
was in place.74  
 In most other contexts, this problem has been resolved in favor of the user. 
If not a mere oversight, the absence of a normal use provision in the database 
right leads one to question the motivations of the legislators. Luckily, the ECJ 
was equally concerned. It tackled this and other issues through the creation of 
a consultation right which is discussed in Section 5.12. 
 
73. See Art. 6.1 of The 1996 Database Directive in regards to copyright in a database, Art. 
5.1 of The InfoSoc Directive and Art. 5.1 of the European Council Directive 
91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs Art. 1(2), 
OJ (L) 122, 17/95/1991. 
74. European Commission, The 1992 Proposal, Recitals 24 and 25. 
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5.8 Evaluating Infringement of a Substantial Part  
Anyone can infringe the database right if their taking amounts to “the whole 
or of a substantial part, evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively, of the 
contents of that database.”75 This is a complicated concept because it can 
either be determined according to the amount of the content or the amount of 
the investment. Although the ECJ has provided clarification, it is worth dis-
cussing if only to ensure that it is applied correctly. 
 The concept of a qualitatively and/or quantitatively substantial part has its 
origins in the first draft where the right to take an insubstantial part was an 
exception. An insubstantial part was defined as “parts of a database whose 
reproduction, evaluated quantitatively and qualitatively in relation to the 
database from which they are copied, can be considered not to prejudice the 
exclusive rights of the maker.”76 The term “a qualitatively and/or quantita-
tively insubstantial part” was not explained in any of the other the preparatory 
documents. It was the Council that first included the term “a qualitatively 
and/or quantitatively substantial part” in its detailing of the database right. No 
explanation was given as to its meaning, either. 
 The ECJ later defined these concepts. A substantial part evaluated quanti-
tatively “refers to the volume of data extracted.” A substantial part, evaluated 
qualitatively, on the other hand, “refers to “the scale of the investment,” re-
gardless of quantity.77  
 During the initial evolution of the Directive, the language of the right 
centered on how much of the content was taken. This focus is natural because 
it is the method used to find infringement under copyright law. It was only 
later that the Council first pinpointed investment as the primary criterion. 
Still, it is easy to employ the wrong test simply because one must compare 
the part taken with the entire database no matter what. So which is it? 
 The ECJ attempts to reconcile these two methods by connecting them, “It 
must be borne in mind that protection by the sui generis right covers databases 
whose creation required a substantial investment. Against that background, 
Article 7(1) of the directive prohibits extraction and/or re-utilisation not only of 
the whole of a database protected by the sui generis right but also of a substan-
tial part, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, of its contents. According to 
the 42nd recital of the preamble to the directive, that provision is intended to 
prevent a situation in which a user ‘through his acts, causes significant detri-
 
75. The 1996 Database Directive, Art. 7.1. 
76. European Commission, The 1992 Proposal, Art. 1.3 
77. British Horseracing Board, ECJ case C-203/02, 9 November 2004, ¶ 82. 
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ment, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, to the investment.’ It appears 
from that recital that the assessment, in qualitative terms, of whether the part at 
issue is substantial, must, like the assessment in quantitative terms, refer to the 
investment in the creation of the database and the prejudice caused to that in-
vestment by the act of extracting or re-utilising that part.”78  
 Since the definition of an infringing act is the crux of the right, it behooves 
us to elaborate on its interpretation. Questions include whether the right is a 
flexible criterion, whether it should be applied in relative or absolute terms 
and how infringement should be determined.  
 In terms of the right as a whole, it seems clear that, similar to the qualifica-
tion threshold, a case-by-case evaluation should be encouraged. This allows 
for the flexibility required to take the specific facts of each case into account. 
Given that there are many different types of databases, it provides a welcome 
opportunity since crafting a one-size-fits-all solution is difficult. On the other 
hand, a flexible criterion translates into a lack of certainty. From this perspec-
tive, more guidance from the ECJ is necessary.  
 One issue to consider is whether a substantial part is an absolute or a rela-
tive term. An absolute measurement would require that anything over a cer-
tain quantity is infringing, and anything under is not. The fact is that data-
bases range in size from one-page tables to thousands of pages. It is therefore 
unrealistic, if not impossible, to have an absolute criterion. 
 If “substantial part” is a relative term, then a tailored analysis could be 
conducted of the specific database in question. One academic argues an indi-
vidual could take more from a larger database than a smaller one before in-
fringing.79 But this assumes that we are comparing what is taken to the data-
base contents. In fact, there is nothing wrong with a relative comparison. 
Copyright law employs the same type of analysis.  
 How can infringement be determined? It has already been stated that one 
of the general purposes of the Directive is to provide a production incentive 
so that more databases are created. This is a vocalization of the incentive 
theory. Moreover, the purpose of the database right is to prevent the misap-
propriation of the database maker’s investment. The right thus allows a per-
fect implementation of the incentive theory. Given this trend, it makes sense 
to push the incentive theory further into action. The correct question to ask 
when judging a particular act is whether or not the unauthorized extraction 
 
78. Ibid., ¶69. 
79. Perttu Virtanen, Database Rights in Safe European Home: The Path to More Rigorous 
Protection of Information (Ph.D., Lappeenranta University of Technology, 2005), p. 
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and/or re-utilization results in a loss of demand for the original database by 
operating as a close substitute.  
 There are several rationales for this interpretation. First, it puts the in-
fringement decision in harmony with other aspects of the Directive, all of 
which depend upon the incentive theory.80 In addition, it successfully incor-
porates the economic determination of infringement as suggested by Landes 
and Posner. Their test is that if an unauthorized copy is a close substitute and 
therefore affects demand for the original, it is infringing. The practical effect 
is to insure that the database owner is able to recoup his initial or value-added 
investment but no more. This allows the kind of access necessary for a re-
source tool such as a database so that re-use is adequately encouraged. 
 How would one identify a qualitatively and/or quantitatively substantial 
part? It would depend on the type of database. The same is true in copyright 
law. Depending on the type of work protected, infringement varies from thin 
to thick. In evaluating whether a quantitatively substantial part has been 
taken, the threshold could be fairly high for a producer who depends on ad-
vertising for an income and who offers free content. In this business model, 
the more people who use the data, the better, because advertising statistics go 
up. What would be considered deadly is a situation in which a business or an 
individual takes the same information and sets up a competing website. If the 
activity affects demand for the original product, it would result in infringe-
ment because it would mean that the producer cannot recoup his investment. 
 A classified directory publisher who directs his energy toward adding 
value to the data itself may suffer income loss in a different way. If compa-
nies begin systematically taking his information without paying in a manner 
that is proven to affect the demand for the product, then this too would be a 
quantitatively substantial part. 
 The criterion of a qualitative infringement is trickier. When substantial 
energy is used to obtain a single piece of data and that piece is taken, it could 
be argued that infringement has occurred. But such a determination would 
come too close to violating the prohibition of Recital 46 of the Directive, 
which states that protection does not extend to the data itself. The Court has 
 
80. In addition, it incorporates the spirit of the original proposal in which the Commission 
provided an example of a substantial part: “It will be the task of the database maker to 
demonstrate that the amount of material so reproduced prejudiced his normal exploita-
tion of his database, for example, by substituting as a source in its own right for the 
work or materials in question.” European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to 
the 1992 Proposal, Part Two, ¶ 8.4. 
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also explicitly rejected this possibility.81 In using the qualitatively substantial 
criterion then, extreme care must be taken to avoid lowering the infringement 
level to less than substantial. One way to achieve this is by making the judg-
ment according to whether demand for the product has been affected. 
5.9 Who is a Lawful User? 
Unfortunately, the Directive does not define what is meant by lawful user. 
This concept is key because it helps to determine the scope of access. Two 
different approaches have been promulgated.82 In the commentary on the first 
draft, the following definition was provided, “a person having acquired a 
right to use the database.”83 However, within the context of its discussion of 
the consultation right, the ECJ proposed a narrower definition, “a user whose 
access to the contents of a database for the purpose of consultation results 
from the direct or indirect consent of the maker of the database.”84  
 The definition accompanying the first draft offers the possibility that a 
lawful user could include one who gains a right of use by operation of law. 
This is because the term “acquire a right to use” could be broadly defined to 
comprise not only direct or indirect permission but also implied permission. 
 Copyright law offers a good analogy. Lawful users encompass those who 
carry out an act which falls under a copyright exception. Thus, by operation 
of law, a user can bypass a technological measure in order to exploit part of a 
work, say, for illustration in teaching. By engaging in an activity that falls 
under an exception, that person has acquired a right to exploit the work and is 
therefore a lawful user. Such a definition grants the rights and exceptions of 
the lawful user to anyone who falls within the exception as well as to anyone 
who possesses direct or indirect permission from the database maker.  
 A second interpretation is that the lawful user may only be construed as a 
person who gains access to a database through the database maker or one 
authorized by the maker. This approach conforms to the ECJ’s interpretation 
 
81. British Horseracing Board, ECJ case C-203/02, 9 November 2004, ¶ 71-72. 
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of lawful user in the new consultation right. A lawful user achieves access 
through direct or indirect consent. This definition is narrower than the first 
because it excludes implied consent through operation of law.  
 The ECJ’s interpretation conforms to that of the Software Directive.85 
What it means is that an individual must have legitimate access – whether by 
direct or indirect permission from the maker – before one can avail oneself of 
the exceptions. Such an interpretation substantially narrows the scope of the 
exceptions. The implication is that there can be no use, insubstantial or oth-
erwise, without access.  
 While this may be an easy formula to implement regarding software in an 
online context, it is not so easy when it comes to databases. Whether or not 
online software is provided free or sold, there is always an accompanying 
clickwrap license which must be accepted before downloading of the pro-
gram can proceed. Although the legal validity of clickwraps and the provi-
sions they contain vary by Member State, one mouse click may arguably 
confirm that a person is a lawful user.  
 The situation is not as clear when it comes to databases. Only a small 
percentage of databases require payment for access and acceptance of a 
clickwrap license before every use. Many more merely allow one to view, 
search and record parts without express permission. While it could be argued 
that the fact that there is no clickwrap license means everyone is a lawful 
user, it is quite easy to assert the contrary.  
 Although the ECJ may have envisioned a situation similar to that in the 
Software Directive, that situation simply does not exist when it comes to 
databases. The interpretation of the lawful user as the lawful acquirer is im-
possible to implement in reality. The consequence is a lack of clarity that will 
confuse and chill users, including those who want to make productive re-use 
of a database.  
 It is unlikely that this is the practical consequence that the Court had in 
mind. Since the online reality of databases is more like that of copyrighted 
works in that clickwrap licenses are not ubiquitously available, an expansion 
of the definition to include lawful use through operation of law may be more 
viable. It would certainly ease the worry of the consumer and the re-user and 
would allow everyone to make noninfringing uses of a database in the man-
ner that people, in reality, already do today.  
 
85. Art. 5 of the European Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal 
protection of computer programs Art. 1(2), OJ (L) 122, 17/95/1991. 
5.10 Transforming User Rights 
 147 
5.10 Transforming User Rights 
Outlining the rights and obligations of the lawful user in Article 8 is a posi-
tive development within the Directive.86 The decision to put forth a list of 
user rights signals the importance of access for re-users and consumers. The 
addition of Article 15 to the Directive, which makes any contractual provi-
sion against these rights null and void, is also praiseworthy. The combination 
of detailing user rights in black and white and making them binding wards off 
any erosion.  
 The problem is that the rights contained in this section of the Directive are 
the wrong ones. Traditionally, intellectual property rights are granted to the 
producer in the form of prohibitions against use without permission. Then 
exceptions are added which determine the circumstances under which these 
prohibitions can be legally bypassed. But the landscape of what can be done 
or not done outside those prohibitions is not laid out because it would be 
redundant.  
 The rights and obligations detailed in Article 8 are precisely these redun-
dant ones. The fact is that one can do anything that is not prohibited. The 
equivalent would be to write a law against going through a red light on a 
bicycle in Denmark which includes the following section: “A bicyclist cannot 
be prevented from going through a green light. But in going through a green 
light, the bicyclist must not hinder others from going through the light. Nor 
can the cyclist hinder those who are waiting for the red light.” Such a law 
would be slightly absurd.  
 There are also dangers. The first is that these redundant rights could 
evolve into substitutes for real exceptions which allow a user to legally en-
gage in acts prohibited by a legislation under certain circumstances. Another 
danger is that access can develop into a kind of two-tiered system of rich 
users and poor users, particularly if the concept of lawful user is restrictive. 
Those who have legally acquired a database could exploit the work while 
those who cannot afford it would have no possibility of access whatsoever. A 
third danger is that the description of these redundant rights and their legal 
interpretation may actually result in narrowing them.  
 For these reasons, it is submitted that the exceptions, as amended in Sec-
tion 5.11 of this chapter, be transferred to Article 8 on the rights and obliga-
tions of lawful users and that the redundant rights be deleted. Article 15 
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should remain. This would prevent producers from attempting to erode these 
new user rights through contract. Describing the exceptions as rights would 
also allow the user to know what he or she can do. In an area as confusing as 
intellectual property law, such a listing could form an important precedent.  
5.11 Harmonizing the Exceptions 
It is a misconception that the higher qualification threshold solves all prob-
lems of access. Once the database right is granted, attention still needs to be 
paid to ensure free use can be made of those contents that are protected. A 
strong right could negatively affect the re-user and thus dampen production. 
It could also deprive the ordinary consumer of private use.  
 Indeed, there is no logical explanation as to why all the copyright excep-
tions should not be imported over to databases. Since there is arguably less 
need for protection of unoriginal database content than for, say, a copyrighted 
work, it is difficult to understand why there are fewer exceptions than there 
are for copyright. Indeed, due to a database’s function in providing access 
and the concern that facts and data should not be protected, there is an argu-
ment for even more access. Such an amendment would have the added bene-
fit of further harmonizing the law so that the user can more accurately deter-
mine what he can or cannot do. It also makes sense from an economic per-
spective because many of the exceptions, such as that on news reporting, save 
on transaction costs and thus are economically efficient.  
 Many stakeholders have voiced a similar opinion. Here, the views ex-
pressed in the Commission’s 2002 study still have validity because the excep-
tions have not changed. Both re-users, including libraries and academic or-
ganizations, and consumers were concerned that the scope of protection was 
too broad. Libraries feared information monopolization by electronic jour-
nals. This would, of course, increase prices. Some called for a broadening of 
the private use exception. Those in the academic and scientific community 
stated that the exceptions were too restrictive. Consumers advocated for con-
tinued replenishment of public domain information.  
 Even worse, the stakeholder opinions from 2005 stated that they simply 
are forced to risk violating the law when conducting normal activities. Exam-
ples mentioned in Chapter 2 were libraries, which engage in substantial re-
utilization, and the British Broadcasting Corporation, which includes infor-
mation from databases in its news reporting. Given the importance of the 
work of many of these re-users and of consumers, it seems contrary to every-
one’s interest to restrict their normal activities. 
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 The best solution is to import the copyright exceptions into the Directive 
and to transform them into user rights. Many of the complaints of re-users 
would be assuaged with this revision. In addition, private users could exploit 
materials for research and private study, which is exactly what they expect to 
do. 
5.12 What is the Right of Consultation? 
The ECJ was not asked to clarify any exceptions. However, in the process of 
defining extraction and re-utilization, the Court created a new right of consul-
tation for the lawful user. According to the Court, a database maker can con-
trol who has access to his database. But once it is made accessible to the pub-
lic, either by the database maker himself or by an authorized third party, the 
right is triggered and a lawful user cannot be prevented from consulting a 
database. This permission does not exhaust the database right and a lawful 
user can still be accused of unauthorized extraction or re-utilization of a sub-
stantial part of a database. The right of consultation does not deprive the da-
tabase maker of income, the Court noted, since the cost of consultation can be 
incorporated into the price of re-utilization.  
 What precisely is this new right? The only mention of consultation in the 
Directive is Recital 20, which states, “Whereas protection under this Direc-
tive may also apply to the materials necessary for the operation or consulta-
tion of certain databases such as thesaurus and indexation systems.” This 
seems to imply that consultation amounts to more than just reading, as it 
involves the use of a logical system. At that same time, it must not mean 
extraction, which is defined as “the permanent or temporary transfer of all or 
a substantial part of the contents of a database.”87 
 A careful reading of the ECJ decision in British Horseracing Board pro-
vides the answer. The right of consultation is first mentioned after the Court 
has said that infringement of extraction and re-utilization can be both direct 
and indirect. States the Court, “However, it must be stressed that the protec-
tion of the sui generis right concerns only acts of extraction and re-utilization 
as defined in Article 7(2) of the directive. That protection does not, on the 
other hand, cover consultation of a database.”88 Furthermore, at the end of the 
discussion on consultation, the Court declares that having this right does not 
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exhaust the sui generis right and that a maker can still prevent the extraction 
and re-utilization of a substantial part of the database.  
 The Court says that Recital 44 and Recital 43 confirm this proposition. 
According to Recital 44, “when on-screen display of the contents of a data-
base necessitates the permanent or temporary transfer of all or a substantial 
part of such contents to another medium, that act should be subject to authori-
sation by the rightholder.”  
 What seems clear is that consultation is not merely viewing. It involves 
use of some kind of search mechanism. On the other hand, it is not extraction 
or re-utilization, that is, the temporary or permanent extraction or re-
utilization of a substantial part of a database. What consultation is, then, is the 
temporary transfer of substantial parts of the database by the lawful user. It is 
the missing normal use provision and should be codified into the law.  
5.13 Are the Contents Protected? 
From the beginning, the database right represented a conscious decision to 
abrogate the idea-expression dichotomy in copyright law. However, in mak-
ing this choice, the Commission took pains not to lock up information. The 
first draft posited a very narrow right with many avenues of access. One criti-
cal mechanism was a compulsory license to ensure the availability of sole-
source database contents. But the Council deleted the compulsory license 
provision on the pretext of having narrowed the right.  
 In fact, the right had expanded. Without a compulsory license provision 
and with narrow exceptions, the database right had the potential to actually 
protect facts and data. This could occur if a database maker, who was the 
sole-source of the information, refused to license or raised prices so that 
many could not afford to pay. 
 The ECJ was very aware of this and its heightened qualification became a 
new mechanism to manage the idea-expression dichotomy. When pre-
existing data was used to make a database, it could be protected without 
worry. Collecting such data became known as obtainment. But when the data 
was not available from any other source, its collection did not qualify as ob-
tainment but was rather called creating. This is an ingenious device. But it all 
hinges on the definition of obtaining.  
 As previously discussed in Section 5.5 on the qualification threshold, there 
are some activities such as the discovery of pre-existing data in science that 
should not be categorized as obtaining. This includes scientific discovery that 
is so costly that the effect of its protection results in a sole-source database, 
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even though hypothetically, the data could be collected by someone else. If 
obtaining were only to consist of the activity of gathering pre-existing mate-
rial then one could argue that efforts were being made to preserve the idea-
expression dichotomy.  
 Competition law could provide an alternative. But its scope is significantly 
narrower. In order to be applicable, the database producer must have market 
power. Once this is proven, the following four factors of abusive behavior 
must be satisfied under IMS Health: (1) the information must be indispensa-
ble, (2) the refusal threatens to exclude all competition on the market, (3) the 
refusal prevents the emergence of a new product for which there is potential 
consumer demand and (4) the refusal lacks objective justification.89  
 A lack of clarity aggravates the difficulty in relying on competition law. 
For example, it is not apparent that the decision applies to the database right. 
Even if it does, the definition of a new product is not clarified at the European 
level. Furthermore, this decision concerns refusals to license. It does not pre-
vent charging high prices or reducing output. Yet these are activities which 
can result from overprotection and can operate to reduce access.  
 In short, competition law does not begin to deal with the everyday, run-of-
the-mill access issues that plague re-users and consumers. It is geared toward 
extreme behavior. While competition law has an important role to play, the less 
extreme concerns can only addressed within the legislation itself. Competition 
law may resolve issues such as refusals to license by database makers that have 
market power. But the consequences of overprotection, such as higher prices, 
can be influenced by building a narrow right with plenty of avenues of access. 
 The danger of protecting the contents instead of the investment is that 
individual pieces of data can be protected. This could be avoided by, for ex-
ample, ensuring that the qualification threshold is high, that individual bits of 
data are not protected through the qualitatively substantial criterion and that 
protection is not perpetual.  
 But because the issue is not fully resolved, further reports by the Commis-
sion should evaluate whether a compulsory license provision is needed. One 
recommendation would be to conduct an independent, objective and scien-
tific study of the impact of the database right on all stakeholders. Next time, a 
more rigorous analysis of access issues is in order.  
 
89. See IMS Health Gmbh & Co OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co KG, ECJ (Fifth Cham-
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5.14 Establishing a System of Limited Renewals 
How renewal of the term of protection works is just as mysterious as the rest 
of the Directive. Questions include: (1) does a substantial new investment 
equal a substantial investment?, (2) what specifically is protected?, (3) when 
is a new term triggered? and (4) is protection perpetual?  
 The language of the Directive indicates that a substantial new investment 
is equivalent to the substantial investment of the qualification threshold. In 
Recital 54, a substantial new investment is referred to as a substantial modifi-
cation.90 It seems to entail substantial verification.91 According to Article 
10(3), it can include successive additions, deletions or alterations. 
 This conclusion is reinforced by the Council’s Common Position. Previ-
ously, substantial modification was necessary for renewal but this was re-
placed by the need to establish a substantial new investment. In the Statement 
of Reasons, the Council said that it had intended to make a link between the 
substantial investment needed to qualify and that needed for renewal.92 
 Despite clear indications that substantial new investment and substantial 
investment are equivalent, the lower British court in British Horseracing 
Board seemed to advocate a lower renewal threshold. It defined verification 
as “ensuring the accuracy of a collection of data” and combined it with Re-
cital 55 in which a substantial verification can result in a new term.93 From 
this analysis, the court concluded that “even if the contents of a database do 
not change substantially, if sufficient investment is put into ensuring that it is 
up to date and accurate, it is protected by the new right.”94 
 Addressing a preliminary question on how a new term is triggered, the 
Advocate General in British Horseracing Board stated that insubstantial 
changes in sufficient number are to be classified as substantial changes. 
However, she stressed that the evaluation of whether the changes are substan-
tial must be based on the requirements of the database right. That is, it must 
be shown that “that there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a sub-
 
90. This may be a leftover from older versions in which a substantial change was defined 
as a substantial modification. 
91. The 1996 Database Directive, Recital 55. 
92. European Council, Statement of Reasons of the Common Position of the Council (EC) 
No. 20/95 with a view to adopting a Directive 95/ /EC of the European Parliament and 
the Council on the legal protection of databases, OJ(C) 288/14 (30 Oct. 1995), point 18. 
93. British Horseracing Board v. William Hill Organization, High Court of Justice Chan-
cery Division, Case No. HC-2000 1335, London, 9 February 2001, ¶ 35. 
94. Ibid., ¶ 36. 
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stantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the 
contents.”95 
 From a policy perspective, there should not be an easier qualification 
threshold for a term of renewal than for starting up a new database. The crite-
ria should remain the same. The plain meaning of the statute and the legisla-
tive intent point toward this interpretation. Moreover, all the examples of a 
substantial change mentioned in the Directive are examples of verification, 
which in this thesis can trigger qualification or renewal if coupled with ob-
taining or presentation. 
 Still another question is what is protected if a substantial new investment 
is proven. Article 10(3) says that a substantial new investment “shall qualify 
the database resulting from that investment for its own term of protection.” It 
is thus arguable whether the database resulting from that new investment 
comprises only the new additions or the entire database, both old and new. 
This question is especially important when it comes to dynamic databases, 
which can be defined as databases that are constantly updated.96  
 The Advocate General’s opinion is unhelpful. She misleadingly claims 
that old information is automatically discarded in dynamic databases. She 
also states that the Directive anticipated a “rolling sui generis right” in which 
each substantial change conveys a new term of protection for a new database 
and all its contents.97 When a substantial new investment occurs, then, what 
should be protected is the resulting new database.  
 This analysis is unrealistic simply because there are dynamic databases 
which change constantly but in which the old information is not discarded. 
An example would be a legal database. Common law litigation attorneys 
would rise up in arms if the old cases were discarded. Moreover, if it turned 
out that one could have rights over all the material that remains in the data-
base, then discarding would stop.  
 The lower court judge in the British Horseracing Board case is also un-
helpful. He suggests that a database is constantly being updated and as those 
updates occur, a new term of protection begins. Protection here extends to the 
old database, which has been revamped. The judge says, in summary, “In my 
 
95 The 1996 Database Directive, Art. 7(1). 
96. British Horseracing Board v. William Hill Organization, Opinion of Advocate General 
Stix-Hackl, 8 June 2004, ¶ 147. 
97. Id., ¶ 151. 
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view the BHB Database is a single database which is in a constant state of 
refinement.”98 
 Both theories lead to perpetual protection for the original content that is 
not discarded. The problem is that unlimited protection arguably gives rise to 
a right over the facts and data contained therein. This is contrary to Recitals 
45 and 46 of the Directive. Given the importance of information and the need 
to promote access, any regime that provides perpetual protection should be 
justified. In this case, however, it is difficult to find any reason for continued 
protection, whereas the cost in terms of access is high. The best policy, then, 
is to ensure that a substantial new investment leads to the protection of the 
revised section of the database. Date-stamping can be used to inform others 
about when a particular part of a database will expire. 
 Another troublesome question is when precisely a new term is triggered. 
Is it triggered every time a substantial update occurs? In fact, there is nothing 
in the legislation itself, the preparatory documents or the academic writings 
which suggests anything different. So if one creates a database, and after six 
weeks makes a substantial new investment, then a new term has started. What 
this means is even if perpetual protection does not adhere to old sections of 
the database that are not updated, it can still arise for any part of the database 
that is continuously updated.  
 Once again, any regime that provides perpetual protection should be justi-
fied. The most convincing argument is that if protection is unlimited, a pro-
ducer will continue to invest in the product. But, it has been argued in the 
theoretical chapter that whether continued investment occurs depends on 
many factors, including competition within the particular industry. Moreover, 
the benefits of investment must be greater than the costs. In this instance, the 
costs in terms of access may be higher.  
 This conclusion is reinforced by legal argumentation. Within the Direc-
tive, there has been a consistent emphasis on not protecting facts or data and 
on not creating a new right in the materials. However, perpetual protection 
does just that. In fact, a careful reading of the first draft seems to reveal that 
the term was finite with no possibility of renewal. This principle was later 
changed due to concerns about dynamic databases.  
 It is also backed by a strategic issue. The granting of perpetual protection 
marks a new expansion in the area of intellectual property rights. Such an 
expansion goes against traditions in intellectual property law and is a great 
 
98. British Horseracing Board, High Court of Justice Chancery Division, 9 February 
2001, ¶ 72. 
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cause of concern for access. This type of precedent should not begin in an 
area that is one of the least deserving of protection. Nor should it begin in the 
absence of a very careful analysis of the legal, economic and practical impli-
cations of such an initiative. 
 One could return to the first draft in which there was arguably only one 
term. After that, databases would have to use other mechanisms or business 
strategies to attract their income. Some may state, however, that their invest-
ment will discontinue once their right dries up or they may not even produce 
in the first place.  
 A good alternative may be to register a database for a fee every 15 years 
so that there is some form of intent to use the protection. There are adminis-
trative costs both to the registrant and to the administrators of the system. 
However, it is likely that the benefits in increased certainty and access would 
be worth it.  
 Registration is beneficial for several other reasons. First, with a registra-
tion and date-stamping process, there would be more clarity about what is 
protected and what is not. Given that qualification for protection is dependent 
on substantial investment, something that a user can simply never independ-
ently know, such date-stamping would result in more confident use. Further-
more, as noted by Landes and Posner, it may result in a larger public domain 
because only those who will benefit from the right will obtain it.99 Lastly, 
registration fees can actually be employed to regulate the size of the public 
domain. Naturally, the higher the fees, the fewer databases that will be regis-
tered.  
 When it comes to database content protection, it is submitted that the costs 
of infinite renewal are greater than the benefits. This is because unoriginal 
content requires thinner protection than copyrighted works. Due to the fact 
that these contents function as generic infrastructural inputs, access assumes a 
heightened priority. Therefore, renewal should be limited to three times 
maximum. This would allow for 45 years of protection and should be more 
than sufficient.  
5.15 Conclusion: The Future 
A regulation of the database industry involves a delicate task of providing 
sufficient production incentives and of safeguarding information access. An 
 
99. Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, p. 212. 
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analysis of legal developments in the EC reveals that it is difficult to strike a 
perfect balance. The fate of this balance is unclear due to the questions that 
still exist regarding interpretation of the Directive and the conclusions of the 
Commission’s evaluation report.  
 When it was first implemented, the 1996 Database Directive was overpro-
tective. The newly created right was extremely broad, its term of protection 
was likely perpetual and it applied against all users, whether noncommercial, 
commercial, public or private. This resulted in limited access by consumers 
and may have stymied database production by re-users. 
 The ECJ judgments of November 2004 may have restored some balance. 
The Court imposed a high qualification threshold by holding that investment 
in a database can only refer to the finding and collecting of existing data. It 
can never refer to data creation. As a result, the database right has the poten-
tial to more precisely help those who need it. Meanwhile, the contents of 
databases of those producers who do not need incentives are open for use.  
 But for those databases that are protected, the right is likely too strong. 
This could result in a situation in which protection leads to less production, 
not more. Given the critical importance of access to the information con-
tained in databases, it is urged that the right be further clarified and revised.  
 In this spirit, the following recommendations are put forth: 
1.  Restrict the database right to electronic databases and all its other forms, 
2.  Clarify the qualification threshold so that scientific discovery does not 
count as obtaining, 
3.  Determine qualification according to economic criteria, 
4.  Narrow the scope of the database right to commercial uses defined as 
“any use – whether domestic or collective – aiming at economic activity 
or a remunerated transaction,” 
5.  Determine infringement according to economic criteria, 
6.  Define lawful user to include those who become legal users by operation 
of law, 
7.  Harmonize the exceptions with those in the InfoSoc Directive and re-
name them the rights and obligations of lawful users. Delete the redun-
dant rights found in Article 8, 
8.  Codify the consultation right and insert it into the section on the rights 
and obligations of lawful users, 
9.  Establish a registration system with the possibility of three renewals, and 
10. Conduct an independent, objective and scientific study of the impact of 
the database right on all stakeholders. 
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6.1 Introduction: The Copyright Balance 
The traditional copyright regime of the United States strikes a balance be-
tween granting authors incentives to create new works and ensuring a free 
flow of information to stimulate further creativity and the development of 
knowledge.1 The Constitution mandates this balance by directing Congress, 
“To promote the … useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors … 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.”2  
 The Supreme Court explains this rationale, “The limited scope of the 
copyright holder’s statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration 
required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the 
public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private 
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public avail-
ability of literature, music, and the other arts.”3  
 Under the 1976 Copyright Act, protection is extended to authors who 
create original works, ranging from literature to computer programs, that are 
fixed in a tangible medium of expression.4 Databases qualify for protection as 
 
1. Parts of this chapter have been published in: (1) “Will the Internet Turn into a Digital 
McWorld? The Possible Consequences of the Expansion of the Copyright Monopoly 
on E-Commerce,” in EU Electronic Commerce Law (Copenhagen: Djøf Publishing, 
2004) and (2) “Who Should Decide? An Evaluation of the Decision Making Process to 
Protect Factual Database Contents in the US and EU,” Julebog 2005 (Copenhagen: Ju-
rist-og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2005).  
2. The Constitution of the United States, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
3. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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compilations under the category of literary works.5 A compilation is defined 
as “a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials 
or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the 
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”6 
 The statute grants copyright owners the following six exclusive rights: (1) 
to reproduce their work, (2) to prepare derivative works, (3) to distribute 
copies by sale, transfer, rental, lease, or lending, (4) to perform publicly, (5) 
to display the work publicly and (6) to perform sound recordings publicly.7  
 Information flows into the public domain in a variety of ways. The fair use 
doctrine authorizes certain uses without permission for purposes such as criti-
cism, commentary, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research.8 Be-
cause the duration of copyright is limited to the life of the author plus 70 
years, all material is eventually available for free.9  
 From the moment of creation, the idea-expression dichotomy ensures that 
certain parts of a work, such as ideas or facts, are not protected and automati-
cally are part of the public domain. It was first elaborated by the Supreme 
Court in 1879, “The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful 
arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains. 
But this object would be frustrated if the knowledge could not be used with-
out incurring the guilt of piracy of the book.”10  
 Despite this clear principle, the balance between protection and no protec-
tion has swung back and forth when it comes to unoriginal contents. Before 
 
5. § 103(a) of the Copyright Act expressly states, “The subject matter of copyright as 
specified by section 102 includes compilations.” § 102 (a) includes an illustrative and 
non-exhaustive list of works of authorship that may be protected by copyright if the 
requisite criteria are met. The Congressional report that explains and accompanies the 
Copyright Act notes: “The term ‘literary works’ does not connote any criterion of liter-
ary merit or qualitative value: it includes catalogs, directories, and similar factual, ref-
erence, or instructional works and compilations of data.”  
6. Databases that assemble previously copyrighted works fall under a subset of compila-
tions termed collective works. A collective work is: “a work, such as a periodical issue, 
anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate 
and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.” 17 
U.S.C. § 101. The copyright in a collective work only extends to the material contrib-
uted by that author and not to any copyright in the materials used. Id. § 103(a). 
7. 17 U.S.C. § 106. There are no general moral rights. However, § 106(a) provides for the 
rights of paternity and integrity to creators of visual art. But these rights only last for 
the author’s lifetime and there are many limitations, including for commercial use. 
8. Id., § 107. 
9. Id., § 302(a). 
10. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879). 
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1991, some federal circuits recognized rights to the entire database, including 
its contents, under a sweat-of-the-brow theory that rewarded labor, time and 
expense. Other circuits adhered to the idea-expression dichotomy by granting 
copyright to the selection and arrangement of a database but allowing the 
unoriginal material to remain in the public domain.11  
 The Supreme Court resolved the circuit split by restoring the balance in 
the 1991 case of Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Services.12 It held that 
under the idea-expression dichotomy unoriginal contents are not copyright-
able, but that the selection and arrangement of a database is, if original.  
 The result is a private ordering regime in which the producer who wishes 
to secure his unoriginal contents must decide upon and pay for the protection 
desired and for enforcement of it. He has the ability to choose from a variety 
of methods including technical measures and contractual provisions to pre-
vent copying. Some methods are backed by clear legal precedent. For exam-
ple, strong enforcement is guaranteed against efforts to circumvent technical 
measures. However, contractual provisions are only valid in a few jurisdic-
tions.  
 As a result of these self-help efforts, the balance between production in-
centives and information access remains tenuous. If these trends become 
widespread, the danger is that unoriginal material will be even more locked-
up than under the database right in Europe. 
 Yet after 16 years, this fear does not comport with reality. According to 
statistics from the Gale Directory of Databases, 65% of all databases in 2003 
were made in North America, while 29% were generated in Europe.13 In 
1991, North America produced 71% of all databases. The percentage has 
consistently been at 60% or more since then.  
 One explanation may be the impact of free access on re-use. A report 
prepared for the European Commission comparing the open access model of 
distributing public sector information in the United States with the cost re-
covery method used in some European Member States reveals that the eco-
nomic value generated from open access is more productive. The Commis-
sion concluded that, “estimates indicate that the US market based on public 
 
11. There are 13 federal court circuits. They comprise the US Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit and 12 regional circuits each composed of a number of states.  
12. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
13. Martha E. Williams, “The State of Databases Today: 2004,” Gale Directory of Data-
bases 2004 Vol. 1, Part 1 (Detroit: Gale Research, 2005).  
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sector information resources may be several (possibly five) times the size of 
the comparable European market.”14  
 If open access has a similar effect on the re-use of unoriginal content, then 
it may help explain why the database industry is thriving. It also further 
strengthens the argument that re-use is critical to greater production within 
the database industry. However, careful empirical analysis is necessary to 
determine the validity of these claims.  
  A lack of protection could result in less production. But it could just as 
easily result in the generation of more databases that are not dependent on 
content protection. One possibility is free content supported by advertising. If 
more producers employ this model, the implications for re-users could be 
enormous. Only time will tell which of these trends is stronger, if either.  
 The goal of this chapter is to describe the US regime and explore what 
lessons it may have for Europe. It begins with a description of the state of the 
law before 1991 followed by an analysis of the Feist decision and its implica-
tions. Next, the failed efforts to pass database content legislation will be ex-
plored. Interestingly, 10 years of congressional battles reveal that it is the re-
users who have defeated passage.  
 The reaction of database makers dependent on protection of their unorigi-
nal content is then explored. For purposes of this thesis, the analysis concen-
trates on the validity of contract provisions to prohibit copying and on the 
strength of the legal protection of technical measures.15 The chapter will con-
clude by discussing whether or not similar trends could occur in Europe. In 
fact, it is difficult to predict how database makers who do not qualify for the 
database right will react. The lesson is that the situation should be carefully 
monitored and efforts made to ensure that unprotected contents do not get 
locked up through other protection mechanisms.  
6.2 The Circuits Split on Unoriginal Contents 
Prior to 1991, the balancing mechanisms of copyright law were not always 
applied to databases containing uncopyrightable materials. All courts agreed 
that unoriginal contents were in the public domain and that compilations were 
 
14. European Commission, Directorate General for the Information Society, “Exploiting 
the Potential of Europe’s Public Sector Information,” (Luxembourg: Unit information 
market E4, May 2004), p. 3. 
15. As mentioned in Chapter 1, other legal mechanisms such as trespass to chattels and 
“hot news” misappropriation are not discussed. 
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copyrightable. As one court explained, “‘a man’s name, his occupation, his 
place of business, and his residence are none of them subjects of copyright.’ 
But, if a man compiles a book containing such information about the resi-
dents of a particular place, he may, as we shall see, copyright it as a whole, 
notwithstanding the fact that the separate parts of which it is composed are 
not copyrightable.”16 But the courts were split over which part of such compi-
lations were copyright protected.17  
 Some courts proclaimed that unoriginal materials were protected, “The 
right to copyright a book upon which one has expended labor in its prepara-
tion does not depend upon whether the materials which he has collected con-
sist or not of matters which are publici juris, or whether such materials show 
literary skill or originality, either in thought or in language, or anything more 
than industrious collection.”18  
 According to the theory of sweat-of-the-brow or industrious collection, 
time, labor and expenditure were enough to qualify an entire work as copy-
rightable, including the unoriginal contents within. The rationale was eco-
nomic, “The compiler’s contribution to knowledge normally is the collection 
of the information, not its arrangement. If his protection is limited solely to 
the form of expression, the economic incentives underlying the copyright 
laws are largely swept away.”19  
 Under the sweat-of-the-brow theory, re-users could exploit a previous 
compilation to verify their own independent effort or consult a previous work 
to find source material. Ultimately, however, every producer had to go to the 
original sources and independently produce their own compilation. “Ap-
propriation of the fruits of another’s labor and skill in order to publish a rival 
work without the expenditure of the time and effort required for independent-
ly arrived at results is copyright infringement.”20  
 
16. Jeweler’s Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 Fed. 83, 87 (2nd 
Cir. 1922). 
17. In Europe, the situation pre-Feist is generally portrayed as a unified sweat-of-the-brow 
regime. See, for example, Estelle Derclaye, “Intellectual property rights on information 
and market power – Comparing European and American protection of Databases,” In-
ternational Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 38 no. 3 (2007), pp. 
275-298. 
18. Jeweler’s Circular, at 88. 
19. National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F.Supp. 89, 92 (N.D.Ill. 
1982). 
20. Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co., 301 F.2d 119, 120, cert. denied, 371, U.S. 817, 83 S.Ct. 
31, 9 L.Ed. 2d 58 (1962). 
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 In Jeweler’s Circular, the court compared two compilations side-by-side 
and determined that the defendant exercised no independent creation, but 
merely copied from the plaintiff. The court viewed evidence that the defen-
dant had copied plaintiff’s work as enough to prove infringement. But it cited 
numerous other examples to show that there was no independent creation, 
including errors that were in both works as well as evidence that the defen-
dant did not verify the materials from original sources, and if it had, did not 
change any information as requested. 
 Other courts refused to accept the sweat-of-the-brow theory, “The law of 
copyrights defies the laws of logic, or, as one commentator puts it, ‘the dicta-
tes of algebra,’ since it ‘affords to the summation of one hundred or one mil-
lion [individual facts and their unadorned expression] a significant measure 
of protection’ while affording none to the facts themselves.”21 This court held 
that the only protectable aspect of a factual compilation was the original se-
lection and arrangement, but not its unoriginal content. Re-users were free to 
take the facts, but not the part that was original to the author, namely the 
selection or arrangement. 
 By the early ’90s, the federal circuits were still split over the issue of what 
in a compilation was copyrightable. Two of the largest and most active court 
systems, the 9th and 2nd Circuits, had already forsaken sweat-of-the-brow 
theory in favor of preserving the idea-expression dichotomy.22 Other circuits 
such as the 10th and 7th continued to adhere to sweat-of-the-brow protection.23  
 It is unclear what effect this lack of uncertainty had on database produc-
tion, if any. Figures from the Gale Directory of Databases portray a clear 
upward trend from 1979 to 1991. In 1979, North American production was 
roughly equal to the rest of the world. However, by 1985, the numbers shot 
up to a little under 2,000 and increased to 4,424 by 1991. By that time, North 
American production was more than twice that of the rest of the world.24  
 
21. Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody’s Investor’s Service, Inc., 751 F.2d 501,505 (2nd 
Cir.1984). 
22. The 2nd Circuit comprises the states of New York, Connecticut and Vermont. The 9th 
Circuit includes Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon 
and Washington State. 
23. The 7th Circuit consists of the states of Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin. The 10th Circuit 
comprises Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming. 
24. Williams, “The State of Databases Today: 2004,” (2005).  
6.3 The Supreme Court Upholds Free Access 
 163 
6.3 The Supreme Court Upholds Free Access 
In 1991, the Supreme Court resolved the conflict in the circuits. Feist Publi-
cations v. Rural Telephone Service involved the most mundane of factual 
compilations, the white pages of a telephone book. Rural was a public utility 
that provided telephone service in the Kansas countryside. As part of its mo-
nopoly status, it was required by law to print a telephone book. The directory 
contained yellow pages as well as white pages with 7,700 listings. The com-
pany obtained the information for its white pages from its subscriber listings. 
While the compilation was free to telephone service subscribers, Rural made 
money by selling advertising space for its yellow pages. 
 Feist competed with Rural and other telephone services by selling adver-
tising space for the yellow pages of its own directory, which was also free. 
Feist’s directory covered 11 different telephone service areas and contained 
46,878 white page listings as well as yellow pages. The company normally 
paid a licensing fee to obtain its white page listings and Rural was the only 
telephone service that refused to license. Without Rural’s listings, Feist’s 
directory would have been incomplete and the company would have had 
problems selling advertising space. 
 Feist used Rural’s listings anyway. After discarding those not within its 
coverage, the company verified Rural’s subscriber information and added 
addresses which were missing. In the end, 1,309 of Feist’s white page listings 
were identical. 
 Rural sued for copyright infringement arguing that the names, telephone 
numbers and towns used in its directory were copyrightable. It stated that 
Feist ought to pound the pavement and collect the information itself. Feist 
countered that such a proposal was economically impractical and unnecessary 
because the information copied was in the public domain. The trial court and 
the court of appeals agreed with Rural.  
 The Supreme Court disagreed. It began by demystifying two main princi-
ples of database protection, that facts are not copyrightable, but compilations 
of facts are. The key to this paradox, it declared, is originality. The Court said 
that facts contained in a compilation are not protected by copyright because 
they are not original. Facts are not original, it explained, because they do not 
owe their origin to an act of authorship, “The distinction is one between crea-
tion and discovery: The first person to find and report a particular fact has not 
created the fact.”25 Thus, wrote the Court, “census takers, for example, do not 
 
25. Feist at 347. 
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‘create’ the population figures that emerge from their efforts: in a sense, they 
copy these figures from the world around them.”26 It continued, “notwith-
standing a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use the 
facts contained in another’s publication to aid in preparing a competing work, 
so long as the competing work does not feature the same selection and ar-
rangement.”27  
 The Court defined originality as: (1) independent creation by the author as 
opposed to copying from other works, plus (2) a minimal degree of creativity. 
It further elaborated, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a 
slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite 
easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or 
obvious’ it might be.”28  
 Because of the low originality threshold, a compilation could meet the 
originality criteria and therefore could be copyright protected, “the compila-
tion author typically chooses which facts to include, in what order to place 
them, and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used effec-
tively by readers . . . These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long 
as they are made independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree 
of creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may protect such compi-
lations through the copyright laws.”29  
 The Court turned to the definition contained in the 1976 Copyright Act as 
a test for determining whether or not a compilation qualified for protection. 
According to Section 101 of the act, a compilation is a work formed by (1) 
the collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts or data, (2) the 
selection, coordination or arrangement of those materials and (3) the creation, 
by virtue of the particular selection, coordination or arrangement, of an origi-
nal work of authorship. While the first component of the test merely de-
scribes what one does to create a compilation, the Court argued that the last 
component simply states that the result must be an original work of author-
ship. Therefore, the most important component of the test is the second ele-
ment. According to the Court, “the statute dictates that the principal focus 
should be on whether the selection, coordination, and arrangement are suffi-
ciently original to merit protection.”30 
 
26. Id. 
27. Feist at 349. 
28. Id., at 345. 
29. Id., at 348. 
30. Id., at 358.  
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 In applying this originality test to the case at bar, the Court declared that 
there was no originality in either the selection or arrangement of the white 
pages of a phone book. In terms of selection, it said, “Rural’s selection of 
listings could not be more obvious: It publishes the most basic information – 
name, town, and telephone number – about each person who applies to it for 
telephone service. This is ‘selection’ of a sort, but it lacks the modicum of 
creativity necessary to transform mere selection into copyrightable expres-
sion.”31 Nor was the arrangement sufficiently original, “there is nothing re-
motely creative about arranging names alphabetically in a white pages direc-
tory. It is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace 
that it has come to be expected as a matter of course.”32 
 In deciding that the white pages of a telephone directory could not be pro-
tected by copyright, the Court opined, “given that some works must fail, we 
cannot imagine a more likely candidate. Indeed, were we to hold that Rural’s 
white pages pass muster, it is hard to believe that any collection of facts could 
fail ... This decision should not be construed as demeaning Rural’s efforts in 
compiling its directory, but rather as making clear that copyright rewards 
originality, not effort.” In further justifying its decision, the Court said, “it may 
seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler’s labor may be used by 
others without compensation ... however, this is not ‘some unforeseen byprod-
uct of a statutory scheme.’ It is, rather, ‘the essence of copyright’.”33  
6.4 The Repercussions 
The Supreme Court decision in Feist was not earth-shattering from a theo-
retical perspective. Rather it functioned as a purification of existing case law 
and practice. The Court reconciled the fundamental principles of copyright 
law with the daily jumble of judicial decision making and confirmed the 
placement of the idea-expression dichotomy as a central principle of copy-
right law. By grounding the definition of originality in the Constitution, ar-
guably for the first time, it heightened the importance of originality in copy-
righted works.34 The result would make it even more difficult to dilute the 
originality concept. 
 
31. Id., at 362. 
32. Id., at 363. 
33. Id., at 371. 
34. This makes it more difficult to pass a database protection law. However, it has been 
argued that a law can be passed through the commerce clause of the Constitution. See, 
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 Despite the seemingly genial nature of the decision, the Register of Copy-
right, Ralph Oman, commented, “the Supreme Court dropped a bomb.”35 
Prior to Feist, he claimed that the Copyright Office generally accepted regis-
tration from database owners under the sweat-of-the-brow theory. Some da-
tabase producers may have thought that their unoriginal content was pro-
tected. However, any business who had their data taken in a circuit that did 
not adhere to sweat-of-the-brow theory would have known better.  
 Even if the selection or arrangement of a work was sufficiently original, 
the protection given to the work was thin. After Feist, the case law generally 
revealed that near identical copying of the selection or arrangement of a com-
pilation was infringement, anything less was not. Even if it was sufficiently 
original, proof of copyright infringement required near exact copying. Thus, 
the case law generally revealed that if a re-user’s selection and arrangement 
varied by more than a trivial degree, it would not infringe the first producer’s 
copyright.36  
 From a producer’s perspective, it could be argued that copyright protec-
tion was almost meaningless. The Supreme Court acknowledged this result, 
“Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to 
use the facts contained in another’s publication to aid in preparing a compet-
ing work, so long as the competing work does not feature the same selection 
and arrangement. As one commentator explains it: ‘No matter how much 
original authorship the work displays, the facts and ideas it exposes are free 
for the taking’.”37  
 Clearly, the Feist decision would have negative repercussions for those 
database producers dependent on protection of their unoriginal content. One 
reaction was to lobby for the passage of legislation similar to the 1996 Data-
base Directive.  
 
for example, Justin Hughes, “How Extra-Copyright Protection of Databases Can be 
Constitutional,” 28 University of Dayton Law Review 159 (2002). 
35. Copyright Office And Copyright Royalty Tribunal Report Status To House Panel, 41 
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 524, (April 18, 1991). 
36. This was confirmed by analyzing all cases involving selection and arrangement of a 
compilation since 1991. They are too numerous to mention but are on file with the au-
thor. 
37. Feist at 349. 
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6.5 Re-users Defeat Legislation 
Efforts to introduce legislation to protect database contents began in 1996 
immediately after the passage of the Database Directive in the European 
Community.38 But even though bills have been introduced in almost every 
Congressional term ending in 2004, none have passed.39 Over the years, two 
main models of protection have been forwarded. 
 The first is an exclusive rights model in which database makers are given 
a right to prevent certain uses of their database content. The “Database In-
vestment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996” is an example of 
the strongest version of this model.40 Databases that qualify for protection are 
“the result of a qualitatively or quantitatively substantial investment of hu-
man, technical, financial or other resources in the collection, assembly, verifi-
cation, organization or presentation of the database contents” and are “used, 
reused or intended to be used or reused” in commerce.41 This definition is 
very similar to that in the Database Directive except that, here, protected 
databases have to be of commercial interest.  
 The exclusive rights granted are also very similar. No person is allowed to 
“extract, use or reuse all or a substantial part, qualitatively or quantita-
tively…of the contents of a database…in a manner that conflicts with the 
database owner’s normal exploitation of the database or adversely affects the 
actual or potential market for that database.”42 “The repeated or systematic 
extraction, use or reuse of insubstantial parts, qualitatively or quantitatively” 
is also prohibited.43  
 The term of protection is 25 years. Any change of commercial signifi-
cance can trigger a new term. Remedies for violations include both civil and 
criminal. Contrary to the Database Directive, all provisions of the act can be 
waived through contract. 
 As bills were repeatedly rejected in Congress, legislative initiatives began 
featuring narrower rights. A second model introduced was variations of the 
 
38. For information on bills considered, see http://thomas.loc.gov/home/c110query.html 
(last visited 9 August 2007). For information about congressional hearings on database 
protection, see the US House of Representatives Judiciary Committee Subcommittee 
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property at http://judiciary.house.gov/ commit-
teestructure.aspx?committee=3 (last visited on 9 August 2007). 
39. See http://judiciary.house.gov/bills.aspx 
40. H.R. 3531, 104 Cong. (1996). 
41. Id., § 3. 
42. Id., § 4(a)(1). 
43. Id., § 4(a)(2).  
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tort of misappropriation. One of the last bills considered on 2 March 2004, 
was an effort to codify the “hot news” exception.44 The purpose of the “Con-
sumer Access to Information Act of 2004” is “to prohibit the misappropria-
tion of databases while ensuring consumer access to factual information.”45 
The bill deems the misappropriation of a database as an unfair method of 
competition or an unfair or deceptive act to be enforced by the Federal Trade 
Commission.  
 A violation occurs under the following circumstances: “(1) a person gen-
erates or collects the information in the database at some cost or expense, (2) 
the value of the information is highly time-sensitive, (3) another person’s use 
of the information constitutes free-riding on the first person’s costly efforts to 
generate or collect it, (4) the other person’s use of the information is in direct 
competition with a product or service offered by the first person and (5) the 
ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the first person would so 
reduce the incentive to produce the product or service that its existence or 
quality would be substantially threatened.”46  
 The failure to pass even the narrowest form of protection in 16 years illus-
trates the strength of stakeholders for whom free access is critical. From this 
perspective, it is instructive to understand the type of representation in both 
the judicial and legislative processes. During its deliberations over Feist, the 
Supreme Court accepted motions to submit amicus curiae briefs from third 
parties that proved an interest in the case.47 Most were commercial competi-
tors whose businesses included the production or re-use of telephone directo-
ries. Several parties had been or were involved in other lawsuits against each 
other that involved the copyright of unoriginal contents. 
 Seven third parties supported Rural Telephone Services, including asso-
ciations representing 200 American publishers concerned with protecting 
their factual compilations and the majority of American telephone companies. 
 Five parties supported Feist’s position that factual contents were not copy-
rightable. They comprised associations representing 33,000 direct mail mar-
keters who rely on telephone books to compile their mailing lists, 11 publish-
ers of cross reference directories which take telephone book contents and 
arrange them according to telephone number or address instead of name and 
 
44. Because it is a codification of the “hot news” tort of misappropriation, it would not be 
considered broad enough in the European context. 
45. H.R. 3872, 108 Cong. (2004). 
46. Id., § 2(b).  
47. All Supreme Court documents including amicus curiae briefs are available on west-
law.  
6.6 Copyright Pre-empts License Provisions 
 169 
120 publishers of independent telephone directories which do not own tele-
phone services.  
 Many of the participants in the lawsuit agreed that Congress should define 
the copyright balance. During the history of legislative activity, a wider spec-
trum of stakeholders was represented. Pubic hearings were held in 1997, 
1998, 1999 and 2003. The hearings featured a healthy mix of those in favor 
and those against protection. Those for protection comprised companies who 
made money selling their factual databases. They were represented by groups 
such as the Coalition Against Database Piracy, the Information Industry As-
sociation and the Association of Directory Publishers.  
 Those who favored little or no protection included a wider pool of re-users 
and consumers. They represented the majority of US universities, public 
libraries, scientists, medical researchers and engineers. For example, the li-
brary associations that gave testimony represented 80,000 nonprofit libraries 
of the 120,000 existing in the United States.  
 Opponents to protection proved very persuasive both because of the sheer 
numbers they represented and because of their warning that protection of 
unoriginal contents could bring the US research and innovation system to a 
halt. Their lobbying might continues to be strong enough that it is unlikely 
that any legislation similar to the Database Directive will pass in the foresee-
able future.  
 Moreover, passage of such legislation could be counterproductive.48 As 
the situation stands now, re-users are free to transform unoriginal contents for 
other creations, including more databases. Noncommercial database makers 
and private users can continue the level of information sharing to which they 
are accustomed. Because the database industry continues to grow despite the 
absence of a secure form of content protection, one implication could be that 
free access is important to a thriving database industry. Without concrete 
empirical evidence, however, it is impossible to make a decisive conclusion. 
  
6.6 Copyright Pre-empts License Provisions 
After Feist, database protection was insecure under copyright law. Even if the 
selection and arrangement of a database was copyrightable, infringement 
 
48. For a contrary opinion, see Derclaye, “Intellectual property rights on information and 
market power – Comparing European and American protection of Databases,” p. 298. 
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required near exact copying. If a re-user’s selection and arrangement varied 
by more than a trivial degree, then it would not infringe the first producer’s 
copyright. Database makers dependent on protection of their unoriginal con-
tents sought other alternatives. 
 Mass market licenses offered a possible solution. Businesses typically use 
licenses to detail the rights and obligations of the parties. Standard provisions 
include those that disclaim warranties, limit liabilities and remedies and des-
ignate the legal forum for disputes.49 Mass market licenses allow businesses 
to determine which provisions to include while purchasers generally accept 
them on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
 Licenses used on digital products come in several forms. Shrinkwrap li-
censes often accompany CDs, including those with electronic databases. 
Typically, a sheet of license terms is wrapped in transparent plastic along 
with the disks. Buyers allegedly signify acceptance by tearing open the plas-
tic wrap and using the disks. Shrinkwrap licenses, or references to them, can 
also be printed on the outside of boxes or included in the product box or user 
manual.50 
 Online licenses usually appear in two forms, clickwraps or browsewraps. 
A product with a clickwrap license cannot be used until the purchaser ac-
tively assents to the license terms, usually by clicking on an icon or by typing 
“I accept.” Browsewrap licenses are more problematic. A browsewrap li-
cense, or a hyperlink to it, normally appears on a website owner’s homepage. 
Although the user is advised not to proceed further if they do not agree to the 
license terms, nothing prevents the user from accessing the product without 
first reading the license.  
 It was believed that license provisions could be used to prevent copying of 
unoriginal content. But in the US, federal copyright law superseded state 
contract law. Thus any license provisions affecting copyright were tradition-
ally held invalid. According to the supremacy clause of the Constitution, 
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”51 Within the 
area of copyright, a state law right will be invalid if, (1) Congress expressly 
 
49. Since this discussion is restricted to limitations that impact copyright, general contract 
law provisions will not be detailed.  
50. See Mark A. Lemley, “Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap licenses,” 68 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 1239, 1241 (July 1995).  
51. The Constitution of the United States, Art.VI, cl. 2.  
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reserves a particular area of the law (express preemption) or (2) a conflict 
exists between state and federal law (conflict preemption).52  
 Section 301(a) of the copyright act expressly mandates preemption if the 
following two-pronged test is satisfied: (1) the work at issue falls within the 
“the subject matter of copyright” and (2) the right asserted is “equivalent to 
any of the exclusive rights” of the copyright holder.53 The general subject 
matter of copyright is broader than what can be copyright protected. For ex-
ample, facts fall under the general subject matter even though they are not 
copyrightable. If a work is encompassed by copyright, preemption will only 
occur if the state law right “is infringed by the mere act of reproduction, per-
formance, distribution or display.”54  
 Many circuits require an ‘extra element’ to uphold a state right. An extra 
element means that the state law right is qualitatively different than rights 
afforded under copyright law.55 While tortuous interference of contractual 
relations is often preempted, privacy right violations, trade secret infringe-
ments and deceptive trade practices, such as false labeling, passing off and 
fraudulent representation, are generally not preempted because they contain 
elements that are different in kind from copyright.56  
 A state law right that survives express preemption can still be invalid un-
der conflict preemption. The Supreme Court has determined that, “When 
state law touches upon the area of these federal statutes, it is ‘familiar doc-
trine’ that the federal policy ‘may not be set at naught, or its benefits denied’ 
by the state law.”57 To determine conflict preemption, courts often compare 
the objectives and impact of the state law right with that of copyright to see if 
there is a clash.58  
 The first decision to evaluate the intersection between contract and copy-
right was the 1988 case of Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.59 The 5th Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals employed both an express and a conflict preemption 
analysis to strike down a shrinkwrap license provision that prohibited reverse 
 
52. A third type of preemption is when a court determines that Congress intended to have 
exclusive authority over a particular area of the law (field preemption). 
53. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). 
54. Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Asso., 805 F.2d 663, 677 
(7th Cir. 1986). 
55. National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431 (8th 
Cir. 1993). 
56. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976). 
57. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964). 
58. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
59. 847 F. 2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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engineering. The state had passed a law that granted software producers the 
right to use specific terms in their licenses. The court found conflicts between 
the state law, upon which the license provision was based, and federal copy-
right. These included the following: (1) the state law allowed a perpetual bar 
on copying, while the federal act provided copyright for a limited duration, 
(2) the state law banned all copying, while the federal act provided limita-
tions, and (3) the state law protected all works, while the copyright act only 
protected original works by authors.  
 Since the Vault decision, the two critical issues have been whether licenses 
for digital products are valid and whether a license provision can prevent 
copying.60 What occurred was that courts began to favor a contract law 
analysis and failed to correctly apply the preemption doctrine. This opened up 
an opportunity for database makers to protect their unoriginal content, but 
only in some federal jurisdictions. 
6.7 Online Licenses and Provisions to Prevent Copying  
Disputes began over the validity of shrinkwrap licenses. The question facing 
courts was whether a shrinkwrap license provision is part of the sales con-
tract. The answer turned on when the contract was formed.  
 Courts initially deemed shrinkwrap licenses invalid. In the 1991 case of 
Step-Saver Data Systems Inc. v. Wyse Technology, a dispute arose over the 
 
60. Policymakers are trying to solidify the erratic case law by proposing legislation that 
clearly legitimizes online licenses. All attempts have failed to date. The Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act was formulated in 1999 to resolve conflicting 
case law by clearly making clickwrap and shrinkwrap licenses enforceable. Applicable 
to software and digital content contracts, UCITA was severely criticized because it 
lacked clarity and would result in much litigation, it failed to protect the interests of li-
censees and it allowed licensors to expand the scope of their copyright. Its failure was 
made clear on 1 August 2003 when the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, which actually wrote the model law, withdrew its support. 
  The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is a model law that applies to most com-
mercial transactions. It has been enacted by every state in one form or another. As of 
May 2003, efforts have continued to revise Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) which has been adopted in some form in all 50 states. Strenuous critiques have 
arisen such as: (1) information, including digital information, appears to have been re-
moved from the definition of a good resulting in a possible void in the law for online 
transactions and (2) the revisions do not take a stand on delayed disclosure of standard 
form terms and, in fact, allow acceptance by a consumer of a delayed term, but not 
through express agreement as is the case under the current UCC 2-207.  
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faulty operating system of a computer hardware and software package.61 The 
plaintiff asserted that the limitation on damages and warranty disclaimer 
contained in the shrinkwrap license was part of the contract.  
 The court disagreed. It stated that the parties’ conduct had established a 
contract but that the nature of the terms was unclear. It then applied Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) §2-207 which is used to discover contract terms in 
classic battle-of-the-forms cases involving the sale of goods. According to 
UCC §2-207(1), “A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a 
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an 
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those 
offered or agreed upon.” In a contract between two merchants as in the case 
at bar, “(2) such terms become part of the contract unless, (b) they materially 
alter it.” Since the shrinkwrap provisions materially altered the contract and 
the plaintiff did not expressly agree, the court invalidated the provisions.  
 Step-Saver was the first decision to strike down a shrinkwrap license un-
der the UCC. In the 1993 case of Arizona Retail Sys. v. Software Link, a fed-
eral district court applied a different UCC provision. It held that in the initial 
sale of computer software involving two merchants, receipt of an evaluation 
diskette through the mail was an offer and opening the envelope constituted 
acceptance.62 In this particular instance, the court determined that the shrink-
wrap license was part of the contract.  
 But in all subsequent sales, the contract was formed through agreement on 
price and quantity over the telephone and consequent shipping or an offer to 
ship. The shrinkwrap license appeared after the contract was formed and 
represented a proposal for a modification of the contract. Under UCC §2-209, 
the warranty disclaimer contained in the shrinkwrap license materially altered 
the contract and required express assent. Because the plaintiff did not ex-
pressly agree to the additional term, the provision was held invalid.  
 The 7th Circuit decision of ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg changed the debate 
regarding the validity of a shrinkwrap license. It was also the first dispute 
since Vault that considered the validity of a license provision to prevent copy-
ing. The defendant had purchased copies of plaintiff’s software program 
which consisted of listings from 3,000 telephone directories and copyrighted 
software needed to access the data. A shrinkwrap license that accompanied 
the software restricted copying of the data to personal use and prohibited any 
 
61. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991). 
62. 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993). The court also had to decide which law to apply. If 
the product was a service then state contract law applied. But if the product was a 
good, the UCC applied. Most courts apply the UCC even for software products.  
Chapter 6. The Effect of No Protection in the United States 
 174 
distribution. The defendant took the telephone listings and made the raw data 
available to Internet users for a lower price. The plaintiff sued for copyright 
infringement and breach of the shrinkwrap license. 
 Contrary to the Vault decision, the district court began by analyzing the 
contract. It agreed with the Step-Saver and Arizona Retail decisions and 
stated that regardless of whether it applied an analysis under UCC §2-207 or 
§2-209, the defendant, not a merchant, was required to expressly assent to the 
terms of the shrinkwrap license whether the contract was materially altered or 
not. Since the he did not assent, the court held, “mere reference to the terms at 
the time of initial contract formation does not present buyers an adequate 
opportunity to decide whether they are acceptable. They must be able to read 
and consider the terms in their entirety.”63  
 Even if the shrinkwrap license was valid, the district court preempted the 
plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Employing the two-pronged test under 
§301 of the Copyright Act, the court found that, (1) the data, though not 
copyright protected, did fall under the subject matter of copyright and (2) the 
rights asserted were equivalent to the exclusive rights of reproduction and 
distribution. In making its decision, the court opined, “It is ironic that after 
plaintiff has attained the benefits of copyright law, it wants to prevent others 
from receiving that same protection. Unfortunately for plaintiff, the rules of 
the game have not changed. Just as plaintiff had public access to the tele-
phone listings, so do defendants. Plaintiff cannot use a standard form contract 
to make an end run around copyright law.”64 
 In 1996, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision.65 It pointed 
out that reference to license terms on the product box at the time of contract 
formation was indeed sufficient. The court further stated, “Notice on the 
outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return the software for a refund if 
the terms are unacceptable . . . may be a means of doing business valuable to 
buyers and sellers alike.”66  
 The court employed the flexible provision of UCC § 2-204(1) on general 
contract formation to argue that the shrinkwrap license was part of the con-
tract. According to § 2-204(1), “A contract for sale of goods may be made in 
any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties 
which recognizes the existence of such a contract.” The court interpreted the 
provision to mean that “a vendor, as master of the offer, may invite accep-
 
63. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 654 (W.D.Wis. 1996). 
64. Id., at 659. 
65. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
66. Id., at 1451. 
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tance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind of conduct that 
constitutes acceptance. . . . ProCD proposed a contract that a buyer would 
accept by using the software after having an opportunity to read the license at 
leisure.”67  
 The court explained that the package of 3,000 telephone directories cost 
US $10 million to create. To sell its product, the plaintiff decided to price 
discriminate by charging a lower price to individual consumers than to busi-
nesses. The court asserted that in order to charge that lower price, the plaintiff 
needed to control arbitrage. Rather than provide an inferior product with, for 
example, data that was older, the plaintiff introduced a license to restrict the 
data to private use and to prohibit its distribution. Without the license, the 
court argued that a higher price would have to be charged to recoup invest-
ment costs. Consumers would lose as a result.  
 Turning to the question of preemption, the court agreed that the work fell 
under the subject matter of copyright. However, it held that contract rights are 
not equivalent to rights under copyright. Although not specifically spelling 
out the distinction, the court implied, through the use of prior case law and 
examples, that the element of promise made a contract qualitatively different. 
It concluded, “A copyright is a right against the world. Contracts, by contrast, 
generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please.”68  
 
67. Id., at 1452. 
68. The ProCD decision is not the last word. Within the federal court system, only the 7th 
Circuit recognizes shrinkwrap licenses. See also Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th 
Cir. 1997)(shrinkwrap license enclosed with computer upheld). Some state courts have 
also validated shrinkwrap licenses. See Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998)(shrinkwrap delivered with computer valid); M.A. Mortenson 
Co. v. Timberline Software Corp.,93 Wa. App. 819 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)(shrinkwrap 
license terms of software program part of the contract); Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., No. 
98C-09-064 RRC, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 563 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1999) 
(shrinkwrap included with zip drive valid). 
  Shrinkwrap licenses remain invalid in the 5th and 3rd Circuits. See Vault Corp., 
847 F.2d 255; Step-Saver, 939 F.2d 91. Although not at the court of appeal level, a 9th 
circuit district court has also denied the validity of a shrinkwrap license. See Arizona 
Retail, 831 F. Supp. 759. A district court in the 10th Circuit recently followed suit. 
Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000)(shrinkwrap enclosed 
with computer invalid because: (1) UCC 2-207 applies, (2) vendor is not typically 
master of the offer and (3) purchaser must expressly accept terms). 
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6.8 Online License Validity 
The ProCD decision smoothed the way for the enforcement of online li-
censes. From the beginning, clickwrap licenses were deemed clearly valid. 
Because the purchaser affirmatively clicks or writes “I agree” to the terms 
before the product is received, mutual assent is not controversial.69 The bind-
ing nature of a clickwrap license has also been upheld.70  
 Browsewrap licenses are more problematic. The issues are whether there 
is sufficient notice and mutual assent. Although court decisions vary, a cer-
tain pattern based on the ProCD analysis may be emerging in some jurisdic-
tions. For these courts, sufficient notice on a website’s initial homepage 
serves to incorporate license terms imbedded further into the website, just 
like the reference outside the box in ProCD. If the notice clearly indicates 
that using the site binds the consumer and the consumer does in fact make use 
of the site, then mutual assent may be found.71  
 The clearest example of an emerging rule can be found by tracking the 
progress of Ticketmaster v. Tickets.Com. The defendant copied and 
deeplinked public domain information from other websites, including from 
Ticketmaster. Ticketmaster’s homepage contained a browsewrap restricting 
its information to personal use. Notice was placed at the bottom of Ticket-
master’s homepage in such a way that without an unusually large computer 
screen, the user had to scroll down to see it. The district court refused to 
honor the license because “many customers instead are likely to proceed to 
 
69. Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 203-04 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001)(par-
ties agree there is a contract); Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 91 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2002)(license valid because it was prominently displayed on screen and user was 
required to click “I agree” before software could be installed). I. Lan Sys., Inc. v. Net-
scout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002)(clickwrap valid under 
either UCC 2-204 or 2-207). 
70. Barnett, 38 S.W.3d 200, 203-04 (user bound to clickwrap license because one has 
obligation to read what one signs and absent fraud is not excused from the conse-
quences). 
71. See Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981-82 (E.D. Cal. 2000)(motion 
to dismiss denied because under 7th Circuit case law the license may be arguably valid 
and enforceable. But the court is concerned that notice appears in small, gray text on a 
gray background on a linked webpage); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 
2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)(because of the warning: “by submitting to this query, you 
agree to abide by these terms” there is no question that the user manifested assent); But 
see Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) aff’d 
306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002)(notice insufficient and downloading the software does not 
manifest user’s assent). 
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the event page of interest rather than reading the ‘small print.’ It cannot be 
said that merely putting the terms and conditions in this fashion necessarily 
creates a contract with any one using the web site.”72  
 Three years later, Ticketmaster changed its notice by prominently placing 
a warning on its homepage. Although the court stated that clickwrap licenses 
provide more legal certainty, it refused to grant summary judgment against a 
breach of contract claim based on the browsewrap license. Referring to 
ProCD, the court stated, “a contract can be formed by proceeding into the 
interior web pages after knowledge (or, in some cases, presumptive knowl-
edge) of the conditions accepted when doing so.”73  
 While the 9th Circuit may lean towards validation of browsewrap licenses, 
the 2nd Circuit has refused.74 One district court has said, “The case law on 
software licensing has not eroded the importance of assent in contract forma-
tion. Mutual assent is the bedrock of any agreement to which the law will 
give force. Defendants’ position, if accepted, would so expand the definition 
of assent as to render it meaningless.”75 
6.9 Are Copy-prevention Provisions Valid? 
ProCD is the re-user’s nightmare. In one stroke, the decision effectively 
eliminated a key mechanism for preserving the copyright balance: the pre-
emption doctrine. Other courts have followed suit by refusing to preempt 
mass market license provisions that expand copyright.76  
 
72. No. CV 99-7654 HLH (BQRx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, 8 (C.D. Cal. 27 March 
2000). 
73. Ticketmaster v. Tickets.Com, No. CV99-7654-HLH(VBKx), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
6483, 10 (C.D. Cal. 6 March 2003). 
74. Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) aff’d 306 
F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (notice insufficient and downloading the software does not 
manifest user’s assent). 
75. Id., at 596. 
76. See Lipsher v. LRP Publs., Inc., 266 F.3d 1305 (8th Cir. 2001)(subscription agreement 
restricting public domain jury verdicts not preempted because agreement affects only 
the parties); Information Handling Servs. v. LRP Publs., Inc., No. 00-1859, 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 14531 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2000)(shrinkwrap license provision prohibiting 
copying of public domain administrative decisions not preempted); Bowers v. Baystate 
Techs., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003)(shrinkwrap license prohibiting reverse engi-
neering not preempted because mutual assent and consideration renders the contract 
claim qualitatively different). 
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 Following the ProCD logic that contracts are different, the 8th Circuit 
Courts of Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and a 3rd circuit district court upheld 
similar license provisions. Just as in Vault and ProCD, these provisions: (1) 
protected data that is expressly non-copyrightable, (2) prohibited all copying 
and (3) created a perpetual copyright.77  
 Though these courts have followed its precedent, the ProCD decision has 
been severely criticized. The court’s opinion in ProCD that contracts are 
different is based on three cases that are not on point because each contract in 
question did actually have an extra element and therefore should not have 
been preempted.78 Moreover, the concrete examples the court mentions – 
such as if the preemption doctrine applied, the promise to return a rented 
videotape would not survive scrutiny, and neither would trade secret in-
fringement – are similarly incorrect and unpersuasive.79 
 An equally faulty contract analysis compounds the problem. The court 
acts as if the contract in question is the product of an individual negotiation 
between two equal parties. But it is a mass market license in which the buyer 
must either accept the terms or return the product. In fact, returning an item 
could prove difficult or downright impossible. Stores often refuse to accept 
returns once a package has been opened. Although the court says that the 
shrinkwrap’s restrictions are applied against an individual party, its mass 
market nature makes it effectively apply against the world. In such a context, 
one would expect even more protection than that given in the cases of Step-
Saver and Arizona Retail which involved licenses between merchants.  
 The uncertain state of the law is not good news from the database pro-
ducer’s perspective because it offers little security. For example, it is not clear 
if shrinkwrap or browsewrap licenses are valid. Clickwrap licenses, such as 
 
77. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d 663, 677. 
78. See Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1496 (5th Cir. 1990) (prohi-
bition against using sale materials for competing business in exclusive dealer agree-
ment not preempted); Acorn Structures v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 
1988)(implicit promise to pay for architectural plans or building materials not pre-
empted); National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 
433 (8th Cir. 1993)(prohibition using software program for third parties for payment 
not preempted). 
79. The court also failed to analyze the case under the doctrine of conflict preemption. As 
the Supreme Court has stated, “The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that 
‘no author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates’.” Feist Publications, 499 
U.S. 340, 344-5 (1991). Clearly any license that prohibits the copying of facts touches 
on an area of copyright law and conflicts with Congress’ decision to make facts auto-
matically part of the public domain. 
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those used in pay-per-use databases, offer more legal certainty. Yet while it is 
typical to include copy-prevention language in a license, such provisions 
have been held valid in only a few federal jurisdictions. A database maker 
interested in protecting his unoriginal content is therefore forced to look 
elsewhere. 
6.10 Technical Measures Offer Secure Protection 
Technical measures combined with strict laws against circumvention provide 
the most effective form of protection. Congress passed the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act in 1988.80 The DMCA is a powerful legal mechanism. 
Rather than vary in judicial interpretation as is the norm, federal courts seem 
to agree on how the DMCA should be enforced and readily grant preliminary 
or permanent injunctions to stop circumvention.  
 Section 1201 of the DMCA prevents the circumvention of technical meas-
ures that protect access to copyrighted works and to the copyright owners’ 
exclusive rights. Under §1203, infringements can be addressed through in-
junctions, monetary damages and destruction of prohibited devices. Monetary 
damages can be calculated as actual damages suffered plus the violators’ 
profits. Civil remedies can also be determined by statute. Statutory damages 
under §1201 range from US $200 to $2,500 per act. Each violation of §1202 
varies from US $2,500 to US $25,000 per act.  
 Under §1204, any person who willfully violates the statute for commercial 
advantage or private financial gain can be indicted for a criminal offense. 
Criminal penalties for the first offense comprise up to 5 years imprisonment 
and/or a fine of not more than US $500,000. The penalty for a subsequent 
offense is imprisonment for up to 10 years and/or a fine of not more than US 
$1,000,000.  
 Section 1201 contains anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions 
aimed at preventing unlawful access to a copyrighted work and unlawful 
violation of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights. The anti-circumvention 
provision of §1201(a)(1)(A) targets those who gain access to a copyrighted 
work by breaking through a digital wall, “No person shall circumvent a tech-
nological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under 
this title.” According to the case law, access control measures that have been 
 
80. 17 U.S.C.§§ 1201-1205. 
Chapter 6. The Effect of No Protection in the United States 
 180 
circumvented include converters, encryption and scrambling programs, au-
thentication sequences and other computer programs.81  
 The DMCA also contains two anti-trafficking provisions. While 
§1201(a)(2) prevents trafficking of devices that circumvent access control 
technologies, §1201(b) prevents trafficking of devices that circumvent protec-
tion of an exclusive right of copyright. The statute defines dealing in prohib-
ited devices as manufacturing, importing, offering to the public, providing or 
trafficking. According to the case law, posting a prohibited technology on a 
website or linking to other websites that have the prohibited device is consid-
ered trafficking.82  
 Under the statute, prohibited circumvention tools are defined as technolo-
gies, products, services, devices, components or parts thereof. Trafficking is 
prohibited only if a circumvention tool: (A) is primarily designed or produced 
to circumvent or (B) “has only limited commercially significant purpose or 
use other than to circumvent” or (C) “is marketed by that person or another 
acting in concert ... with that person’s knowledge for use in circumventing.”83 
A circumvention tool need only satisfy one classification.  
 Courts have banned the trafficking of a console that circumvents the geo-
graphical limitation of video games, a VCR that overrides an authentication 
code to allow streaming of multimedia, a software program that decrypts the 
encryption algorithm and access keys to DVDs and a decoding device that 
descrambles pay-per-view TV signals.84 
 Section 1201(b) prohibits trafficking in technologies used to protect one of 
the six exclusive rights of the copyright owner. According to the statute, such 
technical measures consist of those that “in the ordinary course of operation 
prevent, restrict, or otherwise limit the exercise of a right of a copyright 
owner.” Courts have banned the trafficking of circumvention tools such as a 
 
81. See, for example, CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Greenleaf Electronics, Inc., 2000 WL 715601 
(N.D. Ill., 2000)(pirate TV decoding device); RealNetworks, Inc. v Streambox, Inc. 
2000 WL 12731 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (pirate media player decoding device); Directv, 
Inc. v. Ferguson, 328 F. Supp. 2d 904 (N.D. Ind. 2004)(pirate satellite TV decoding 
device). 
82. See, for example, Universal City Studies, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294 
(S.D.N.Y., 2000), affirmed by Universal City Studies, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2nd 
Cir., 2001). 
83. §§ 1201(a)(2) and1201(b). 
84. See Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v. Gamemasters, 87 F.Supp.2d 976 
(N.D.Cal., 1999); RealNetworks, Inc. v Streambox, Inc., 2000 WL 12731; Paramount 
Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, 2004 WL 402756 (S.D.N.Y., 2004); CSC Holdings, 
Inc., 2000 WL 715601. 
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VCR that allows downloading of streamed multimedia from the Internet, a 
software program that allows downloading, copying and distribution of 
DVDs and a cable pirating device.85  
 The use of technical measures backed by strong legal protection seems 
like good news for the database maker who wishes to protect his unoriginal 
content. The combination of technical measures backed by the law offers an 
ironclad form of protection that can be controlled by the producer himself. 
Although paid for by the owner, the cost can be passed onto consumers and 
re-users.  
 But the possibility of the increased use of technical measures is a cause of 
concern for re-users and consumers, particularly since the law is not on their 
side. Within the US, legal scholars, research institutes and libraries, and civil 
liberties groups have argued that technical measures upset the traditional 
copyright balance. Such concerns may have come to a head because locking 
up unoriginal and other public domain content seems even more permanent 
through the use of technical measures than through the expansion of copy-
right or the employment of restrictive license provisions. But the DMCA has 
survived all challenges.86 
 In 2002, a court rejected the argument that the DMCA was unconstitu-
tional because it prevented access to free material. The court declared, “Noth-
ing within the DMCA grants any rights to anyone in any public domain work. 
A public domain work remains in the public domain and no party has any 
intellectual property right in the expression of that work.”87  
 The court further argued that the defendants wrongly assumed that the 
only available version of a public domain work was electronic. In reality, the 
publisher only controlled one version of the work, while others remained 
freely available. The court concluded, “Publishing a public domain work in a 
restricted format does not thereby remove the work from the public domain, 
even if it does allow the publisher to control that particular electronic copy. If 
this is an evil in the law, the remedy is for Congress to prohibit use or access 
 
85. RealNetworks, Inc. v Streambox, Inc., 2000 WL 12731(preliminary injunction); Para-
mount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, 2004 WL 402756 (S.D.N.Y., 2004)(preliminary 
injunction); CSC Holdings, Inc., 2000 WL 715601(permanent injunction). 
86. The DMCA cannot be pre-empted. This is because the DMCA is also federal law and 
in fact comprises part of the 1976 Copyright Act. The federal copyright law cannot 
pre-empt itself. Derclaye disagrees. See Derclaye “Intellectual property rights on in-
formation and market power – Comparing European and American protection of Da-
tabases,” pp. 294-6. 
87. U.S. v. Elcom, 203 F Supp. 2d. 1111, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
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restrictions from being imposed upon public domain works. Or perhaps, if 
left to the market, the consuming public could decline to purchase public 
domain works packaged with use restrictions.”88 The court did not address 
what should happen if the particular data had only one source and it was pro-
tected by technical measures. 
 In reality, widespread use of technical measures is against everyone’s 
interest. As has been shown in the previous chapters, overprotective measures 
can hinder the creation of more databases. It could also result in less con-
sumer access and re-use for other productive activities. While database pro-
duction is currently thriving in the United States, in the long run it is unclear 
whether the trend will move towards greater use of technical measures and a 
permanent lock-up of information. 
6.11 Using License Provisions and Technical Measures in Europe 
The heightened qualification threshold of the 1996 Database Directive may 
provide additional incentives for use of license provisions and technical 
measures to protect factual database content. This is cause for concern. Yet 
similar to the situation in the United States, it is not clear whether shrinkwrap, 
clickwrap or browsewrap licenses are valid in the European Community or 
whether license provisions prohibiting certain actions allowed by the Direc-
tive would be upheld. Moreover, the legislation in Europe allows for an over-
riding of technical measures to make use of an exception and mandates 
Member States to aid in this process, if necessary. In order to ensure that 
information remains available in the long term, therefore, a careful monitor-
ing of these developments is necessary. 
 The only two statutes that shed light on these problems are Directive 
97/7/EC on Distance Contracts and Directive 2000/31/EC on Information 
Society Services.89 The first Directive applies to suppliers of products and 
consumers, while the second covers suppliers of services and consumers. 
Both involve contracts concluded from a distance.  
 A goal of these Directives is to promote transparency to enable consumers 
to make well-informed decisions. Although they provide basic rights of in-
 
88. Id., at 1132. 
89 Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on 
the Protection of Consumers in respect of Distance Contracts; Directive 2000/31/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services. 
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formation to protect consumers, neither defines how a contract is formed. 
Such information is important in determining the validity of online licenses. 
 What is certain is that contract terms must be clear and downloadable. In 
the Directive on Distance Contracts, information must be “provided in a clear 
and comprehensible manner in any way appropriate to the means of distance 
communication used.”90 Moreover, written confirmation must be provided in 
a “durable medium” that is “available and accessible.”91 The Information 
Services Directive mandates that information provided, whether or not a 
contract is formed, must be “easily, directly and permanently accessible.”92 
When a contract is actually made, “contract terms and general conditions 
provided to the recipient must be made available in a way that allows him to 
store and reproduce them.”93 
 These rules indicate that there must be some form of sufficient notice of 
basic contract terms and that those terms must be downloadable. Based on the 
law, then, one could argue that browsewrap licenses do not meet these re-
quirements and thus are likely invalid. Whether or not specific Members 
States would validate shrinkwrap licenses is subject to debate. According to 
one scholar, France and Germany would recognize shrinkwrap licenses under 
certain circumstances, while the Netherlands would not.94 Clickwrap licenses, 
if their terms are clear and downloadable, are most likely to be accepted.  
 It is also unclear whether database producers can expand protection 
through licenses. Under Article 15 of the Database Directive any contractual 
provision contrary to Article 8 is void. Article 8 of the sui generis right pro-
vides that a lawful user can use insubstantial parts of a database without per-
mission as long as it does not conflict with normal exploitation or prejudice 
any copyright holder of materials included in the database.  
 Whether or not license provisions can be used to deny database users the 
right to any other limitation or exception is debatable. In terms of whether 
exceptions and limitations of copyright can be prohibited by contract, one 
scholar believes that in France license provisions that expand copyright 
would probably be allowed, whereas in Germany they would probably not.95 
 
90. Art. 4.2. 
91. Art. 5.1. 
92. Art. 5.1. 
93. Art. 10(3). 
94. Lucie Guibault, Copyright Limitations and Contracts: An Analysis of the Contractual 
Overridability of Limitations on Copyright (The Hague: Information Law Services, 
Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 201. 
95. Id., at 220-222. 
Chapter 6. The Effect of No Protection in the United States 
 184 
 While the status of licenses and license provisions is in doubt, the protec-
tion of technical measures, incorporated into Chapter III of the Information 
Society Directive 2001/29/EC, is strong, but varies from the US in several 
ways.96 The statute is divided into an anti-circumvention and an anti-
trafficking component. Article 6.1 mandates the provision of “adequate legal 
protection against the circumvention of any effective technical measures, 
which the person carries out in the knowledge or with reasonable grounds to 
know, that he or she is pursuing that objective.”  
 The anti-circumvention provision embraces both efforts to circumvent 
access to copyrighted works and any efforts to circumvent technical measures 
that protect an exclusive right of copyright such as reproduction or dissemina-
tion. This makes the provision potentially broader than its US equivalent.  
 At the same time, however, the anti-circumvention provision requires 
proof that the action was carried out “in the knowledge or with reasonable 
grounds to know, that he or she is pursuing that objective.”97 It may signifi-
cantly weaken the force of the provision, especially outside the EU, if it can 
be shown that the person performing the act did not know about the provi-
sion. In the US, the intent requirement is absent except where criminal sanc-
tions are sought. 
 The anti-trafficking provision is similar to that in the US. It requires 
Member States to provide “adequate legal protection against the manufacture, 
import, distribution, sale, rental, advertisement for sale or rental, or posses-
sion for commercial purposes of devices, products or components or the pro-
vision of services which” aid in circumvention.98  
 The definition of technical measures comprises both access and copyright 
control technologies. Technical measures are defined as “any technology, 
device or component that, in the normal course of its operation, is designed to 
prevent or restrict acts, in respect of works or other subject-matter, which are 
not authorized by the rightholder of any copyright or any right related to 
copyright as provided for by law or the sui generis right provided for in 
Chapter III of Directive 96/9/EC.”99 
 In stark contrast to the US, Member States are encouraged to promote 
voluntary agreements to achieve the objectives of the exceptions and limita-
 
96. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the informa-
tion society. 
97. Id. 
98. Art. 6.2. 
99. Art. 6.3. 
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tions.100 If voluntary agreements are impossible, Member States are mandated 
to take appropriate measures to ensure that users can exercise limitations and 
exceptions. Article 6.4 specifically states that technical measures can also be 
circumvented in order to achieve the exceptions and limitations outlined in 
the Database Directive. How effectively this provision will be implemented is 
open to question. Therefore, it should be carefully monitored because it is an 
important way to ensure that unoriginal contents are not made inaccessible 
through the use of technical measures. 
6.12 Conclusion 
The US features a private ordering regime in which the producer decides 
upon and pays for the type of protection desired and for enforcement of it. 
Producers have the ability to choose from a variety of methods including 
technical measures backed by strong legal enforcement. The danger is that all 
information can be controlled by the producer and will be inaccessible to the 
user in the long run. However, evidence in the last 16 years reveals that this 
has not occurred and that instead re-use through free access has been stimu-
lated. Whether this positive trend will last is unclear.  
 What does this mean in the European context? Every compiler who does 
not qualify for the database right is saddled with a number of costs. The pri-
mary one is the price of protection. Additional costs include payment for 
legal enforcement of that protection as well as rent-seeking to broaden the 
applicability of less secure forms, such as contractual provisions. To the ex-
tent such costs are passed onto the re-user and consumer, it spells higher 
prices and reduced access. 
 Indeed, producers who use technical measures thrive in a regime of no 
content protection. For example, pay-per-use databases do not need extra 
incentives. They are already protected through technical measures, copyright 
in the structure and arrangement, if original, and contractual provisions, if 
valid. They also gain from knowing that enforcement against the circumven-
tion of technical measures is backed by law, as is the protection of the struc-
ture and arrangement under copyright. The fact that other forms of protection 
are uncertain may not be decisive.  
 There are other businesses that may thrive under a regime of no content 
protection. These include database makers who sell advertising to capture an 
 
100. Art. 6.4 and Recital 51. 
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income and allow free access to their content. In the absence of content pro-
tection, such database makers simply find other methods of recouping their 
investment. One example is Yahoo! Europe whose income generating activi-
ties include selling advertising space, sponsored searches and personal ads.  
 The last category is database makers whose primary investment is in add-
ing value directly to their content. Such databases may feature unoriginal 
structure and arrangement simply because that is what customers expect. 
Their content is vulnerable to wholesale copying by competitors and by other 
users who may not wish to pay for the data.  
 These compilers will have to decide if they wish to use technical meas-
ures. Some may feel they cannot afford it. Just as with the advertising model, 
others may not be able to apply these measures simply because the industry 
will not accommodate them or customers are not willing to pay. They, too, 
will be forced to find a business model that allows them to make an income. 
 The bottom line is that it is impossible to tell how database makers will 
react. Either information could be protected even more than it is under the 
European database right or efforts will be made to switch to a model where 
protection of database contents is unnecessary. A good model is that of free 
content combined with advertising. While the first scenario is a cause of con-
cern given the importance of re-use in the database industry, the second is a 
cause for celebration.  
 Luckily, the European Community has already implemented measures to 
ensure that a locking up of information is less likely. With continued monitor-
ing of the situation, it is possible that database production could stay free of 
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7.1 Introduction: Revising Policy  
The goal of this thesis is to build a convincing argument that in order to best 
regulate databases, access should be prioritized. This hypothesis is derived 
from three factors: the nature of the subject matter, an economic analysis of 
the law and the empirical evidence offered by the EC and US protection re-
gimes.  
 Each chapter provides reasons for why access is so important. In Chapter 
2, it was posited that the social value of a database emanates from its ability 
to afford access. For example, the function of a database is to allow informa-
tion to be understood, analyzed and transformed. Access is therefore neces-
sary to utilize this resource tool. 
 Moreover, a sampling of the models of production and use exposes the 
extent to which re-use is needed to create databases and to contribute to other 
important sectors of society. This dynamic process calls for a re-
categorization of stakeholders. While they are typically divided into produc-
ers and users, they really ought to be called producers, re-users and consum-
ers. This shift in interests enables a better understanding of how to regulate. 
In order to support production incentives and to encourage other productive 
activities, the solution is additional access.  
 These observations are strengthened by the economic analyses in Chapter 
3. Landes and Posner assert that the greatest productivity can only be 
achieved if access is permitted. Under their model, protection increases costs 
for both producers and copiers. Even at the optimal level, they assume that 
copiers will create less. But they believe this decrease will be offset by 
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greater output from original producers. Due to the critical role of re-use in 
database production, it is suggested that the optimal level may be lower than 
that for copyright.  
 Frischmann and Lemley’s infrastructural theory more accurately reflects 
the reality within the database industry. These academics assert that when 
intellectual property qualifies as a generic infrastructural input, the demand-
signaling function of the traditional supply-side model can be so inadequate 
that the only remedy is to prioritize access. This occurs in situations in which 
an intangible product is used as an input for many different types of goods 
produced in a variety of production modes. It is suggested that databases 
function as generic infrastructural inputs. The implication is that the encour-
agement of re-use is critical. 
 The importance of re-use is further supported by evidence from the United 
States, as explained in Chapter 6. The fact that the industry is thriving, despite 
database contents not being protected, suggests that access does not inhibit, 
but may actually stimulate additional production, at least in the short term. 
This is contrary to developments in the EC as described in Chapters 4 and 5, 
where the needs of re-users have been inadequately addressed until the recent 
ECJ decisions. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to synthesize the evidence in order to make 
a final determination on how best to regulate databases. The analysis will 
proceed as follows. All the evidence from the proceeding chapters will be 
marshaled to prove that databases function as generic infrastructural inputs. 
Such a conclusion provides clear guidelines for confirming and answering the 
policy questions.  
 Since access is dependant upon the state of the law, the regulatory impli-
cations of recognizing databases as generic infrastructural inputs are enor-
mous. Without heightened access, the value of databases to society is com-
promised because re-use flounders. Instead of formulating a strategy of 
strong protection with narrow access, the policy should be turned around. The 
priority should be placed on flexible access with minimum incentives. 
 After answering the policy questions, an evaluation of the two policy op-
tions will be possible. These models are: (1) the relevant law currently operat-
ing in Europe and (2) the proposed amendments to that applicable law. The 
effects of these two models on the three different stakeholders – the producer, 
the re-user and the consumer – will be examined. Through such an explora-
tion, it will be argued that the best way to adhere to the requirements of a 
generic infrastructural input and to satisfy all stakeholders’ needs is to revise 
the Database Directive and its interpretation according to the amendments 
proposed in Chapter 5. 
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7.2 Are Databases Generic Infrastructural Inputs? 
In order to qualify as a generic infrastructural input, a database must be: (1) 
nonrivalrous (2) an input and (3) generic. All three criteria must be satisfied. 
An examination of the evidence available leads to the conclusion that data-
bases are generic infrastructural inputs. 
 Since a database is a form of intellectual property as explained in Chapter 
2, it is by definition nonrivalrous. Thus, a person’s use does not exhaust a 
database, and many different people can exploit it simultaneously. One goal 
in the regulation of such a resource is to take advantage of this simultaneous 
use.  
 To be considered an input, a database must function as a building block 
for other productive activities. As explained in Chapter 3, an input can be 
viewed as “an enabling foundation on which others can build.” The social 
value of an input is not adequately measured by the demand and supply sig-
nals of an ordinary market transaction. This is because it fails to take into 
account the high social value that will be realized through re-use. Granting 
more access can correct this problem. 
 All evidence points towards a database as an input. It has been shown in 
Chapter 2 that the function of a database is to facilitate information use. Im-
plicit in this function, then, is the idea that a database will be employed as an 
input for further production.  
 An investigation into the incentive and access needs of the industry re-
veals the extent. Databases are often exploited to create other databases. 
Commercial databases rely on free access to material from public ones. 
Online city guides harvest their information from other databases. Libraries 
frequently combine compilations in order to improve research opportunities. 
Databases are also re-used to create additional productive value for society. 
 The high social value of such activities is not always realized in an ordi-
nary market transaction. For example, what would happen if the Copenhagen 
city guide, www.aok.dk, suddenly started charging for its product? No doubt 
some would willingly pay, but many would find a substitute such as one of 
the free newspapers available in the city. Others would simply do without. 
The price of using the city guide would not reflect the social value of allow-
ing free access. That value includes the publication of books and reviews, the 
compilation of lists and schedules, increased traffic to linked websites, better 
quality tourist activities and more business for those mentioned on the web-
site. Yet the guide may not attract enough customers. Eventually, the website 
may close down when in fact its social value is rather high. 
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 As illustrated in Chapter 5, the general purpose of the Database Directive, 
its definition of a database and its high qualification threshold all reflect the 
importance of a database as an input. For example, Recital 9 recognizes a 
database as “a vital tool in the development of an information market” and 
acknowledges that “this tool will also be of use in many other fields.”  
 The definition of a database in Article 1.2 also mirrors this function, “a 
collection of independent works, data or other materials arranged in a sys-
tematic or methodical way and individually accessible by electronic or other 
means.” What separates a database from a copyrighted work, according to the 
ECJ, is the fact that its contents comprise independent materials that can be 
separated without their value being affected. Implicit in this definition is that 
every piece of material is capable of being retrieved and re-used.  
 The ECJ’s decision to raise the qualification threshold provides additional 
evidence of the importance of a database as an input. As explained in Chapter 
5, this threshold operates as a critical lever to control the size of the public 
domain. Due to the Court’s line-drawing, manufacturers of sports fixtures and 
of horseracing lists cannot prevent use of their database content unless they 
make a substantial investment in obtaining, presenting or verifying it.  
 The divergent examples of the legal regimes in the United States and 
Europe portrayed in Chapters 4-6, further strengthen this argument. It has 
been suggested that one reason for the unanticipated results in Europe is that 
the critical role of re-users was not recognized in the applicable law until the 
ECJ decisions. In contrast, a policy of no protection in the United States en-
courages re-use. The short term result is a thriving database industry. 
 The critical requirement for qualification as a generic infrastructural input 
is that a database must be generic. This means that it can be used as a build-
ing block to produce a wide variety of goods and services, including private, 
public and nonmarket goods. These goods can be created through various 
modes of production including commercial, noncommercial and commons-
based. If an input is generic, then it is assumed that the demand signals from 
an ordinary transaction distort to such an extent that a policy of open access is 
required. 
 As explained in Chapter 3, a cure for a disease is not considered generic 
because, though an important discovery, its output possibilities are limited. 
The Internet, on the other hand, is considered generic because it can be used 
for a wide variety of applications. Other inputs that qualify include basic 
research, operating systems, abstract ideas and peer-to-peer file sharing tech-
nology. 
 Since a database can comprise nearly all information, the production pos-
sibilities resulting from its use are only limited by human ingenuity and legal 
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access. A database is generic simply because its breadth ranges widely and it 
can be employed for an unlimited number of productive uses for the creation 
of private, public and nonmarket goods. Moreover, a database can be pro-
duced in a variety of ways ranging from commercial, such as Westlaw, to 
public, such as that of the Danish Meteorological Institute, to commons-
based, such as Wikipedia.  
 A summary of all the evidence reveals that a database is a generic infra-
structural input. As argued in Chapter 2, a database resembles the Internet 
more than a copyrighted work. Both are resource tools which require height-
ened access.  
7.3 The Policy Questions Revisited 
The policy implications of determining that a database is a generic infrastruc-
tural input are enormous. A database is socially valuable because it is used to 
create all types of products. The goal, then, is to encourage access to generate 
the greatest variety of goods, including databases. This means that the focus 
must shift from ensuring that the most vulnerable database producer is 
strongly protected to guaranteeing that the overall production needs of society 
are satisfied. It also implies that the aim of any regulation is not to provide an 
incentive but instead to balance incentives with access.  
 Clearly, the policy dilemma is no longer how to stimulate production. 
Instead, it is: 
1. What is the best way to provide production incentives for those who need 
it?  
2. What is the best way to provide legal access to materials contained within a 
database?  
These questions are not new. A balancing of production incentives with in-
formation access is already evident in the original intent of the legislation, the 
general purpose of the Database Directive and the heightened qualification 
threshold mandated by the ECJ. Answering these two questions can provide 
important guidelines for evaluating the available policy choices.  
 As the authors of infrastructural theory acknowledge, a legal incentive 
may be necessary. The analysis in Chapter 2 revealed that some database 
producers require protection. While minimum incentives are prescribed, it is 
up to the policymaker to determine the precise level. Given the nature of the 
database industry, it is submitted that the right should be just enough to 
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stimulate production. Anything more would jeopardize positive externalities 
emanating from access.  
 Efforts can also be made to generate further investment. But this extra 
protection must be balanced against the costs of access. If additional value 
has been added, then such protection may be worth it. 
 Which type of producer requires an incentive? As was argued in Chapter 
2, the motivations of those not out to make a profit are likely to come from 
somewhere other than the market. In fact, evidence suggests that statutory 
protection may hinder their activities and that widespread exchange of data is 
a priority.  
 This narrows the provision of incentives down to those who wish to make 
a profit. It has already been established that commercial database makers can 
be divided into producers for whom incentives may be required, and re-users, 
for whom access may be critical. But even some producers obtain their incen-
tives elsewhere. For example, the ECJ has decided that database makers do 
not qualify if their investment consists of the creation of data and not its ob-
tainment. This seems reasonable because such businesses would have manu-
factured databases anyway. Any legal incentives would be pure rent and thus 
would thwart access.  
 The category of stakeholders that depend on statutory incentives may be 
even smaller. Their protection needs will depend on the model used to gener-
ate an income. For example, entities that use technical measures may not 
require an extra incentive.  
 On the other hand, databases in which the content is available for free and 
which depend on advertising may need some protection. The main concern 
here is that competitors, including companies or private persons, are pre-
vented from copying their data without paying and using it in a way that 
jeopardizes demand for the original product. Thus, protection needs are 
somewhat thin and may resemble prohibitions against unfair competition. 
 Other producers may need a stronger form. They include those whose 
income source emanates from adding value to the unoriginal content. Such 
compilers are likely to benefit not only from a prohibition on copying by 
competitors, but also from ordinary subscribers who may not pay for the data, 
if their taking threatens incentives. For these database makers, protection may 
be somewhat thicker.  
 Lastly, some producers who have decided to continue investing in their 
database may need a statutory incentive to maintain their product. There may 
be reason to provide it, but only if the benefits are greater than the costs. One 
method is to require that the value added to the database enhances rather than 
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hinders information access. If so, then there may be a valid argument to ex-
tend protection.  
 What, then, is the best way to provide production incentives for those who 
need it? Given the varying degrees of protection required by the industry, it 
seems clear that the best choice is one that is flexible. This would enable 
decisions to be made on a case-by-case basis. Similar to copyright then, pro-
tection could be thick or thin depending on the production model.  
 What are the important considerations regarding access for generic infra-
structural inputs? According to infrastructural theory, open access should be 
forwarded. This does not mean that an input is free. Instead, it means that 
access is guaranteed to all regardless of identity or use.  
 A high priority should be placed on access for re-users because their ac-
tivities tend to result in concrete and measurable advancements in society. 
Their needs vary from substantial to insubstantial use. Database makers may 
rely on free access to public domain materials. Some may capture their in-
come by harvesting information. Others may actually buy their information 
but hope for an affordable price.  
 Providing access to consumers is just as critical. This is because generic 
infrastructural inputs are necessary for less measurable but important out-
comes such as democratic development, educational advancement or social 
experimentation. As was discussed in Chapter 2, consumers wish to be able 
to consult, share and make insubstantial uses. 
 Given these various requirements, what is open access in the context of 
databases? Because the needs of re-users and consumers also vary, emphasis 
should be placed on flexibility. This means that everyone should be able to 
conduct their normal activities without taking a legal risk. Several methods 
can be used to ensure this possibility. Overprotection should be avoided so 
that prices remain affordable. Sole-source database makers should be moni-
tored and actions taken if there are refusals to license. Re-users and consum-
ers should continue being able to take the amounts necessary to continue their 
activities as long as it does not jeopardize demand for the original product.  
 Any regime that decides it is socially valuable to protect databases must 
have the goal not only to produce as many as possible but also to ensure as 
much access as befits a generic infrastructural input. These two goals are not 
mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they can be mutually reinforcing. A law 
that encourages database production and allows enough access for re-users to 
compete in the market will result in more databases. A law that further en-
courages productive uses that go beyond the database market, such as in re-
search or education, will result in still more databases.  
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7.4 The Current Regime Skimps on Access 
The relevant law grants sui generis protection for databases that qualify. It 
results in two intertwining regimes. Those unoriginal database contents that 
remain unprotected exist in a system similar to that of the United States. 
Those that do qualify are offered a flexible, strong right with inflexible, nar-
row access. 
 Since the United States has been operating for more than 16 years under a 
regime of no content protection, it is valid to examine what happened there 
and to adapt its lessons to the European context. The US features a private 
ordering regime in which the producer must decide whether his unoriginal 
contents need protection and if so, pay for it himself. The most secure 
mechanism is the employment of technical measures. But there are other 
possibilities. For example, a database maker could shift to a model in which 
protection of contents is unnecessary. While use of technical measures would 
reduce access, adoption of a model with unprotected content would enhance 
it.  
 It is difficult to predict the behavior of those who are unprotected. Within 
the European context, there may be some who try to bypass the qualification 
threshold. The discussion in Chapter 5 revealed that this may be fairly easily 
accomplished. For example, sole-source database makers may be able to sell 
their data to a subsidiary and qualify under obtainment. This is rent-seeking 
and may not be what the database right was meant to encourage.  
 In a private ordering regime, producers have to find other ways to generate 
incentives. The lack of certainty could result in fewer databases. But it could 
also result in more databases that do not need protection of their contents. 
One such model is free access coupled with advertising. The growth of these 
types of databases would stimulate re-use and consumer access, which is 
exactly the aim in regulating generic infrastructural inputs.  
 Still others may decide to make a substantial investment in the obtaining, 
presentation and verification of the contents in order to qualify for the right. 
Such an investment would be just as positive for the user provided that there 
is true value added to the product.  
 A lack of protection could also result in efforts to reduce costs. One cost 
cutting measure is the re-use of free information. Re-users rely on varying 
quantities of free content. Some may survive by regularly taking small bits of 
data in order to compile information about the contents of a variety of data-
bases. Still others may require substantial amounts.  
 Access to unoriginal material allows noncommercial compilers such as 
scientists, academics and librarians to conduct their activities without worry-
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ing about the law. They will be able to do as they please with content that 
lacks protection.  
 With free access, then, more types of production and more uses will be 
stimulated than under a regime of database content protection. Given that 
databases are generic infrastructural inputs, free use of data can result in a 
wide variety of transformative activities ranging from value-added databases 
to technological and scientific innovation. This is good from the perspective 
of the re-user and from the perspective of society as a whole.  
 Consumers can also benefit. They can employ unprotected information for 
their own personal use and for that of their friends and family. Access not 
only benefits a given individual, but also contributes to a more informed 
population and enhances other features of a liberal society such as democratic 
debate.  
 But this state of affairs could be short term. Any information that is pro-
tected by technical measures is likely to be higher priced. This is because the 
cost will be passed on to the buyer. The result is less re-use. The more wide-
spread the application of technical measures, the less access there will be. For 
this reason, it can be said that a regime of no content protection may be good 
in the short run. Careful monitoring and regulating is necessary, however, to 
ensure that the long term consequences continue to be positive.  
 The result may be different for databases that qualify. There is a high de-
gree of flexibility built into many components of the right, from the qualifica-
tion threshold to its scope to its duration. This is admirable. But it also en-
courages rent-seeking by some who will naturally attempt to broaden its 
scope. To the extent they are successful, there will be even stronger protec-
tion and less access. Unless this tendency is carefully monitored, it can nega-
tively impact the production of databases, their re-use and private use. 
 A producer naturally wishes to qualify for the database right. Indeed, the 
very point of the threshold is to ensure that all databases have a chance at 
protection no matter what their size or the required skill in compiling. The 
benefit is increased user-friendliness of the information contained. Since the 
threshold is rather flexible, there is a good chance for protection. For exam-
ple, the investment can be qualitatively or quantitatively substantial, it can be 
measured in relative terms and it can consist of obtainment, verification or 
presentation.  
 If a database qualifies, the right functions as a subsidy so that the compiler 
does not have to pay for protection himself. He can then choose whether or 
not to further protect through other measures. This subsidy could induce the 
creation of databases in which the statutory protection of content is critical. 
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Because a substantial investment is required in obtaining, verifying and pre-
senting, it could also result in more databases that are beneficial to users.  
 The right provided is quite strong. It allows prevention of a substantial 
extraction and re-utilization and of a repeated and systematic insubstantial 
taking. It covers all activities, whether commercial or noncommercial. Be-
cause infringement can be measured in quantitative and/or qualitative terms, 
there is a built-in flexibility in determining infringement. Moreover, there is 
the possibility of perpetual renewal by engaging in normal maintenance ac-
tivities such as updating and verifying. 
 At the same time, there is little access. For example, only lawful acquirers 
can make insubstantial uses. This restricts the number who can avail them-
selves of free access. In addition, the exceptions are few and narrow. For 
example, consumers can only make substantial private use of nonelectronic 
databases. This allows the producer to guard against unauthorized copying 
and increases the value of the database.  
 Does the database right satisfy the needs of the producer? For some, it 
may be overprotective. Pay-per-use databases are given additional value 
which may be unnecessary. For database makers who sport a model of free 
content with advertising, it may also be overprotective. This is because their 
main threat comes from those who copy their database and take away de-
mand for their product, not from other types of use. The consequences of 
overprotection could include reduced access, higher transaction costs and, in 
some cases, monopoly pricing.  
 On the other hand, the directory publisher who adds value to the data it-
self, and who may have little in the way of other forms of protection, may 
feel underprotected. He could argue that insubstantial uses can also jeopard-
ize his investment. In truth, this would only be the case if demand for his 
database were negatively affected. In fact, some insubstantial uses could 
result in increased exploitation of the original product.  
 What is the effect of the right on the re-user? From the point of view of 
qualification, there is a good chance that a re-user’s database will be pro-
tected. This is because the whole point of re-use is to invest in pre-existing 
material. If that investment is substantial, then protection will be granted.  
 However, the re-user is less lucky when it comes to access. Since the law-
ful acquirer is considered the lawful user, the chances for making insubstan-
tial uses are reduced. For example, a database owner who harvests informa-
tion from other databases risks legal action because they may not be consid-
ered a lawful acquirer. In the event that a sole-source database maker is pro-
tected, those who wish to lawfully exploit the database may not be able to 
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obtain the information barring a suit in competition law. The overall effect is 
increased transaction costs, increased prices and less access.  
 What about re-users who are not database makers? Unfortunately they are 
not better off. Although scientists and academics can make substantial uses 
under certain circumstances, this exception only applies to extraction and not 
to re-utilization. Given the extent of cooperation required, their activities are 
hampered. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, certain types of re-use are left 
out. One casualty is the British Broadcasting Corporation which wants to 
report information contained in databases. Yet, it must risk infringement in 
order to conduct its normal activities. 
 The consumer will also suffer. If they buy a database, they will be able to 
take insubstantial amounts, share the data with others and consult the data-
base. The problem is that one has to be a lawful acquirer in order to take ad-
vantage of such a right. Moreover, any substantial use is only allowed for 
nonelectronic databases. Thus, although the purpose of this Directive is to 
encourage the development of the information society, the public-at-large is 
left without access to information on their computer. Given the strength of the 
database right, such a gap must be an oversight. 
7.5 Providing Minimum Incentives and Flexible Access 
The proposed amendments to the Directive and to its interpretation by the 
courts are aimed at promoting the use of database contents as generic infra-
structural inputs. The implication is that the best way to regulate in a manner 
that advances social welfare is to create a regime of minimum incentives 
coupled with flexible access.  
 The basic problems with the current regime are as follows. The challenge 
for unprotected contents that do not qualify will continue. Only time and 
careful monitoring will reveal if the trend is to lock up information or to free 
it. For those that do qualify, there is a natural tendency to strengthen the right. 
One goal of the amendments, then, is to ensure that any protection succeeds 
in securing minimum incentives without unduly jeopardizing access. At the 
same time, access is currently narrow and inflexible. Therefore, additional 
suggestions are aimed at enhancing access so that the full benefits of re-use 
and consumption can be realized. 
 Flexibility is built into the qualification threshold. This is desirable if it 
advances a system of minimum incentives and promotes the general welfare. 
There are three mechanisms to ensure such an outcome. The first is to narrow 
the subject matter to “an electronic database and all its other forms.” The 
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purpose is to gently push database makers into the digital world without 
negatively affecting their incentives. At the same time, digitization will in-
crease access. Producers who wish to pursue digitization but lack the money 
could be eligible for public funding.  
 Database makers can decide for themselves whether such a transformation 
is desirable. If not, then their unoriginal content will be unprotected but other 
rights could apply such as copyright of the structure and arrangement. This 
situation is not new. For example, significant access to unoriginal database 
content in paper form is already contemplated in the Directive. It contains an 
exception for substantial private use of nonelectronic databases.  
 The second mechanism is to ensure that the threshold is not easily by-
passed by rent-seekers. This can be achieved by requiring that qualification 
include more than one of the three criteria of obtainment, verification and 
presentation. Compilers would be prevented from selling their product in 
order to gain protection. They would also be encouraged to generate data-
bases that feature additional value added that facilitates use of the contents 
and so benefits society. 
 The last suggestion is that the qualification threshold be enforced so that 
only those who need protection receive it. This could be achieved by answer-
ing two questions: (1) Does the producer depend on database content protec-
tion to recoup his investment?, (2) If not, would the granting of a right ad-
vance access by adding additional value to the information so that it can be 
understood, analyzed and transformed?  
 The purpose of the first question is to ensure that only producers who are 
dependent on content protection receive it. If not, the aim of the second ques-
tion is to encourage those who do not need an initial incentive to invest even 
further in their database. If that investment results in added value to the fin-
ished product, the rationale is that the benefits of protection for both the pro-
ducer and the user will outweigh the costs. 
 What is the overall effect of the revised qualification threshold on the 
database maker? Those who are truly dependent on an incentive will receive 
it. Those who may not be dependent on an initial incentive will receive it if 
they add value to the database. Users will gain simply because a system of 
minimum incentives carefully narrows the right, thereby expanding access. 
 Once qualification is obtained, how does the revised right operate? There 
are three proposals that function to narrow the right, but at the same time 
provide the protection necessary. The first is to restrict it to commercial uses. 
The rationale behind this suggestion is that commercial database makers need 
to recoup their investment and make a profit, while noncommercial compilers 
should be able to remain in a world of information sharing and exchange. 
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 Within the parameters of this amendment, producers can decide for them-
selves who their targeted user group is. It does not mean, for example, that 
scientific databases cannot be commercialized. A biotechnology company 
can sell its data so long as there is demand for the product. If there is not, then 
that information should remain in the public domain due to its critical value 
to noncommercial scientific research and to subsequent societal advance-
ment. In balancing the costs of commercialization against the benefits of 
access, then, such an amendment falls on the side of access because this is 
better for the overall welfare of society. 
 The second proposal is that infringement should be determined according 
to the investment taken and not according to the contents. This ensures that 
the money put into generating a database is protected, but no more. While it 
may narrow the right under some circumstances, it still adequately aids the 
producer who can be assured that his investment is safeguarded.  
 In making a decision about whether infringement has occurred, the ques-
tion that should be asked is whether or not the activity results in a loss of 
demand for the original product. There are several rationales for this pro-
posal. First, such a requirement offers adequate, but minimum, incentives. 
Naturally, producers wish to obtain the most income from their product. Thus 
any income loss is regarded as detrimental. However, the purpose of the leg-
islation is not to subsidize the producer so that they can capture all potential 
income. The purpose is to provide a base level of protection so that an incen-
tive is granted. After that, it is up to the database maker to use his own inge-
nuity to generate additional income.  
 In fact, there are times when re-use can result in additional income for the 
original producer. This is the case with sports betting. Because organizations 
can lawfully use the contents of fixture list databases, increased betting activi-
ties can result in additional enthusiasm for the game and, hopefully, more 
money spent on it. Allowing re-use thus encourages positive externalities 
including more money for the sport.  
 The last proposal is the establishment of a registration system to obtain 
protection and of a limitation on renewal to three times for a total of 45 years 
of protection. The system will no doubt increase administrative costs for the 
producer and for public institutions. Yet it allows flexibility for all stake-
holders. One advantage is that users will be able to tell if a database is pro-
tected. Such legal certainty will encourage consumption and re-use. It also 
allows producers to choose for themselves whether they wish protection. If 
not, then their unoriginal content will be in the public domain, thus increasing 
access.  
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 The rationale for limiting the term is based on the idea that perpetual pro-
tection has a negative impact on access and consequently on total social wel-
fare. What it means is that after 45 years, a database maker will have to im-
plement a production model that is not dependent on content protection or 
create a new database. Such a requirement will encourage producers to be 
less dependent on statutory protection and will be good for the user who 
benefits from increased access.  
 How will this revised Directive affect the activities of our three business 
models of pay-per-use, free content with advertising and of value added di-
rectly to the unoriginal contents? As mentioned earlier, the producer who 
uses technical measures is likely not to need this additional protection. He can 
refrain from registering. However, if he does believe such protection will be 
beneficial, then he will be required to qualify through making a substantial 
investment. Once achieved, it can safely be said that both the producer and 
the user will benefit. The same reasoning applies to the compiler who offers 
free content and relies on advertising for an income. 
 The last type of database producer may be the one who is in most need of 
protection. Although his administrative costs may increase due to the need to 
register, it is likely that he will be able to qualify. If so, his database will be 
protected against infringement so that he can generate an income. However, 
after 45 years, this producer will be expected either to come up with a model 
that is not dependent on content protection or to create a whole new database.  
 While the producer’s needs will be adequately met, the amount of access 
will largely increase. The restriction of protection to commercial uses of elec-
tronic databases will allow a substantial amount of re-use and consumption of 
databases that are not protected. Given the importance of access in regulating 
a generic infrastructural input, this is likely to be beneficial.  
 For those databases that are protected, suggestions are made to ensure 
flexibility in access to the contents. Several recommendations have been 
made in this context. The first is that the definition of the lawful user should 
be codified to include those who qualify by operation of law. This expands 
access. The second is to incorporate the consultation right into the Directive 
so that a re-user or consumer can actively look at a database without risking 
infringement. It is a simple codification of the normal use provision.  
 The third suggestion is to incorporate and transform the exceptions from 
the InfoSoc Directive into the rights and obligations of lawful users. At the 
same time, the redundant user rights currently existing in the Directive should 
be deleted. This would have the effect of guaranteeing access at a level which 
provides the requisite flexibility needed to promote the general social welfare.  
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 Lastly, careful monitoring of the balance between incentives and access 
should occur, including whether access is being denied to sole-source data-
base contents. An independent, objective and scientific study of the impact of 
the database right on all stakeholders should be conducted. If it is discovered 
that contents are being unreasonably restricted, then, compulsory licenses 
should be re-instituted.  
 How will these rights of access affect the producer? Many of these excep-
tions, now called rights, are designed to save on transaction costs or to ad-
vance the public interest. Examples include allowing use for reporting or 
aiding the sight-impaired. The fact is that these copyright exceptions are nar-
rowly tailored and have been operating effectively and so have been gener-
ally accepted within the producer world. 
 In sum, the implementation of these amendments will provide minimum 
incentives to producers who wish to recoup their initial investment or to con-
tinue investing in their product. At the same time, significant access will be 
guaranteed so that re-users and consumers can continue to engage in their 
normal activities if they so choose. The result is a clear provision of the req-
uisite level of access and incentives needed to regulate a generic infrastruc-
tural input. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The goal of this thesis has been to evaluate the database right and to suggest 
amendments that can improve its effectiveness. One conclusion is that data-
bases should be regulated as generic infrastructural inputs. The purpose of 
such regulation is to ensure that re-use plays a bigger role in both encourag-
ing the further generation of databases and in allowing other productive uses 
for the betterment of society. The policy implication is that access assumes a 
heightened priority whereas production incentives stay at a minimum. 
 The treatment of databases as generic infrastructural inputs transforms the 
policy questions. Instead of focusing on how to increase incentives, the ques-
tions become:  
1. What is the best way to provide production incentives for those who need 
it?  
2. What is the best way to provide legal access to materials contained within a 
database?  
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In reality, these questions have been latent in the Database Directive from its 
inception. They can be seen in the narrowness of the original proposal and in 
the purposes of the Directive as well as in the functional definition of a data-
base. However, the original intention went astray. The end result is a legisla-
tive innovation that may discourage production and restrict access.  
 By comparing the production and access needs of three stakeholder groups 
– the producer, the re-user and the consumer – it has been shown that the 
current regime allows too much flexibility in terms of the actual right to the 
producer and too little in terms of access. Due to the importance of re-use 
within the industry, this formula should be turned around. 
 The proposed amendments aim to narrow the scope of the database right 
in order to expand the flexibility of re-users to engage in productive activities. 
Such an aim has been aided by the ECJ’s decision to raise the qualification 
threshold. At the same time, the amendments seek to ensure adequate incen-
tives for those who need it. 
 But even if these amendments are implemented, the long term conse-
quences are uncertain. As a result, there needs to be more empirical research 
on the effect of the right and on the nature of the database industry in general. 
Moreover, it is difficult to predict what will happen to database makers who 
do not receive protection. They could adopt technical measures, charge more 
and further restrict access. Or they could switch to a model that embraces free 
content. In order to ensure a bright future, rigorous monitoring and regulatory 
adjustment is in order.  
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Kapitel 1: Indledning 
1. Database-direktivet fra 1996 giver database-producenterne eneret til at 
forhindre udtræk og/eller gengivelse af hele eller væsentlige dele af en da-
tabases indhold i 15 år med mulig forlængelse af perioden. 
2. I sin første evalueringsrapport, som blev lavet seks år efter implemente-
ringen, slår Europa- kommissionen fast at: “Med hensyn til ‘ikke-origina-
le’ databaser, synes formodningen om, at en højere grad af IP-beskyttelse 
betyder mere innovation og vækst, ikke at holde stik. Der stilles følgende 
spørgsmål: “Er ‘sui generis’-beskyttelse således en nødvendighed for en 
database-industri i fremgang? Det empiriske bevismateriale sår på nuvæ-
rende tidspunkt tvivl om denne nødvendighed.”  
3. Dette lovgivningstiltags tilsyneladende svigt har affødt bestræbelser på at 
revidere strategien for database-beskyttelse. Formålet for denne afhandling 
er at evaluere den gældende lovgivning og klarlægge, hvordan uoriginalt 
database-indhold reguleres bedst muligt. 
4. Med udgangspunkt i en given databases specifikke funktion, økonomisk 
analyse af loven og empirisk bevismateriale, kan spørgsmålet, der er frem-
sat i database-direktivet, være forkert. Det spørgsmål omhandlede mulig-
heden for at fremme produktionen af flere databaser. 
5. De korrekte spørgsmål er: a) Hvad er den bedste metode til at skabe lovlig 
adgang til materiale, der ligger i en database? b) Hvad er den bedste måde, 
hvorpå der kan ydes tilskyndelse til dem, der har brug for det? 
Kapitel 2: Databaser som emneområde 
1. Databaser fungerer som referenceredskab til støtte i forståelsen, analysen 
og behandlingen af information. På denne måde er en database anderledes 
end en bog. En bog er et eksempel på information, viden og kultur, mens 
en database er et opbevarings-, proces- og søgeredskab, der hjælper i til-
gangen til bogen og andre kilder. En database er således mere lig Internet-
tet end et kreativt værk. Begge er redskaber, der fremmer informationsbe-
handling.  
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2. Strategierne for produktion og brug afslører, at reproduktion af informati-
on er særligt vigtigt i forbindelse med database-industrien. Derfor foreslås 
det, at en hvilken som helst regulering af rettighederne bør omfatte inte-
resserne hos tre interessenter i stedet for to. Disse interessenter er produ-
center, re-producenter og forbrugere.  
3. Producenter defineres som dem, der først skaffer data og samler disse i en 
database. Re-producenter er sekundære brugere, der har til hensigt at om-
forme det oprindelige indhold til et andet produktionsformål. Det kunne 
være at skabe værdiforøgende databaser, eller at gå ind i anden produktion 
udenfor branchen I modsætning hertil benytter forbrugere blot information 
til egen gavn i forbindelse med aktiviteter, der ikke medfører yderligere 
produktion. 
4. Behovet for producenter, re-producenter og forbrugere diskuteres i per-
spektivet af hvor megen tilgængelighed og tilskud, der er behov for i hver 
kategori. En databases funktion og omkategoriseringen af balancen mel-
lem de interesser, der er involveret i databasereguleringen betyder, at der 
bør være fokus på øget tilgængelighed.  
Kapitel 3: Økonomibaserede teorier om immaterialretlig regulering 
1. Den almindelige opfattelse af, at “desto mere produktion, desto mere be-
skyttelse”, som det fremgår af eksemplet med Goldstein’s ‘celestial juke-
box’ er måske ikke gangbar i virkeligheden.  
2. I stedet viser Landes og Posner at det højeste produktionsniveau og den 
største velfærd kun opnås gennem tilvejebringelse af tilgængelighed, der 
tilskynder re-producenterne til produktion. Dette støtter således behovet 
for at skabe balance mellem tilskyndelse og tilgængelighed, når der skal 
formuleres en politik om regulering. På baggrund af vigtigheden af re-
produktion, foreslås det, at det ideelle niveau for beskyttelse bør være la-
vere for databaser end for copyrightbeskyttede værker. 
3. Frischmann og Lemley pointerer dog, at traditionelle udbudsmodeller kan 
være håbløst vildledende, når immaterielle aktiver fungerer som generiske 
bidrag til infrastrukturen. For at falde herunder må tre kriterier være op-
fyldt. Ressourcen skal være: a. ikke-rivaliserende, således at mange men-
nesker kan udnytte værket samtidig; b. en kilde, som andre kan udbygge; 
og c. generisk eller anvendt som byggesten til en bred vifte af varer og 
ydelser. I sådanne tilfælde bliver tilgængelighed så høj en prioritet, at re-
gulering bør tilbydes på en frit tilgængelig måde, hvilket forfatterne defi-
nerer som tilgængelighed uafhængigt af identitet og brug.  
4. På baggrund af databasernes funktion, og deres struktur i forhold til pro-
duktion og brug, fremsættes påstanden at uoriginalt database-indhold fun-
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gerer som generiske bidrag til infrastrukturen. Dette indebærer, at der er 
økonomiske grunde til at fremhæve behovet for tilgængelighed, og det er 
dermed ikke blot et spørgsmål om offentlighedens interesse.  
Kapitel 4: Udviklingen af retsbeskyttelsessystemet i EU 
1. Målet med dette kapitel er at forstå lovgivningsprocessen for at skabe den 
nødvendige basis for en indgående forståelse og evaluering af den gæl-
dende lov.  
2. Det lovgivningsmæssige tiltag begyndte som et forsøg på at afbalancere 
producenternes, re-producenternes og forbrugernes respektive behov.  
3. Senere i kampen blev forslaget dog ændret i retning af en stærk ejendoms-
ret, og bestemmelser, der bevilligede tilgængelighed, blev udhulet. 
4. Næsten syv år efter direktivet blev indført, har EF-domstolen dog muligvis 
genoprettet balancen ved at hæve tærsklen for at være kvalificeret til at 
opnå sui generis-retten.  
Kapitel 5: Evaluering af den gældende lov i EU 
1. EF-domstolen hævede tærsklen for at kvalificere sig til sui generis-retten 
betydeligt. Som en konsekvens heraf er database-producenter, der ikke sy-
nes at have brug for tilskyndelse til produktion ubeskyttede. Dette resultat 
er vigtigt, fordi tilgængelighed bliver vigtigst og re-producenter frit kan 
bruge uoriginalt database-indhold til værdiforøgende produktion. Tiden vil 
vise, om stigningen i tilgængelighed vil have en positiv effekt på produk-
tionen. 
 2. Men den gældende lovgivning afføder utilsigtede konsekvenser. Ironisk 
nok er de databaseproducenter, der faktisk er berettiget til databasebeskyt-
telsen muligvis overbeskyttede. Det vil sige, at re-produktion hindres. Re-
sultatet kan blive det modsatte af, hvad der forventes. I stedet for at stimu-
lere produktionen, kan det måske mindske den.  
3. Der er et behov for at ændre den gældende lovgivning for at fremme til-
gængeligheden. Det antages, at produktionspotentialet hos re-producenter-
ne undervurderes i den europæiske model. Et større fokus på tilgængelig-
hed vil tøjle deres økonomiske potentiale. Dette ville ikke blot tilskynde 
større produktion af værdiforøgende databaser, men også sætte gang i vi-
densproduktionen i samfundet i almindelighed. 
4. Her gives en række forslag til indsnævring af database-beskyttelsen og 
genoprettelse af balancen. Ændringer af direktivet inkluderer: a. en afkla-
ring i forhold til tærsklen for kvalifikation, således at kun indsamling af al-
lerede eksisterende indhold tæller i kvalifikationsvurderingen; b. indsnæv-
ring af anvendelsesområdet for rettigheden til databasen til at gælde kom-
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mercielle formål.; og c. harmonisering af undtagelserne, så de afpasses In-
foSoc-direktivet om harmonisering af copyright og beslægtede rettigheder 
i informationssamfundet. Ydermere introduceres retningsliner, der hviler 
på principper vedrørende unfair konkurrence, i anvendelse af loven ved 
domstolene. 
Kapitel 6: Den amerikanske ‘nul-beskyttelsesmodel’  
1. Formålet med dette kapitel er at udforske den amerikanske ‘nul-
beskyttelsesmodel’ for uoriginalt indhold. Den indeholder et privat rets-
håndhævelsesmiddel, hvor database-producenten udvælger og betaler for 
den givne type beskyttelse samt håndhævelsen af denne. 
2. De der primært benytter tekniske blokeringer har en klar fordel. Men 
mangel på den sikkerhed som andre former for beskyttelse yder, så som 
kontraktlige bestemmelser, der forhindrer kopiering, kan have en indvirk-
ning på den samlede produktion. Denne usikkerhed i forhold til beskyttel-
se kan medføre mindre produktion. Usikkerheden kan få store konsekven-
ser i europæisk sammenhæng, hvor harmonisering anses for en central 
faktor i udviklingen af en levende database-industri. 
3. Med fri adgang til uoriginalt materiale, vil re-produktion stimuleres i høje-
re grad end under et system, der beskytter databaseindhold. Dette kan re-
sultere i en bred vifte af reproducerede varer, der varierer fra værdifor-
øgende databaser til teknologiske og videnskabelige nyskabelser. Et så-
dant resultat er gavnligt set fra re-producentens perspektiv og i et samlet 
samfundsperspektiv. 
4. Der er dog en hage. Så længe re-producenterne er afhængige af databaser, 
der benytter tekniske blokeringer vil denne information som regel have en 
højere pris. Disse databaser vil derfor blive re-produceret i mindre om-
fang. Hvis brugen af tekniske foranstaltninger bliver mere udbredt, vil 
mængden af re-produktion dernæst mindskes. Af denne grund er det rime-
ligt at sige, at mens et system uden indholdsbeskyttelse kan være godt på 
kort sigt, er det uklart, hvorvidt konsekvenserne på langt sigt vil være 
gavnlige for tilgængeligheden eller for produktionen. Faktisk kan mere in-
formation blive låst under denne model end under den, der bruges i EU på 
nuværende tidspunkt.  
Kapitel 7: Konklusion  
1. Kapitel 7 opsumerer afhandlingen ved at samle konklusionerne, der blev 
draget i tidligere kapitler for at kunne svare på spørgsmålene angående 
målsætning og skabe en passende model. På grund af databasers struktur 
og måden de er defineret på i database-direktivet, åbner kapitlet med at ar-
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gumentere for, at databaser er generiske bidrag til infrastrukturen. Konse-
kvensen er, at der er økonomiske grunde til at fremhæve behovet for til-
gængelighed, og det er dermed ikke blot et spørgsmål om offentlighedens 
interesse.  
2. Effekten af de tre modeller på producenten, re-producenten og forbrugeren 
evalueres. Disse modeller er: 1. det amerikanske system uden beskyttelse 
af database-indhold; 2. den gældende lov, der bruges i EU; og 3. den fore-
slåede model fra kapitel 5, bestående af ændringer af den gældende lov. 
Disse modeller svarer til reguleringsforslagene fremsat i Kommissionens 
evaluering, der er relevante for database-retten. 
3. Den komparative analyse viser, at den bedste måde at angribe målsæt-
ningsspørgsmålet og afstemme tilgængelighed med tilskyndelse er, at an-
vende den ændrede version af den gældende lovgivning, som det foreslås i 
kapitel 5. Implementeringen vil resultere i et system, der beskytter produ-
centerne i rimeligt omfang, giver en fornuftig grad af tilgængelighed for 
re-producenterne og tilfredsstiller forbrugerbehovet. Vigtigst af alt, ved 
igen at få inkorporeret re-producenterne, kan der skabes en levende data-
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